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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The study seeks to answer the question, why are states adopting revenue 
decoupling in the electricity market, by investigating the relationship between policy 
adoption and attributes of the electricity market, the structure of the state utility 
commissions, and the political climate of the state.  The study examines the period 1978-
2008. Two econometric models, the marginal risk set model and the conditional risk set 
model, are estimated to predict the influence of covariates on the probability of the state 
adopting revenue decoupling in the electricity market.  The models are both variants of 
the Cox proportional hazard model and use different underlying assumptions about the 
nature of adoption of revenue decoupling and when the states are considered to be at risk 
of adoption. 
 Results suggest that market attributes, such as the source of electricity 
generation in the state, state energy intensity, and the distribution of non-public and 
public utilities, significantly influence the adoption of the policy. Also, the method of 
selecting commissioners and the party affiliation of elected officials in the state are 
important factors.  The study concludes by suggestions to improve the implementation 
and evaluation of revenue decoupling in the electricity markets.   
 iii 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 This paper is dedicated to my family and friend for their support and 
encouragement, especially my mother and father. 
 iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
        I thank God for the opportunity and the endurance to complete this project.  I would 
like to thank Dr. Tollison for his advice and guidance throughout the process of 
completing my dissertation.  I would like to thank Dr. Maria Palacas for her guidance and 
inspiration over the past seven  years. I am grateful to my committee members: Dr. 
Hughes, Dr. Stewart Jr., and Dr. Willis, for accepting the task and for exercising patience 
throughout the process. 
        I would like to thank the Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public 
Affairs and the Graduate School at Clemson University for the opportunity and financial 
support. 
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Page 
 
TITLE PAGE ............................................................................................................... i 
 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ ii 
 
DEDICATION ........................................................................................................... iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .......................................................................................... iv 
 
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... v 
 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................... vi 
 
CHAPTER 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1 
 
   Purpose of the Study ............................................................................ 6 
   Revenue Decoupling ............................................................................ 7 
   Remainder of the Study .......................................................................18 
 
 
 II. BACKGROUND LITERATURE ..............................................................21 
 
   Precursors ...........................................................................................25 
   Modern Capture Theorists ...................................................................30 
   Agency Theories .................................................................................37 
   Contributions from Political and Policy Sciences.................................38 
   Revenue Decoupling in Light of the Literature ....................................45 
   Conclusion ..........................................................................................48 
 
 
 III. METHOD .................................................................................................49 
 
   Revenue Decoupling Across the United States ....................................50 
   Statistical Models ................................................................................51 
   Data ....................................................................................................59 
   Variables and Hypotheses ...................................................................63 
   Conclusion ..........................................................................................80 
 
 vi 
 
Table of Contents (Continued) 
 
Page 
 
 IV. RESULTS .................................................................................................81 
 
   Marginal Risk Set Model Results ........................................................81 
   Conditional Risk Set Model Results ....................................................87 
   Hypotheses ..........................................................................................92 
   Conclusion ..........................................................................................97 
 
 
 V. DISCUSSION ...........................................................................................98 
 
   Influence of Market Characteristics .....................................................98 
   Influence of Commission Structure ................................................... 102 
   Influence of Political Climate ............................................................ 106 
   States that Repealed Revenue Decoupling ......................................... 109 
    
 
 VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ................................... 116 
   Recommendations ............................................................................. 116 
   Conclusion ........................................................................................ 124 
   Limitations ........................................................................................ 128 
   Future Research................................................................................. 129 
 
 
APPENDICES ......................................................................................................... 130 
 
 A: Data ........................................................................................................ 131 
 B: Models .................................................................................................... 140 
 C: Econometric Results ............................................................................... 146 
 
REFERENCES......................................................................................................... 157 
 vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table                                                                                                                               Page 
 
 1-1 Traditional Regulation ............................................................................... 8 
 
 1-2 Revenue Decoupling .................................................................................. 9 
 
 3-1 Revenue Decoupling in the U.S. Electricity Industry by State ...................51 
 
       3-2 Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................60 
 
       4-1 Marginal Risk Set Model Results ..............................................................84 
 
       4-2 Conditional Risk Set Model Results ..........................................................89 
 
       5-1 States that Repealed Revenue Decoupling .............................................  110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure                                                                                                                             Page 
 
 1.1 Distribution of Market Surplus—Estimated Sales = Actual Sales ..............13 
 
 1.2 Distribution of Market Surplus—Estimated Sales < Actual Sales ..............15 
 
 1.3 Distribution of Market Surplus—Estimated Sales > Actual Sales ..............16 
 
 
 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The electricity industry is one of the most important sectors in today‟s economy.  
The industry affects every aspect of daily living within the household and the 
marketplace.  Therefore, changes to policies in the electricity markets can have wide 
reaching effects on the economy.  The increasing dependence on electricity makes the 
electricity market the focus of much public attention.  Economic development around the 
world has been facilitated by the availability of electricity, and in most advanced nations 
the availability of instantaneous and uninterrupted electricity service has become 
common place.  The growth and expansion of the industry and the increasing 
interconnectedness and complexity of its operation affect each member of society.  The 
task of monitoring and ensuring the continued development of the industry in the United 
States is carried out at all levels of governments in the form of regulatory commissions 
and other types of political oversight.   
In recent decades, there have been increased pressures on the regulatory 
commissions to be more considerate of the environmental and potential health impacts of 
the electricity market.  Pressures are being exerted due to rising cost of inputs, growing 
demand, and increased interest-group participation in the market. As a result, the role of 
regulatory commissions is of increased importance in the electricity industry.  To address 
the possible negative effects of the electricity market, mechanisms have been developed 
and implemented to promote more efficient use of electricity on both the supply and 
demand sides of the market.   
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The issues in the electricity market are as much a part of its history as they are of 
the industry‟s future.  Phillips (1988) argues that social and political considerations make 
it difficult to reverse longstanding policies and goals in regulated industries.  Addressing 
each issue affects different groups in society in different ways, and none of the potential 
solutions will benefit everyone equally or proportionally.  The development of the 
electricity industry makes it an interesting area to study in public policy as increased 
dependence of all facets of society on electricity places it in the group of industries 
affecting the “public interest”.   
Since the early 1900‟s, the electricity market has been regulated at the state level 
by utility commissions.  Prior to state regulation of the industry, the task was the 
responsibility of the local or municipal government.  Regulation requires the balancing of 
the various interests, and the goal of commissions can be summarized as follows to 
“ensure reliable service at a reasonable price” (National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners—NARUC, 2009).  The state regulatory commissions play a significant 
role on the supply side of market by affecting the amount of capacity available in the 
market.  The rationale behind government regulation of the electricity industry is itself an 
issue that faces the electricity market.  It has been argued that features of the market such 
as—limited storage, instantaneous demand, and decreasing long-run costs—makes the 
industry a candidate for regulation.  Regulation may improve efficiency by limiting the 
number of firms in the market under such circumstances.  The justification for regulation, 
however, does not prescribe the amount of regulation or the level of government that 
should be responsible for regulating the industry (Phillips).  
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Historically, the four stages in the electricity market—generation, transmission, 
distribution and retail—were vertically integrated.  A single company operated all stages 
of supply which enabled them to take advantage of cost-saving activities.  Due to 
restricted entry in the electricity market a profit-maximizing utility could set a monopoly 
price and quantity in the market.  Decreased output and higher prices would be seen in 
the market relative to a competitive market.  There would be increased inefficiency as an 
additional unit of production would be beneficial to society—that is, the marginal 
benefits of an additional unit of production would be greater than its marginal cost of 
production.   
The utility commissions are mainly responsible for monitoring investor-owned 
and operated electricity utilities in the states to reduce monopoly power in the market and 
to maintain reliable quality of service at a reasonable price.  Investor-owned utilities 
account for most of the sales and revenue in the U.S. electricity industry.  They accounted 
for 66% of sales and 67% of revenue in the electricity market and served 71% of the total 
country in 2007 according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2008). 
Therefore, the policies affecting the regulated utilities affect most electricity consumers 
in the United States.   
Regulators use rate of return regulation to set prices based on the cost of service 
and a reasonable profit to investors.  The goal is to increase efficiency through the 
production of socially beneficial units of electricity that may not be produced if the firms 
exercised monopoly power.  The allowed rate of return is estimated using revenue 
requirements and sales figures.  The revenue requirement is based on the fixed and 
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variable costs of the utility—which include plant and equipment, operating costs, fuel 
costs, depreciation and taxes (Suelflow).  The fixed and variable cost of the utility 
determines the cost structure. The sales are estimated using information about the market 
demand and historical patterns including consumption and weather.   These two figures 
are used to determine the average cost of producing electricity and average prices.  
Average cost pricing is the most widely used method of rate of return regulation in the 
electricity market.   
Electricity users are generally placed in three broad groups: residential, 
commercial and industrial, based on the use of electricity and level of consumption.  In 
addition to the differences in the amount of electricity consumed and the demand patterns 
varies for each group.  Estimations of how much electricity will be demanded and when it 
will be demanded are generally predictable based on the weather and past consumption.  
However, unexpected events such as adverse weather may cause significant deviations 
from forecasted consumption patterns.  Therefore, at any point in time there can be stress 
on the existing capacity due to high consumption or increased reserves due to lower than 
expected consumption.  The more concerning of the two is the case of a significant 
increase in demand.  One of the obligations of the utility is to provide reliable and safe 
electricity service.  The traditional rate structure in the electricity market provides little 
incentive for consumers to conserve energy.  A significant increase in demand increases 
the likelihood of blackouts due to capacity constraints.   
In recent years the introduction of competitive forces on the supply side has been 
used to encourage producers to develop and adopt more efficient techniques and to 
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consider a wide range of energy sources. The focus on energy efficiency in the 1970‟s 
was a response to surging oil prices, a major energy source in the production of 
electricity.    The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 was passed 
with the objectives of diversifying energy supplies, encouraging competition and 
promoting conservation (Sioshansi). On the demand side, Demand Side Management 
(DSM) programs were created to promote efficient electricity use and to influence when 
electricity was used (Hirst, Cavanagh, Miller).   
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) defines demand-side 
management as “the planning, implementation, and monitoring of utility activities 
designed to encourage consumers to modify patterns of electricity usage, including the 
timing and level of electricity demand.”  The degree of implementation and the success 
of the programs have varied throughout the states over the past two decades.  Total end-
user consumption of electricity has been approximately 3 billion megawatts annually 
since the year 2000.  Demand-side management programs have decreased annual end-
user consumption by over 20,000 megawatts annually since 2000 (EIA).  There are 
several mechanisms that can be used to achieve the objectives of energy conservation, 
capacity control and promoting utility incentives including: consumer education, pricing, 
and rate design.  Revenue decoupling is a form of rate design that has become the focus 
of much attention in recent years. 
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Purpose Of The Study 
This study conducts duration analysis of regulatory processes in state electricity 
markets.  The study investigates the question: why are states adopting revenue 
decoupling in electricity markets?  The aim of the study is to identify the characteristics 
of the states that influence the decisions to adopt revenue decoupling and offer insights 
about the pattern of diffusion that may take place around the country.  The paper 
contributes to the understanding of the regulatory process and by providing an analysis of 
the driving force behind revenue decoupling by exploring two stages of the policy 
process.   
First, econometric models are developed to predict the influence of market 
characteristics, commission structure, and political environment on the likelihood of 
states adopting revenue decoupling in the electricity market.  Second, states that have 
implemented and then later repealed revenue decoupling policies are analyzed.  I am 
unaware of any previous studies that use this approach to examine revenue decoupling in 
the electricity industry and my hope is to provide evidence that contributes to the 
knowledge and understanding of the regulatory process with respect to revenue 
decoupling. 
To date there are a limited number of states that have adopted revenue decoupling 
in electricity markets.  In addition, with the exception of California which implemented 
revenue decoupling in the early 1980‟s, the ability to conduct research on the impact of 
revenue decoupling over an extended period of time is limited.  Electricity markets are 
undergoing significant restructuring and regulatory changes.  Understanding the impacts 
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of revenue decoupling enhances knowledge about the regulatory process and can assist in 
the development of economic models and help to improve planning.   
 
Revenue Decoupling 
Revenue Decoupling “refers to a class of automatic or semiautomatic annual rate-
making adjustments that insure that utilities collected an agreed-upon level of revenues 
independent of actual sales between rate cases” (Eto, Stoft, Belden).  The mechanism is 
designed to improve the electricity market by providing incentives for both producers and 
consumers to use electricity more efficiently and to better align benefits and costs in the 
market.  The policy seeks to improve rate design and reduce utility disincentive towards 
energy conservation by guaranteeing their approved revenue requirements and to improve 
rate design.  Under current rate design, fixed and variable charges do not appropriately 
recover the fixed and variable costs of the utility.  That is, under current rate design some 
fixed costs are recovered through the variable charges.     
As of August 2009, eight states had revenue decoupling in the electricity market, 
and eleven states were considering revenue decoupling as a rate design (The Regulatory 
Assistance Project—RAP, 2009).  The revenue decoupling methods vary across states as 
mechanisms are based on a per customer basis and based on historical or future sales.  
Periodic adjustments are made by the states to reimburse customers for over-collected 
revenues or to recover lost revenue to the utilities.     
Under traditional regulation the commission determines the amount of revenue 
the utility should collect over a designated period.  Customers are charged a fixed fee 
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during the period, but as discussed earlier, this fixed fee does not cover total fixed costs 
of the utility.  Using the revenue requirement and an estimate of sales, the unit price of 
electricity is obtained.  Actual sales in the period may be higher or lower than estimated 
sales resulting in the utility collecting excess profits or incurring losses.  Traditionally, 
the utility is allowed to keep the excess profits and may recoup at least some of the losses 
in the next rate case.   
Table 1-1 shows a simple example of utility revenue over three years under 
traditional regulation with a rate case that covers two years.  In period 1, estimated and 
actual sales are identical so the utility does not collect excess profit or incur losses.  In the 
following period the sales are lower than estimated and the utility suffers a loss of $200.  
In year 3, the utility files a new rate case with the commission.  The rates are adjusted to 
recover the loss revenue from the prior period.  In addition actual sales are higher than 
estimated in the third period.  In that year, the utility recovers the lost revenue of $200 
and earns additional profit of $240.  Under traditional regulation the utility is allowed to 
keep the excess profits.   
Table 1-1—Traditional Regulation 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Revenue Requirement $2,500 $2,500 $2,700 
Estimated Sales (kwh) 20000 20000 20000 
Fixed Monthly Fee Total $500 $500 $500 
Price/kwh $0.10 $0.10 $0.11 
Actual Sales (kwh) 20,000 18,000 22,000 
Actual Revenue $2,500 $2,300 $2,940 
Profit/Loss 0 ($200) $240 
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Table 1-2 shows a similar scenario in an electricity market with revenue 
decoupling mechanism that is based on the number of customers.  In a revenue-decoupled 
market fixed costs are recovered by a customer charge and variable costs by the demand 
charge.  The customer charge is determined initially by an estimate of the utility‟s 
customer-base.  The example assumes the number of customers and the costs are constant 
in the analysis.  The demand charge is based on consumption during the period.  In the 
first period, the actual sales are greater than estimated; therefore the utility earns a profit 
of $200.  In the next period, which is still governed by the existing rate case, an 
adjustment is made to the customer charge.  The price per unit remains fixed during the 
period at $0.10, and the customers charge is lowered as the customer receives a credit for 
the over collection in the prior period.  In the third period, the utility files a new rate case 
in which new estimates are used to determine price per unit.  In the period estimated sales 
are equal to actual sales so there are no excess profits or loss.   
Table 1-2—Revenue Decoupled 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Revenue Requirement $2,000 $1,800 $2,000 
# of customer 100 100 100 
Customer Charge $1,000 $800 $1,000 
Demand Charge $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 
Estimated Sales (kwh) 10000 10000 10000 
Price/kwh $0.10 $0.10 $0.10 
Actual Sales (kwh) 12000 10000 10000 
Actual Revenue $2,200 $1,800 $2,000 
Adjustment $200 $0 0 
 
Using simple economic analysis, it is shown that the price level and the elasticity 
of demand and supply determine the distribution of market surplus.  The price is a signal 
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to producers to supply to the market, and the cost of production determines when the 
suppliers enter the market.  On the demand side, based on the valuation of electricity, the 
price determines how much consumption takes place at a particular time.  In a market 
system, demand and supply determines the market clearing prices.  The interaction of 
demand and supply also affects the quantity and quality of the product.  In a regulated 
market, the price is set by the regulators, and based on the allowed price, market 
participants determine how much electricity to produce and consume at a given point in 
time.   
Elasticity of demand measures the customers‟ responsiveness to price changes, 
the percentage change in quantity demanded relative to the percentage change in price.  
The availability of substitutes, complements, and the amount of time on hand are 
important factors in determining the elasticity of demand.  The value of electricity at any 
given moment determines how much and what the customer will be willing to trade off 
for an additional unit.  The trade-off is made at the margin.  Supply is assumed to be 
inelastic in the analysis due to capacity availability and the utility‟s obligation to serve.  
For a given demand, supply, and level of production an increase in the price will increase 
the surplus to the producers and decrease consumer surplus.  Therefore, with revenue 
decoupling in place the overall price paid by consumers will depend on aggregate 
consumption during a given period.  Higher consumption increases the likelihood that 
revenue requirements are met and less price adjustments are needed.  Lower consumption 
increases the need for price adjustments to meet revenue requirements.  These are some 
of the risks faced by the market participants.   
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Investors forgo consumption in the present with the expectation of higher 
consumption in the future—that is a return on their investment.  The expected return on 
an investment is a tradeoff between risk and reward.  Risk in economic markets is based 
on the uncertainty surrounding an asset‟s future income stream.  Risk takes various forms 
and is influenced by many factors—some more predictable than others.  Uncertainty 
about a firm‟s income stream determines the amount of interest that is paid to investors.  
High levels of uncertainty require higher interest rates, all else the same.  Investors 
assume the risk of the company when they purchase the firm‟s assets.   
The risk faced by investors in the utility industry is lower relative to the risk faced 
by investors in firms with similar risk factors in unregulated industries.  The revenue 
requirement reduces the company‟s exposure to risk by adding predictability to the 
income stream of the utilities but does not eliminate all risk factors.  Under traditional 
regulation, if sales are lower than projected, the lost revenue may be recovered through 
the rate case process.  In a revenue-decoupled electricity market adjustments are made 
between rate cases to ensure that the utilities collect the designated revenue.  Therefore, 
risk to the producers and investors are further reduced with revenue decoupling.   
The effect of revenue decoupling on the risk faced by the consumer is 
indeterminate as some risk factors are decreased while other factors may be increased.  
The consumer no longer faces the risk of paying excess profits, excess meaning above the 
revenue requirement, as the actual revenue is matched with the revenue requirement.  
Consumers still face the risk associated with exogenous shocks to the market that may 
affect demand or supply.  In addition consumers may be exposed to increased 
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management risk as the utilities may have reduced incentive to monitor market 
conditions.  The current regulatory practice is to address non-fuel cost in rate cases.  
Therefore, recovering lost revenue associated with increased non-fuel costs may be 
delayed for years until the rate case is heard.  The company has incentives to operate 
more efficiently as recovery of lost revenue is delayed.  Until revenues are recovered in 
the next filing the management has an incentive to monitor market conditions more 
closely to present a favorable bottom line.  Revenue decoupling allows between rate case 
adjustments to match actual and required revenue.  Automatic adjustment of revenue may 
reduce the utilities‟ incentive to be efficient.  The relative magnitudes of the changes in 
the risk factors will determine the how much more or less risk the consumer faces in a 
decoupled electricity market.   
The stylized examples used in the following analysis assume constant marginal 
cost of production.  The assumption is made for simplification and does not materially 
alter the results of the analysis. It is shown that in a market with revenue decoupling 
variations in sales can affect consumer surplus positively or negatively, but producer 
surplus is relatively unaffected.   
 For each utility there is a maximum capacity level at which they can produce 
electricity.  The reliability of the electricity system decreases as this limit is approached.  
It is the regulators‟ duty to enforce system reliability by having adequate capacity.  The 
average cost to the company is estimated based on, among other things, the amount of 
investment in capacity.  Estimated sales are used to set revenue requirements and the 
regulated price is based on the average cost of production and a reasonable profit.   As a 
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result, every unit of electricity that is sold produces some level of profit for the utility; 
giving the utility the incentive to sell additional units.   
 Under traditional regulation, when sales are greater than estimated, the utility 
retains the excess revenue; however, when sales are less than estimated, the utility may 
recover lost revenue through the rate setting proceedings. The nature of electricity pricing 
determines the distribution of consumer and producer surplus.  The following diagrams 
show how consumer and producer surplus are affected when these changing conditions. 
Figure 1.1 depicts the case when estimated sales are equal to actual sales for the 
period.  The diagram shows the maximum level of output that the utility can produce,     
QMAX.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Distribution of Market Surplus—Estimated Sales = Actual Sales. 
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The estimated sales, QEST, are used to determine the revenue requirement.  The diagram 
also shows actual level of sales, QACT, over the period.  For simplification the assumption 
is made that marginal cost of production is constant—average cost (AC).  The average 
cost is spread across all the available capacity of the utility and is therefore determined by 
the maximum quantity of electricity that can be produced.  The estimated sales for the 
year are used to determine the price (PREG) in the market which is the average cost of 
production plus a reasonable profit to the utility.  The diagram shows that for every unit 
of production, the difference between the average cost and the price produces a profit of π 
to the utility.  The consumer surplus and producer surplus are also highlighted in the 
diagram.  The consumer surplus is represented by the area shaded in yellow.  Consumer 
surplus is the difference between the customer‟s valuation, given by the demand curve, 
and the regulated price paid in the market.  The producer surplus, represented by the area 
shaded green, is the difference between the regulated price and average cost.   
 Figure 1.2 depicts the case when actual sales for the period are greater than 
estimated sales.  The estimated consumer and producer surpluses are the same as depicted 
in Figure 1.1 because the same level of estimated sales are used to set the price initially.   
When actual sales are greater than estimated both consumer and producer surplus are 
increased.  The market demand shifts to the right and the additional consumer surplus is 
the red area.  The blue area shows the increase in producer surplus when actual sales is 
greater than estimated.  The utility collects revenue greater than the revenue requirement.  
When the revenue requirements are exceeded for the period and under traditional 
regulation the utility retains the excess profits.     
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Market Surplus—Estimated Sales < Actual Sales. 
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fixed and variable costs and the variation in variable costs.  If variable costs are low and 
relatively stable then the profit on an additional unit will be higher for the utility. 
 Figure 1.3 shows the case when sales is less than estimated for the period.  The 
lower sales are caused by decreased demand which shifts the demand curve in to the left. 
Consumer surplus decreases by the red area relative to the estimated surplus.  Revenue 
requirements are not met when sales are lower than estimated and the utility does not 
earn the designated level of profits.  The reduced profit is represented by the purple area.  
Under traditional regulation the utility is allowed to file a rate case to attempt recovery of 
these costs.  If the recovery of the lost profits is granted, which is normally, the utility is 
granted a rate increase to cover the losses incurred in prior periods.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Distribution of Market Surplus—Estimated Sales > Actual Sales. 
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 Revenue decoupling is designed to be revenue neutral, and the cost of electricity 
is automatically adjusted to ensure the revenue requirements are met.  Consumer surplus 
is affected under traditional regulation or revenue decoupling when cost when the price 
of electricity increase, all else the same.  A major difference in the impact to the customer 
is the timing of the adjustment.  In a revenue decoupled market the adjustments and the 
effects on surplus would occur more quickly and possibly more frequently in the market 
than under traditional market regulation.  In all the cases presented, consumer surplus is 
affected by variation in sales while producer surplus is relatively unaffected.  Revenue 
decoupling reduces the risk faced by the producers as the variability in their income 
stream is eliminated.  The change in risk to the consumer is dependent on the variability 
of demand and supply in the market.   
 Despite the insinuation that utilities should be indifferent to revenue decoupling, 
they have a major reason for opposing the policy.  Eto, Stoft and Belden (1997) showed 
that the portion of total revenue for the utilities that is attributed to revenue decoupling is 
relatively small.  Over the past decades economic growth and increased demand for 
electricity services has resulted in increased sales.  Revenue decoupling essentially puts a 
cap on the revenue of the utility, which under current regulatory practice is potentially 
limitless.  Therefore utilities, in general, may be opposed to the policy.  There is one 
condition under which utilities may support revenue decoupling.  In markets where sales 
are consistently lower than estimated, utilities may be inclined to accept a policy that 
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guarantees increase revenues.  Sales may be below estimate for some utilities when there 
is significant competition in the market.    
 In today‟s economy increased demand and increased dependence for electricity 
service has increased the negative societal impact of the industry.  Regulators seek to use 
revenue decoupling to remove utility disincentives towards energy conservation and to 
improve rate design in the market. Revenue decoupling has been implemented around the 
United States with varying results in the past; however, regulators have expressed 
renewed interest in the policy.  The presentation thus far indicates that changes to the 
electricity market through the regulatory process have significant implications for all 
members of society.  The simple economic analysis shows that some groups will be 
benefited by the policy and some groups will be burdened with the costs.  The study 
seeks to identify what characteristics of a state influences regulators at the utility 
commissions to adopt revenue decoupling in the electricity industry.   
 
Remainder of the Study 
My analysis of revenue decoupling begins with an overview the literature on 
regulation and the theory of revenue decoupling in Chapter 2. The overview focuses on 
the works of authors mainly in the area of economics and political and policy science.  
The chapter highlights the use of positive economics in explaining and predicting 
political outcomes.  Positive economic theory is centered on the use of testable 
hypotheses to understand how income is transferred among groups in society. My aim is 
not to be comprehensive but to give sufficient background so that the reader can 
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understand the various literatures and methods developed in later chapters. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the revenue decoupling literature.     
 In Chapter 3, I develop the methodology used in the study.  The study uses 
marginal risk set and conditional risk set models to examine the relationship between 
state characteristics and the adoption of revenue decoupling in the electricity market.  
Three specifications of each model are tested in the study.  Specification (1) examines the 
effect of market characteristics on the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted.  
Specification (2) extends specification (1) by incorporating the effect of commission 
structure.   Finally, specification (3) examines the effect of market characteristics, 
commission structure, and the state political climate on the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling being adopted in the state electricity market.   The available techniques of 
analysis are discussed, and the criteria for selection of the method used in the study are 
presented.  Summary statistics and variable descriptions are also provided.   
  The results from the models are presented in Chapter 4 of the study.  Estimates 
from the regression models are presented.  There is a comparison of the hypotheses and 
results and a brief discussion of the parameter estimates.   
 Chapter 5 analyzes the results from the regression models.  Based on the results, 
inferences are made about why states are adopting revenue decoupling in electricity 
markets around the United States.  An analysis of the states that implemented and 
repealed revenue decoupling is conducted including the conditions that may have led to 
the policy being repealed.   
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Chapter 6 concludes the study and highlights potential areas of future research.  
Recommendations are made based on the results along with a discussion of the limitation 
of the study.   
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
The intervention of government into commercial activities has become common place 
in society.  Regulation of economic activities in the interest of the public has been 
presented, by theorists and practitioners, as a means of maximizing social welfare.  
However, in many cases regulation is sought by specific groups in society for their 
benefit at the expense of other groups.  Regulation is political in nature, and by design the 
political process pits interests in society against one another.  Legislation is the result of 
successful bargaining by groups, or the exercise of dominance by some groups over 
others.  The governmental system is designed to balance the various interests in a manner 
that maintains civility and promotes progress—however measured.  The evolution of 
governmental systems is the result of competing pressures by various groups in society.   
Since the 1900s, several theories have sought to describe and predict the outcomes of 
regulatory policies.  These include: public interest theory, capture theory, the economic 
theory of regulation, political theories of government and the interest group theory of 
government.  Each theory offers some insights about the importance of the different 
factors, the potential impacts of the interplay of the factors, the conditions under which 
these factors are significant and the possible outcomes that may arise.  For each theory 
the origin, the process, intended effects and outcomes offer varying explanations for what 
is observed in society.     
The literature covered in this chapter is a subset of the literature investigating 
regulatory processes and is not an attempt at a comprehensive review.  The authors and 
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material covered highlight some of the contributions that have been made towards 
understanding regulatory processes.  The literature of regulatory policy is vast, and the 
main aim of the review is to discuss some of the theoretical and empirical foundations for 
the investigation and models used in the analysis.  The paper seeks to use positive 
economic theory to formulate testable hypotheses about the regulatory process.  The 
paper develops several hypotheses about policy change in electricity markets in an 
attempt to indentify some of the influential factors behind the observed changes.   
There are two broad hypotheses that will be tested based on the literature.  One is a 
capture theory hypothesis which suggests that regulation is formulated for the benefit of 
specific interests in society.  The implication of a capture theory hypothesis is that the 
regulators are the agents of the industries which they regulate, and through the political 
process regulated industries are able to affect wealth redistribution in their favor by 
obtaining in transfers from consumers and other producers in the market.  The alternative 
hypothesis is based on public interest theory which proposes that government 
intervention is the most efficient means of correcting market failures.  The public interest 
hypothesis suggests that through the regulatory process regulators are able to reduce 
inefficiencies and increase social welfare by improving the allocation of resources in 
society (Pigou, 1938).   
The theoretical grounds for my study are derived from economic and policy science 
literature on regulation.  The economic literature covers an array of areas from welfare 
analysis to positive economic analysis.  Understanding of the political process is 
increased by synthesizing these areas as political decisions have significant welfare 
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implications and also lend themselves to testable hypotheses.  Governments may be 
designed to promote the social welfare of the constituency, but political outcomes are 
influenced by both political and economic variables, producing observable causal 
relationships which allow predictability.  To increase understanding of the political 
process scholars have sought to distinguish the characteristics of the participants and the 
mechanisms used to make political decisions.   
The theories explaining government actions and political outcomes can be placed into 
two broad categories: normative theories and positive theories.  Normative theories are 
based largely on how and why public actions should be taken.  The positive theories of 
government seek to explain what is observed in society. The theories examine the 
policymaking process by making specific assumptions about the individual participants—
citizens and politicians—within the various institutional settings to predict policy 
outcomes.  In a democratic society the legislative process has similar characteristics to a 
market.  There are vendors offering similar goods and services, and there are consumers 
who are interested in acquiring these goods and services.  In the legislative process the 
politicians are the vendors and the citizens are the consumers.  The citizens‟ currency of 
exchange is their vote and political contributions while the politicians offer goods and 
services in the form of policies.  Similar to the market, both the citizens and the 
politicians seek to obtain the highest values given their levels of resources.    
The political theories of government explain policy outcomes based on the activities 
and influences of specific interests in society.  The political process is comprised of 
interest groups placing demands on government officials and bureaus.  Interest groups 
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have access to public officials and are able to make policy requests in return for political 
support.  By identifying the participants, the design and structure of the process, and the 
relationships between participants, testable hypotheses can be derived about the political 
process.  Empirical tests of the hypotheses enable scholars to make predictions of policy 
outcomes.  The political process in comprised of different actors seeking to translate their 
ideals and interests into political action.       
Individuals are categorized based on common beliefs and desires.  The perceptions of 
the members influence how the problems are interpreted and what forms the solutions 
take.  The groups that specialize in issue areas and through specialization are able to more 
effectively exert their influence.  The design and structure of the regulatory process 
determines how effectively groups are able to influence outcomes.  The openness of the 
process, the technical complexity, and availability of resources dictates whether groups 
act individually or collectively to affect political outcomes.  Competition among interest 
groups generates benefits that accrue to the more politically effective groups and places 
burdens on less effective groups.  Despite the competition among groups, maximization 
of benefits in this political environment at times requires the formation of coalitions to 
increase political effectiveness.   
Prior to the development of these modern theories social scientists investigated the 
legislative processes and derived explanations of observed outcomes. These earlier 
theories laid the ground work for modern social scientists.  The presence of competing 
interests, the susceptibility of public officials to the influence of these groups, and the 
redistribution of welfare among interest groups have long been recognized in the 
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legislative process.  Over the years, investigation of the effects on the political system by 
these factors has increased our knowledge and understanding of governments.  
 
Precursors 
In the 17
th
 century, Adam Smith recognized the ability of specific interests to 
influence political outcomes in the mercantile system.  Smith discerned that the high 
duties imposed on certain imports secured monopoly profits to some domestic industries.  
He argued, in The Wealth of Nations, that although a limited number of circumstances 
warranted regulation by the government, regulation does not augment the sum total, 
either of its industry, or of its revenue (Smith).  Smith noted that the concentration of 
certain groups, the merchants and manufacturers, relative to other groups in society, 
allowed them to mobilize to convince Parliament to impose duties for their private 
benefit under the pretence that the regulations were socially beneficial.  He stated that the 
restricted trade would continue in society because the private interest would seek to resist 
free trade (Smith). 
Smith argued that “[c]onsumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; 
and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary 
for promoting that of the consumer” (625).  He criticized the mercantile system because 
“the interest of the consumer is almost constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; and it 
seems to consider production, and not consumption, as the ultimate end and object of all 
industry and commerce” (625).  Smith developed the argument further by acknowledging 
the presence of competition among producers for favorable regulation.  He stated that in 
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the mercantile regulations, “the interest of the manufacturers was most dominant while 
the interest of the consumers and that of some other sets of producers were sacrificed” 
(626). 
Much later, Arthur Bentley analyzed interest group activities in his book The 
Process of Government.  In the analysis he argued that the task of studying the forms of 
social life is centered on an analysis of groups.  Political groups lend themselves to 
analysis by scholars because they are highly representative and are based on ideals that 
are more clearly defined than other groups.  Bentley asserted that groups and interest are 
intimately intertwined and cannot be separated.  He stated that “[w]hen we succeed in 
isolating  an interest group the only way to find out what it is going to do, indeed, the 
only way to be sure we have isolated an interest group is to watch its progress” (214).  By 
the comparison of many groups scholars are able to make predictions about the “relation” 
between men which is the raw material we attempt to study.   Bentley stated that “[w]e 
must get our raw material before us in the form of purposive action, valued in terms of 
other purposive action” (Bentley). 
In describing the practical nature of the raw material, Bentley argued that the raw 
material “can only be found in the actually performed legislating-administering-
adjudicating activities of the nation and in the streams and currents of activity that gather 
the people and rush into these spheres” (Bentley).  To study the relationships between 
different groups in society, it is necessary to investigate the apparatus by which interest 
groups achieve their desired objectives.  Bentley argued that it is necessary to understand 
the mechanism by which some groups are able to dominate other groups and actualize 
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their interest from mere ideas into outcomes (Bentley).  He suggested that government 
can be considered as an adjustment or balancing of interests stating that all “phenomena 
of government are phenomena of groups pressing one another, forming one another, and 
pushing out new groups and group representatives (the organs or agencies of 
government) to mediate the adjustments.  It is only as we isolate these group activities, 
determine their representative values, and get the whole process stated in terms of them, 
that we approach to a satisfactory knowledge of government” (269). 
The importance of interest groups in governmental activities increased in the 
second half of the 20
th
 century.  Commenting on the observed trends, Truman stated that 
“the rapid multiplication of organized groups; an explicit or more frequently, an implicit 
suggestion that the institutions of government have no alternative but passive submission 
to specialized group demand; and an admonition that the stability or continuance of 
democracy depends upon a spontaneous, self-imposed restraint in advancing group 
demands” (Truman, 1971).  Truman attributed the rise in the number of interest groups to 
increasing complexity and interdependence of society and diversity of social patterns.  
The development of the political process cultivated an environment in which collective 
action presents an effective way of achieving desired outcomes.  Scholars of the political 
process acknowledge the importance of overcoming limitations to group actions—such as 
information costs and free-riding.  Truman argued that alliances are formed in the 
political arena based on shared attitudes.  The mobilization of groups based on shared 
beliefs allows them to become a part of the governmental institution and enables them to 
achieve their objectives.    
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 In discussing the difficulties of political prediction, Truman stressed the 
importance of the dynamics of human relationships in political outcomes.  He stated that 
group powers are exhibited in two ways: power over the members of the group and the 
exertion of power over other groups in society (Truman).  The effectiveness of groups is 
dependent on the ability of a group to control its members and to exert power over other 
groups.  In addition, the group must have access to the government to make effective 
claims.  Truman described the importance of access to the government as belonging to 
three categories: factors relating to group strategic position, factors associated with the 
internal characteristics of the group, and factors of the governmental institution.  Truman 
contended that government “decisions are the resultant of effectiveness of access by 
various interests, of which organized groups may only be a segment” (Truman, 1971). 
 The observations and findings of Smith, Bentley and Truman, among others, laid 
the ground work for the development of modern theories about government regulation 
and the political process.  By extending and refining these works, modern theorists have 
been able to develop testable hypotheses to investigate the relationships among groups, 
their influence and political outcomes.   
Yet another precursor of the modern literature in regulation is the economist, A.C. 
Pigou.  Pigou developed the theory of welfare economics of regulation, which is the basis 
for the justification of the public interest theory of regulation.  In his book, The 
Economics of Welfare, Pigou sought to offer a measurable feature of social well-being, 
social welfare, that would form the basis for determining the desirability of changes in 
policy.  In his analysis, Pigou acknowledges the indivisibility of activities in society and 
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the effects of these activities on the national dividend—the measure of social welfare.  He 
argued that in cases where actions taken by individuals decrease social welfare, the 
remedies can be found through government intervention.  He stated that “when the inter-
relations of the various private persons affected are highly complex, the Government may 
find it necessary to exercise some means of authoritative control” (Pigou).  Pigou 
suggested that when self motivated individuals take actions that are counterproductive to 
the social welfare, then it is “possible for the State, if it so chooses, to remove the 
divergence in any field by „extraordinary encouragements‟ or „extraordinary restraints‟ 
upon investments in that field.  The most obvious forms which these encouragements and 
restraints may assume are, of course, those of bounties and taxes” (Pigou).   
Pigou argued market coordination could not solve these problems because the costs 
and benefits were not fully accounted for by individuals.  However, governments could 
assume the role of coordination and improve the resource allocation through the 
implementation of taxes and subsidies.  The theory endorses government forces based on 
the belief that the improvements to social welfare are greater under government 
intervention than in uncontrolled markets.  He acknowledged there are limits to the use of 
government intervention to improve social welfare. However, he argued that 
improvement in the forms of governing and the appointment of special commissions are 
able to overcome the limitations. By appointing qualified members to public office with 
specified purposes, agencies can be created that are not subject to the pressure of private 
interests.   
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The empirical evidence since the early 1900s is mixed with respect to public interest 
theory.  The development of governments has become closely tied to the economic 
interests of society.  The notion that elected or appointed officials are isolated from the 
pressure of economic interest does not seem to be viable. Therefore, the ability for the 
government to act independently of economic interest is limited as public officials have 
become increasingly susceptible to the desires of specific interests as these interests are 
often instrumental in helping them to attain office.  The welfare costs associated with 
government failure has increased significantly and therefore achieving improvement to 
social welfare through government intervention is costly.  Government is defined as the 
“inability of the government to act primarily in the interest of its citizens (Gruber).  In 
other words, government failure means that institutional analysis is more complex than 
simply assuming a perfect government.   
 
Modern Capture Theorists 
Stigler (1971) offered a theory of government regulation that provided and tested 
hypotheses of the regulatory process.  The economic theory of regulation formalized the 
idea that governments institute policies in return for political support.  Stigler (1971) 
offered a positive theory of regulation with the tasks of identifying the participants in the 
market for regulation, predicting the form regulation will take, and the resulting 
allocation of resources.  Stigler asserted that “regulation is acquired by the industry and is 
designed and operated primarily for its benefits” (3).  The model posits that the state has 
monopoly over the supply of regulation and that industries will demand policies in one of 
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four forms: subsidies, control of entry, policies that affect substitutes and complements, 
and price control.   
 Stigler investigated several characteristics of the group: size, per capita income, 
concentration of the group, and concentration of the costs to the opposing groups.  The 
effectiveness of a group in obtaining favorable regulation is dependent on the 
characteristics of the group relative to other groups demanding legislation.  An important 
implication of group effectiveness is that the success depends on its relative effectiveness 
not its absolute effectiveness.  The ability of a group to obtain favorable regulation is a 
function of how effectively the group can organize relative to the opposition.  
Overcoming information asymmetry and free-riding costs is essential to the effectiveness 
of a group.  Each group potentially faces the same costs of organization; however, the 
group that is better able to reduce the costs relative to the benefits will have a higher 
effective demand and will have an increased likelihood of success.   
 Posner (1974) examined the theories of economic regulation dating back to the 
formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the late 1800s.  He critiqued the 
public interest assumptions of market inefficiencies and costless government regulation 
as the justification for regulation of private industries.  Posner argued that a “serious 
problem with any version of the public interest theory is that the theory contains no 
linkage or mechanism by which a perception of the public interest is translated into 
legislative action” (340).  Posner emphasized that the evidence of regulation does not 
support the theory.   
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Posner argued that the regulatory process “can be expected to operate with 
reasonable efficiency to achieve its ends” (350).  An important implication of Stigler‟s 
model is that industries will demand regulatory policies from the government when they 
are unable to secure those benefits independently.  Posner refuted the argument that the 
regulators are captured by suggesting that regulation is the result of coalitions between 
the regulator and the regulated. With some compromise on both the parts of the 
regulators and the firms, the outcome is higher profits than those expected in a 
competitive market accruing to the firm and lower than monopoly prices offered to the 
customers in the market.  Posner highlighted an important shortcoming of capture 
theory—including the Stigler model—that is, the model‟s inability to address the 
situation when a single agency regulates firms from different and competing industries.   
Peltzman (1976) generalized the Stigler model to account for competing interests 
and the effectiveness of demand for regulation.  The model focuses on group size and the 
costs of the political process to demonstrate that the use of the political process limits 
“not only the size of the dominant group but also their gains” (213).  In Peltzman‟s model 
the regulator seeks to maximize net votes when policies are developed.  The model 
accounts for the offsetting features of the size of the group—that is, the larger groups 
provide more support but benefits per capita are a decreasing function of the number of 
members.   
An important result from the Peltzman model is that depending on the relative 
demands, demand elasticities and tax responsiveness—the benefited group cannot be 
limited to a single economic interest (219).  The finding refuted the theory that regulators 
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are completely captured by the regulated industry and also provided strong evidence 
against the regulated industry obtaining “full” monopoly profits.  Decisions are made 
based on the criteria that votes gained and lost are equated at the margin.  A vote-
maximizing regulator does not set out to win all the votes in the industry, but devises 
polices so that a majority is won among competing groups—the goal of the regulator is to 
maximize net votes.  The vote-maximizing behavior of the regulator results in a “more 
uniform treatment of consumers than the unregulated market by weakening the link 
between prices and cost and demand conditions” (239).  
 Jarrell (1978) investigated the electricity market and found support for the 
proposition put forth by Peltzman, namely, that regulation will occur first in competitive 
or pure monopoly industries.  Jarrell developed a model of rate and entry in the electricity 
market to investigate determinants of the demand for regulation.  Prior to 1907, the 
electricity markets were regulated by the municipalities, and the markets were 
characterized by fierce competition among the utilities.  During the early 1900s, there 
was considerable consolidation in the electricity market, and the potential for monopoly 
control at the local level provided the justification for state regulation in the electricity 
market.  Jarrell stated that proponents argued that state commissions would be better able 
to monitor and control monopoly activities (275).  
 His findings suggest that the unregulated market surplus is an important 
determinant of the demand for regulation.  Politically effective groups that are unable to 
secure benefits outside of the political process will use their political collateral to gain 
benefits through regulation.  Jarrell argued that in “general, regulation is demanded when 
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it can confer upon the politically powerful interest group some benefits or advantage that 
the group could not secure as cheaply on its own” (280).  The model supported the 
hypothesis that there was higher demand for regulation by states with more competitive 
electricity markets under municipal regulation.  The earliest adopters of commission 
regulation were states with lower prices and profits and therefore the potential for greater 
redistribution of market surplus.   According to the theory of economic regulation, the 
results found by Jarrell (1978) are not surprising.  The theory suggests that regulation will 
favor the more politically effective interest groups—for a given amount of market surplus 
and cost of organizing, the smaller the group, the larger the per capita gain from 
regulation.   
Competition among interest groups has been used to explain the patterns of 
regulatory decisions in society.  Tollison (1998) stated that the goal of an interest group 
theory of government is to explain all legislation and governmental activities using 
interest group principles.  Becker (1983) provided a model of interest groups competing 
for political influence. The model showed that the relative effectiveness of pressure 
groups in gaining political influence determines the structure of taxes and subsidies and 
achieves political equilibrium in the market.  The groups are able to achieve political 
equilibrium and maximization of transfers by efficiently allocating resources given the 
political productivity of their expenditures and the behavior of the other groups (372). 
In Becker‟s model, the deadweight loss produced by competing groups plays an 
important role in the determination of political equilibrium.  Deadweight loss is the 
reduction in of total surplus due to inefficiency (Pindyck and Rubinfeld,).  The 
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assumptions of income maximizing behavior and the government budget constraint 
ensures that interest groups will equate costs and benefits at the margin and ensures that 
political equilibrium is achieved in the model.    Therefore, each group is assumed to 
recognize that deadweight losses reduce the economic value of the benefits received from 
competition. Deadweight losses diminish the benefits to the winning groups and increase 
the costs to the losing groups.  Becker stated that increased deadweight losses cause the 
optimal pressure by one group to increase when the pressure by the other group 
decreases.  
The market for regulation is characterized by similar traits to those described by 
Becker in the market for taxes and subsidies.  Interest groups demand regulation to 
maximize the net income of the members of the group.  In similar token, the groups the 
bear the burden of regulation attempt to minimize the effects by making expenditures to 
this end.  One of the major limitation of the theory of economic regulation—as put forth 
by Stigler 1971) and Peltzman (1976)—was that the effects of regulation were assumed 
to be distributed proportional to their market share—that is, proportional to profits and 
costs.  Several studies (Marvel 1979, Maloney and McCormick 1982) have suggested that 
firms within the industry have heterogeneous cost structures, and therefore, regulation 
may be used as a means of reallocating wealth within the industry.  Regulation increases 
costs relative to profits disproportionately to some firms in the industry, driving the high 
cost firms out of the industry and increasing the market share of the relatively low-cost 
firms.   
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Becker‟s model does not treat explicitly the role of the politicians in the market.  
Becker acknowledges the importance of the politicians and bureaucrats; however, in the 
model they are assumed to carry out the collective interests of pressure groups.  Crain and 
McCormick (1984) provided a model of the regulatory process in which the regulators 
are identified as an interest group seeking wealth transfers in addition to reelection.  In 
their bids for reelection the regulators accept contributions from various interests to 
finance campaigning expenses.  Crain and McCormick (1984) develop a majority-
generating function that uses price and profit to represent consumer surplus and producer 
surplus and a variable that accounts for wealth transfer to the regulator through legal and 
illegal contributions (289).  The model assumes that legal contributions do not alter the 
expected distribution of welfare. However, illegal contributions have both negative and 
positive effects on the regulators‟ welfare.  Illegal contributions increase regulators‟ 
wealth but also increase the likelihood of being removed from office; therefore, the 
regulator seeks to maximize net benefits of transfers.   
The interest group theory of government suggests several attributes of the 
political process that can be used to make predictions about political decision making.  
The positive theory presents hypotheses about various aspects of government activities; 
one such area is the legislative process.  Tollison (1988) asserted that the economic 
theory of legislation focuses on the testable propositions offered by interest theory of 
government.  The author characterized the economic theory of legislation in terms of 
demand and supply for legislation and draws attention to the importance of the policy 
brokers in attaining equilibrium in the market for legislation. The theory facilitates 
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predictions about the rate of legislative output and legislative outcomes based on 
legislative inputs and constitutional constraints.   
 
Agency Theories 
A model of the legislative process was formulated by Weingast and Moran 
(1983).  The authors extend the economic model of regulation by investigating the effects 
of the legislature on the decision making process of the Federal Trade Commission.  
Weingast and Moran (1983) argue that “a complete theory of political allocation must 
have a model of the legislature to complement our models of demand for legislature.  Put 
simply, we need to know how these mechanisms work” (770).  By examining the 
committee system in the United States Congress, Weingast and Moran investigated the 
ability of the legislature to monopolize specific issues by trading off influence over many 
areas to have greater influence over a specialized policy area.  The authors showed that 
the legislature significantly impacted the type of cases investigated by the Federal Trade 
Commission and the resulting policies through the preferences of the committee members 
and the budgetary process.  Their findings refute the assertion of bureaucratic 
independence and discretion in policymaking. 
Laffont and Tirole (1991) developed a theory of regulatory capture using an 
agency-theoretic model in which Congress is the principal, the agency is the supervisor 
and the regulated firms are the agents.  The model highlights the importance of 
information asymmetry and the relationship between politicians and the bureaucracy.  
The authors asserted that regulatory agencies and the interest groups develop 
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longstanding relationships from working together resulting in informal agreements that 
promote collusive behavior.  The agency reports to Congress information gathered about 
the firms.  They argued that Congress can develop incentive schemes for the supervisor, 
regulated group and non-regulated groups to reduce the regulatory stakes—decreasing the 
likelihood of collusion between the supervisor and the agent.  The model suggests that 
agency discretion is reduced when the interests, both regulated and non-regulated, are 
organized.  That is, competition among organized interest groups increases the efficiency 
in the regulatory process by limiting the discretionary powers of the agencies. 
 
Contributions from Political and Policy Sciences 
Similar to the economic theories on government, policy science theories make 
predictions about group activities by making assumptions about the environments in 
which the decisions are made, the participants, relationships between the participants and 
the power structure in the political process.  These theorists use frameworks to identify 
variables, develop models of the political process and test hypotheses.  The modern 
theories are based largely on the work of political scientists who investigated the 
activities of interest groups and their relationships with politicians and government 
bureaus. 
Downs (1957) formulated a model of political rationality using an economic 
approach.  In An Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs postulated a model of 
democratic government in which politicians are assumed to rational and self-interested 
and their main goal is to obtain the benefits of holding office.  These individuals form 
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coalitions—political parties—and create policies in order to win elections.  The parties 
compete to win elections by offering a set of policies that provides more relative benefits 
to voters.  Downs makes predictions about the behavior of politicians and citizens in an 
environment shaped by uncertainty.  The impact of information costs is used to describe 
and predict the behavior of the citizens and the government. Voters are unable to obtain 
full information about candidates and parties and therefore make decisions based on 
incomplete information.   
In formulating policies, the political parties make decisions that equate votes 
gained to votes lost at the margin to maximize political support.  Downs offers several 
testable propositions about party motivation and citizen-rationality.  The theory predicts 
the types of policies that will arise in the democratic society, the actions that can be 
expected from parties and party members and the behaviors that can be expected from 
citizen groups in society.  One of the major implications of Downs‟ theory is that 
politicians are unable to create policies to meet the needs of each individual or group in 
society.  Therefore, policies are made to serve the interest of specific groups.   
 The theory of regulatory capture provides an explanation of how policies serve 
the interest of specific groups in society.  Capture theory purports that regulators enact 
policies to serve the interest of the groups under their jurisdiction.  The development of 
capture theory in the field of political science provided useful insights regarding the 
intent and the effects of government policy.  Lowi (1964) offered a typology of 
government policies.  He identified three types of government policies: distributive, 
regulatory, and redistributive.  For each area Lowi discussed the applicable units of 
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analysis, the political relationships that may arise, and the structure of power and 
stability.  
Lowi asserted that the regulatory arena is better understood at the group level and 
can be characterized as a coalition of shared interests and bargaining.  The power 
structure is pluralistic and requires a balancing of interests.  He argued that “the impact of 
regulatory decisions is clearly one of directly raising costs and/or reducing or expanding 
alternatives of private individuals” (16).  The statement posits that regulatory policies by 
the government are contrived by individuals attempting to raise costs to others or provide 
benefits to private individuals.  Lowi further argued that the policies affect similar 
individuals in the same way, and therefore the aggregated effect is at the sectoral level of 
society.  The political process creates significant competition among the groups in society 
as they vie for the benefits and attempt to avoid the burdens of the policies.   
Based on the work of Lowi and Truman, the theories of the policy process 
examine the pluralistic nature of government decision-making.  The theories describe 
public policy making as the activities of special interest groups working closely with the 
bureaucracy to make decisions.  The models suggest that policies are made by groups 
sharing a common view about the problems of society and the potential solutions.  The 
existence of many diverse interests in society requires groups to form coalitions to 
achieved desired outcomes.  Policy theorists argue that the policy process is characterized 
by significant bargaining and compromise.  The issue areas or policy subsystems are 
dominated by individuals or groups working together over many years.  The resulting 
relationships are formal and informal alliances forged along the lines of common beliefs 
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that are relatively stable over time, but are influenced by factors both internal and 
external to the subsystem.  The extent to which conditions affect the internal dynamics of 
the group or the degree to which external factors change the environment determines the 
rate at which change occurs in the policy process and the extent to which predictions are 
possible.   
Evidence shows that the policy process in the United States is characterized by 
incremental changes to existing policies which is attributed to the design of the political 
system.  Periodically, however, there are significant changes to existing policies. Scholars 
of political processes argue that the rate of policy change is affected by many factors 
including: political institutions, the interactions of the interest groups in the policy 
subsystem and changes in the external environment.  Decisions by regulatory agencies 
may occur swiftly due to changes in social factors—such as increased severity of the 
issue or emergency situations.  However, regulatory decisions are generally characterized 
by slow changes over a relatively long period of time—this argument is supported by 
regulatory lag at government agencies.   
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) developed a framework to explain problems 
that involve substantial goal conflicts, important technical disputes and multiple actors at 
different levels of government (321).  Advocacy coalition theory explains changes in 
policy subsystems that occur over a long period of time.  Coalitions are formed by 
individuals specializing in specific policy areas that represent different interest groups 
and shared core beliefs that are relatively stable over time.  The framework assumes that 
governmental authorities make decisions about institutional rules, resource allocation and 
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political appointments.  Coalitions use resources to exert pressures to influence decisions 
by governmental authorities.   It is assumed that policy changes in the subsystems result 
from policy-oriented learning (learning from experience and making adjustments to new 
information) and external shocks (including policy decisions by other subsystems) to the 
subsystem. 
Sato (1999) investigated smoking control policies in Japan using several 
frameworks including Advocacy Coalition Framework.  The study examined four 
decades of smoking control policy chronicling changes to the policies and how the 
various interests formulate their beliefs into policy outcomes.  Sato argued that the pro-
tobacco coalition was able to maintain dominance during the 1960s and 1970s by 
influencing government officials who regulated the tobacco industry.  The period was 
marked by significant bargaining between the industry and the regulators.  Policies that 
were implemented were mostly voluntary and symbolic in nature.   
After the 1970s, increased health concerns facilitated the rise of the anti-tobacco 
coalition in Japan consisting of the health advocates, the media and the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare.  Sato stated that the policies during the 1970s were made in a more 
competitive policy environment.  The author asserts that the “policies that have resulted 
are a bundle of contradictory elements derived from both sides of the issues” (34).  Sato 
claimed that the dominant group did not lose power in any substantial way; therefore, 
only secondary control mechanisms were put in place by the government.  
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) developed a framework to describe sudden policy 
changes in political environments that are characterized by relatively stable policies over 
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an extended period of time.  Punctuated equilibrium theory examines the interruption of 
long periods of stable political decision making by sudden policy changes in the policy 
subsystems.  The authors investigated the role of institutional setting, the importance of 
information processing and policy entrepreneurs.  The theory purports that individuals in 
the subsystem have limited capacity to process information, and therefore focus on issues 
as they increase in importance and make decisions based on the information at their 
disposal which is often limited and incomplete.  Punctuated equilibrium seeks to explain 
how issues are brought to the attention of decision-makers and how information is used to 
make decisions in the policy process.   
Richardson (2000) investigated policy changes that resulted from the interaction 
of governments and interest groups in Europe during the 1980s and 1990s.  The author 
characterized the 1960s and 1970s as being monopolized by policy networks and 
communities that used political influence to affect policy changes in society.  Richardson 
argued that as the external environment changed—due to increased globalization—the 
relatively less powerful groups found new venues in which to voice their desires.  The 
change in the institutional setting gave rise to new venues and ideas which resulted in a 
significant departure from the previous mode of policy decisions.   
Givel (2006) tested the theory of punctuated equilibrium in the market for tobacco 
regulation in the United States.  The author described tobacco policymaking between the 
1980s and 2002 as being dominated by a stable pro-tobacco subsystem despite increased 
mobilization by anti-tobacco interests in society.  Givel examined the types of policies 
that were produced by the conflict.  He found that tobacco lobbying was an effective 
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means of gaining favorable legislative outcomes by the pro-tobacco interest group.  
Lobbying indirectly promoted the goals of the tobacco industry—increase sales and 
profits—through the use of campaign contributions, assistance to legislatures, and gifts.  
The analysis showed that the laws that were enacted were largely symbolic and did not 
produce any meaningful restraints on the tobacco industry.  Laws such as increased 
cigarette taxes, restrictions on smoking in public areas, and anti-smoking campaigns 
targeting juveniles were not substantive across the states.  Givel argued that the findings 
do not support the punctuated equilibrium theory; tobacco policies are dominated by 
policy monopolies despite the presence of a mobilized opposition.   
Meier (1985) provided an alternative view of regulatory policymaking.  He stated 
that regulatory policymaking is the product of both the bureaucracy and environmental 
forces.  Meier argued that “bureaus can take an active role in structuring their 
environments; they need not passively respond to subsystem pressures.  They can 
actively seek to influence the forces impinging on regulatory policy” (271).  In other 
words, bureaucratic policymaking can be better understood by investigating the dynamics 
of the policy subsystem—the relationship between members and the power structure.  
Meier extends the framework developed by Sabatier (1977) by dividing regulatory policy 
into two dimensions based on the degree to which regulatory benefits are distributed 
among the regulated industry and the non-regulated groups.   
The investigation highlighted the importance of policy subsystems in the 
regulatory process.  The ability of the subsystem to resolve conflict internally determines 
how effectively outside interests can influence the policy outputs.  An implication is that 
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the degree of openness of the policy subsystem affects both the ability of regulated 
groups, for instance, to capture other members of the subsystem and the extent to which 
policy output will reflect the public or private interest.  The extent to which regulatory 
policies reflect one of these extremes or some combination of the two is dependent on the 
goals and resources of the regulatory agencies.  Meier argued that agencies use the 
following resources---expertise, cohesion, legislative authority, policy salience, and 
leadership—to pursue their goals.  Meier declared that greater agency resources decrease 
the potential for regulatory capture.  Gormley (1983) and Berry and Berry (1983) also 
provided evidence in support of the importance of agency resources in determining policy 
outcomes.   
 
Revenue Decoupling in Light of the Literature 
Revenue decoupling in the electricity market is an attempt to change the 
traditional relationship between sales and revenue.  The mechanism allows for automatic 
adjustments to actual revenues to meet the revenue requirement established by the 
regulatory commissions.  A motivation for the policy design is to decrease the 
disincentives faced by utilities to promote energy conservation.  In addition to addressing 
utility concerns about energy conservation, revenue decoupling stands to alter several 
other key aspects of the electricity market namely: how rates are designed and how 
market surplus is distributed among market participants. 
Under traditional regulation utility revenues depend almost entirely on the amount 
of units sold.  Revenue requirements are predetermined based on estimated number of 
 46 
units to be sold at an established rate schedule.  During the course of the year the actual 
sales may be higher or lower than the level estimated.  Historically, utilities have retained 
excess earning when sales are greater than expected and are compensated for some, if not 
all, of the revenue shortfall when sales are lower than estimated.  Rate cases typically 
govern a period greater than 2 years so under traditional regulation the adjustments to 
revenue occur years after the costs were incurred.  Revenue decoupling promises to better 
align cost and revenue on a monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, or annual basis.     
Energy conservation gained increased importance over the past few decades as 
negative environmental effects have multiplied and higher demand has caused input 
prices to increase.  Policies to reduce utility disincentives towards energy conservation 
are being explored by public utility commissions around the United States.  Eto, Stoft and 
Belden (1997) suggest that there are at least three issues that need to be addressed to 
decrease utility disincentives: cost of demand-side programs, lost revenue margins and 
vested interests.   The authors suggest that revenue decoupling, by itself, does not provide 
incentives for the utility to pursue energy conservation goals.  It makes the utility at most 
indifferent to increased sales or promoting energy conservation (5).  They showed that 
the revenue guaranteed by the policy comprises a small portion of the overall utility 
revenue.  Therefore, in and of itself, guaranteeing that portion of revenue may not 
significantly affect the utility profits.     
Revenue decoupling will alter rate design in the electricity market by attempting 
to better allocate fix costs to fixed charges and variable costs to variable charges.  
Utilities incur substantial upfront fixed costs to purchase equipment and build facilities.  
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There are also significant variable costs associated with providing electricity service.  
The costs of inputs vary with the amount of electricity produced and fluctuations in the 
economy.  The electricity rates are designed to recoup these costs by assessing fixed and 
variable charges to customers monthly.  The current rate design is criticized for not 
adequately appropriating fixed costs to the fixed charge.  That is, historically portions of 
the fixed costs have been collected through the variable charge.  Residential customers 
are said to benefit from the current rate design because as a percentage of their total 
monthly energy costs, the fixed costs are lower than the actual fixed costs incurred by the 
utility to provide the service.  Revenue decoupling is aimed at improving the rate design 
by attempting to recover total fixed costs of service through a fixed monthly charge.   
Through the regulatory process regulators are able to redistribute wealth in the 
market.  The regulatory process is comprised of various interest groups vying for 
benefits. The current structure of the electricity market places the interest groups at odds 
with each other because benefits and costs are distributed disproportionately among the 
groups.  Therefore, the groups organize to translate their ideals into favorable policies.  
The market for regulation consists of three distinct groups: regulators—who control the 
distribution of surplus through policies; producers and consumers—who make demands 
on the process.  Producers and consumers can be divided into subgroups: producers—
regulated and non-regulated; public and private; old and new—and consumers—
residential, commercial and industrial.  Changes to the structure of the electricity market 
will redistribute the benefits and costs in the market, and it is expected that the groups 
will attempt to influence the regulatory process to retain or increase their surplus or to 
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reduce their costs associated with the changes.  The composition of the producer and 
consumer groups will influence how benefits get distributed within the groups.  These 
principles are used to test the relationship between state attributes and the adoption of 
revenue decoupling in the electricity market and to offer predictions about the behavior 
of the participants in the regulatory process.     
 
Conclusion 
There is a rich tradition in economics and political and policy science that views 
the regulatory process in terms of the motivation of the behavior of the select interest 
groups.  I have touched on some of the highlights of these literature to provide some 
intellectual background for the study of revenue decoupling.  These theories will be used 
to examine the factors that may have influence the decision of regulators to implement 
revenue decoupling in the electricity industry.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHOD 
This study conducts duration analysis of the regulatory process of public utility 
commissions in the United States.  An explanation of why states are adopting revenue 
decoupling in the electricity market is explored by investigating the relationship between 
state characteristics and the regulatory process.  There are several techniques developed 
to analyze these types of questions; however, in this study marginal risk set and 
conditional risk set models are used to estimate the influence of the covariates on the 
hazard rate—i.e. the probability of the state adopting revenue decoupling in the electricity 
market. The models are used to analyze the influence of characteristics of the state 
electricity market, commission structure, and state political environment on the decision 
to adopt revenue decoupling.  The marginal risk set and conditional risk set models use 
different underlying assumptions about the nature of the occurrence of the events and 
when and how the risk set, i.e. the potential for state adopting the policy, is defined.   
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. An overview of revenue 
decoupling adoption in the United States is presented. The proportional hazard model is 
discussed, followed by description of the marginal risk set model, conditional risk set 
model, and explanation of how the model results are interpreted.  Applications of the 
statistical model are presented. The data and data sets are described. The variables and 
hypotheses are developed using the theory of revenue decoupling and positive economic 
theory.   
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Revenue Decoupling Across the United States 
 Revenue decoupling was first implemented in the natural gas industry in 
California in the late 1970s.  In subsequent years, revenue decoupling was adopted in the 
electricity market in California.  Increased input costs and environmental concerns 
prompted regulators in California to address these issues in the electricity market through 
rate design.  In 1982, the California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) adopted the 
Electricity Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (ERAM) which made adjustments to 
revenue when sales deviated from estimates.  Since that time revenue decoupling has 
been in place in the California electricity market, except for a few years in the late 1990s 
when the state attempted to deregulate the industry.  California has had revenue 
decoupling in the electricity market for the longest period of time in the United States.   
 Since California implemented the policy, several other states have experimented 
with or have adopted revenue decoupling in the electricity market.  Across the United 
States 14 other states have adopted the policy.  Several states—CA, NY, OR—have 
adopted revenue decoupling more than once in the electricity market.  As of 2008, 10 
states had revenue decoupling in the electricity market, and 11 states had revenue 
decoupling pending (Pacific Economic Group).  The Table 3-1 gives a summary of the 
states that adopted revenue decoupling and the years in which the policy was in place. 
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Table 3-1— Revenue Decoupling in the U.S. electricity industry by state 
 
State Years 
CA 1982-1995, 2001- 
CT 2007- 
FL 1995-1997 
ID 2007- 
MA 2008- 
MD 2007- 
ME 1991-1993 
MN 2008- 
MT 1994-1998 
NY 1988-1996, 2007- 
OR 1995-2001, 2008- 
VT 2007- 
WA 1991-1995 
WI 2008- 
 
Statistical Models 
Marginal risk set and conditional risk set models are used to analyze the influence 
of characteristics of the state electricity market, commission structure, and state political 
environment on the state‟s decision to adopt revenue decoupling.  The likelihood of 
revenue decoupling being adopted is described as the hazard rate—which is the 
probability of revenue decoupling being adopted given the covariates and the counting 
process. Partial likelihood estimation of regression coefficients was developed Cox 
(1972) using a semi-parametric model.  The models used in the study are variants of the 
Cox proportional hazard model. 
 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Cox (1972) considers a population of individuals that either experiences an event 
or is censored.  For individuals who experience an event the time to the event is recorded, 
and for individuals who do not experience an event, the only information that is available 
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is that the time to the event is greater than the censoring time.  The proportional hazard 
model can be non-parametric, semi-parametric, or parametric, depending on the 
assumptions that are made about the underlying distribution.  Cox uses a semi-parametric 
approach.  In the model the hazard function is described as the probability that the 
variable representing failure time occurs between the initial time of the study and last 
observed time in the study, that is, the probability that the event occurs within the study 
period.  The individuals who have not experienced an event are considered to be at risk 
and make up the risk set.   
The regression model is developed to assess the relationship between the 
distribution of failure time and covariates.  The hazard rate is a function of the covariates 
and time, parameters to be estimated and an unknown function which represents the 
hazard function for the covariates valued at zero.  In the model the unknown function is 
allowed to be arbitrary.  Leaving the function arbitrary contributes no information about 
the parameters when there are no failures as the unknown function may be zero.  Cox 
acknowledges that there is some loss of information when the unknown function is made 
arbitrary; however, the loss of information is usually slight.  Conditional on the risk set at 
that time, the probability of failure for an individual is observed as the ratio of the 
covariates of the individual relative to the sum of the individuals in the risk set.  The 
conditional log-likelihood is the weighted ratio of observations that have experienced a 
failure relative to the observations in the risk set.   
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) discuss the Cox model in the book, Event 
History Modeling: A Guide to Social Scientist.  The authors state that the Cox regression 
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model does not produce an intercept, which is absorbed into the baseline hazard function, 
because the hazard function is not parameterized. The model uses the partial likelihood 
method to estimate the coefficients.  The partial likelihood method is based on the 
assumption that the intervals between successive duration times contribute no 
information regarding the relationship between the covariates and the hazard rate.  
Therefore, it is the ordered failure times, rather than the interval between failures, that 
contributes information to the partial likelihood function (49). 
 The partial likelihood function is derived by taking the product of the conditional 
probability of a failure at time ti, given the number of cases that are at risk of failing at 
time ti. Maximum partial likelihood estimates (MPLE) of the coefficients are obtained by 
maximizing the likelihood function.  The likelihood function is not the true likelihood 
function because it does not include actual survival times for censored and uncensored 
cases due to the assumption that the intervals between successive event times contribute 
no information regarding the relationship between the covariate and the ordered event 
times (52).   
Cox (1975) demonstrated that the MPLE have similar properties as Maximum 
Likelihood Estimates (MLE).  The MPLE are asymptotically efficient, consistent, and 
invariant.  The coefficients from the Cox proportional hazard model reveal information 
regarding the hazard rate.  As such, positive coefficients imply hazard is increasing or 
rising as the covariate increases and negatively signed coefficients imply that hazard is 
decreasing or falling as the covariate increases.  Positive coefficients imply shorter 
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survival times; a negative coefficient implies longer survival time (Box-Steffensmeier 
and Jones, 54). 
The marginal risk set model and conditional risk set model are variants of the 
proportional hazard model.   The two models are used in this investigation because they 
utilize different but complementary assumptions about the nature of the events and the 
individuals at risk. The models build on each other in terms of complexity of the 
assumptions.   
The marginal risk set model assumes that the individual is at risk for each event at 
the onset of the study.  The marginal risk set model makes no distinction between the first 
and second occurrence of revenue decoupling in the state electricity market.  Each 
individual is placed in the risk set for each stratum, i.e. number of occurrences.  The 
conditional risk set model assumes that the onset of a second event is conditional upon 
the individual experiencing the first event.  Therefore, the risk set for each stratum is 
differentiated by the number of previous events.  Different underlying assumptions 
allows for an examination of how the results vary under the different conditions. The 
models are used to obtain the nature of the influence of the covariates on the probability 
of revenue decoupling being adopted in the state electricity market and the marginal 
effects of the covariates on the probability of policy adoption by the state utility 
commissions.   
Marginal Risk Set Model 
The semi-parametric models were developed by Wei, Lin, and Weissfeld (1989) 
to analyze multivariate failure time data. The models are generalizations of survival 
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techniques used to estimate repeated failures.  The marginal distribution of the 
observation is formulated by a Cox proportional hazard model.  The structure among the 
distinct failure times is unspecified in the models and partial likelihood methods are used 
to estimate the regression parameters.  In the model for a specific failure type, there is a 
failure time associated with each subject or the observation is censored.   
The model has a set of covariates for each observation beginning at the start of the 
study.  The failure times and the censored observations are assumed to be independent.  
The failure-specific partial likelihood is the ratio of covariates for the subjects that have 
experienced failure relative to the observations at risk.  The estimates of the coefficients 
are obtained by maximizing the partial likelihood function.   
The marginal risk set model is estimated under the assumption that the 
occurrences of revenue decoupling in the electricity market are independent.  That is, for 
states that adopted revenue decoupling multiple times, the model assumes that these 
event are not strongly correlated with each other.  In other words, the second adoption of 
revenue decoupling is assumed to be independent of the first occurrence. The 
independence assumption will be relaxed in the conditional risk set model.   
 
 
Conditional Risk Set Model 
 
The conditional risk set model was developed by Prentice, Williams, and Peterson 
(1981).  The model is considered conditional because the occurrence of a subsequent 
events is dependent on a previous event occurring.  The model records the year that 
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revenue decoupling is adopted, the length of time between the start of the study and the 
year of adoption, and the number of times the policy was adopted.   
The model assumes that the years between events do not contribute information 
about the relationship between covariates and the occurrence of the event.  The model 
investigates the period in which the state is at risk or could potentially adopt the policy in 
the electricity market.  For example, California first adopted revenue decoupling in 1982 
and again in 2001.  In the model, the time component for California is recorded as 4 in 
1982 and 23 in 2001.  A value of 1 is recorded for the covariate STATUS the year of 
adoption.  A value of zero is assigned to STATUS for states that have never adopted the 
policy or do not have the policy in place in the final year of the study.   
 
Model Interpretation 
In this study, the adoption of revenue decoupling in the state electricity market is 
the event being analyzed and is considered the hazard.  The coefficients estimated in the 
model are converted to a hazard ratio through exponentiation.  The hazard ratio is 
interpreted as “the ratio of hazards for a 1-unit change in the corresponding covariate” 
(Cleves, 131).  A coefficient greater than 1 indicates that as the covariate increases the 
hazard, or likelihood of the event occurring.  Therefore, a hazard ratio of 1.3 is 
interpreted as a 1 unit change in the independent variable increasing the hazard by 30%.  
A hazard ratio of less than 1 implies decreasing hazard—so as the independent variable 
increases the likelihood of the event occurring decreases.  Therefore, a hazard ratio of 0.7 
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implies that a 1 unit increase in the covariate will decrease the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling being adopted in the state electricity market by 30% (Cleves, 131). 
For binary variables the hazard ratio indicates the likelihood of an event occurring 
for one group relative to another group (Cleves, 132).  Therefore, if a value of 1 is 
assigned to group 1, a hazard ratio of 0.3 indicates that the risk of experience the event 
decreases by 70 percent for that group.  In other words, the group 1 faces 30 percent of 
the risk faced by the other group.  On the other hand, a binary variable with a hazard ratio 
of greater than 1, for example 1.10, indicates that group 1 faces a 10% greater risk than 
the second group.   
The proportional hazard model has been used to investigate the influence of 
various covariates on occurrence of the economic, political, and social events including: 
unemployment duration, risk of insurance payments, payment of government subsidies, 
birth rates, and political regime changes.  The following discuss several studies that have 
used proportional hazard models to investigate these types of relationships.   
 
Previous Studies 
Sanhueza (1999) investigates the effects of economic and political conditions on 
the stability of political regimes.  The author discusses two advantages of using a 
duration model to study the survival of political regimes: the models accounts for data 
censorship and utilizes the available information, and the models allow for time 
dependence patterns of the conditional probability of survival (340).  Proportional hazard 
models are used to estimate the effects of economic and political variables of the survival 
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rate of various types of political regimes between 1950 and 1990.  The study examines 
duration of the political regimes, and how they are influenced by the covariates.  That is, 
do the covariates increase or decrease the survival rates of the political regimes?    
Benin and van de Walle (1989) study the factors affecting the tenure of political 
leaders.  The study investigates how the longevity of the leaders is affected by country 
characteristics, personal traits of the leader, and political environment using proportional 
hazard models.  The longevity of the leader is hypothesized to either be positively or 
negatively affected by the characteristics of the country, personal attributes, and the 
overall political environment in the country.  These factors are shown to either increase 
or decrease the length of time in office.   
McGillivray and Stam (1992) investigate the relationship between leadership 
turnover and the duration of economic sanctions using proportional hazard models.  
Specifically, they study how political changes in the issuing and target states affect 
sanction duration in states with different political institutions.   Proportional hazard 
models are used to indicate the influence of political and leadership changes in the 
issuing state or the target state on the length of time of the economic sanctions in 
democratic or non-democratic states.   
The examples show how the proportional hazard model has been applied in the 
social sciences to investigate the occurrence of social and political change.  Using the 
theory of revenue decoupling and positive economic theory, econometric models are 
developed to test the influence of characteristics of the state electricity market, 
commission structure, and political climate of the state on the regulatory process. The 
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theories are used to identify variables, to segment interest groups, and to make 
predictions.  The study uses marginal risk set and conditional risk set models to examine 
the relationship between state characteristics and the adoption of revenue decoupling in 
the electricity market.  For each model three specifications are tested in the study.  
Specification (1) examines the effect of market characteristics on the likelihood of 
revenue decoupling being adopted.  Specification (2) extends specification (1) 
incorporating the effect on commission structure.   Finally, specification (3) examines the 
effect of both commission structure and the state political climate on the likelihood of 
adopting revenue decoupling in the electricity market. 
The participants are assumed to operate within the rules governing the regulatory 
process.  It is assumed that the groups make decisions on whether or not to engage in the 
process based on their expectations which are revealed by observed behavior.  That is, 
groups that expect higher net benefits per capita should be more active in the regulatory 
process than groups with low net benefits per capita.   
 
Data 
The study examines the period 1978 to 2008. The data are collected from state 
utility commission website, state statutes, U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, U.S. Census Bureau, 
National Resources Defense Council, National Governors Association, United States 
House of Representatives, and Regulatory Assistance Project.  The variables include: 
number of commissioners, length commissioner of term, elected vs. appointed 
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commissioners, ratio of non-public to public electricity entities, residential to industrial 
prices, percentage of industrial sales, sales per capita, ratio of net generation provided by 
utilities relative to independent power producers in the state, population density, 
difference between state and national electricity price, electricity sales variance, electoral 
vote majority, party affiliation of the state Governor, new chairperson at the commission, 
consumer choice at the retail level, energy intensity, decoupling in the natural gas market, 
and percentage of hydro-electricity generation.  (The District of Columbia was excluded 
from the study because it did not meet some of criteria that the study investigated even 
though the district adopted revenue decoupling in 2008).  The data are described below, 
and Table 3-2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables. 
The variable, DIFF, is the difference between the average price per kilowatt hour 
of electricity at the national level and the price in each state.   
Table 3-2—Descriptive Statistics 
 
    Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DIFF 0.0727 4.072208 -4.13 19.46 
RESIND 1.5495 0.2463855 0.72 2.44 
INDSALES 0.2955 0.1047496 0.08 0.58 
SALESCAP 13.5741 4.343708 6.61 31.33 
SALESVAR 2.34E+08 5.43E+08 5.97E+05 3.42E+09 
GENERATION 46.2593 254.1501 0 1813.05 
ENTITY 2.4086 5.559646 0.07 40 
POPDENSITY 188.9602 254.5618 1.2 1170.64 
INTENSITY 136.5695 151.7854 9.49 1112.01 
HYDRO 9.98 19.35753 0 90 
CHOICE 0.33 0.4725816 0 1 
GAS 0.33 0.4725816 0 1 
ELECTED 0.24 0.4292347 0 1 
COMMISSIONERS 3.96 1.10023 3 7 
NEWCHAIR 0.7 0.4605662 0 1 
TERM 5.3 1.010051 3 8 
MAJORITY 0.48 0.5021167 0 1 
GOVERNOR 0.44 0.4988877 0 1 
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The average difference ranges from 4 cents below the national average to 19 cents above 
the national average with a mean difference of 0.00035 cents.  RESIND is the ratio of the 
price of residential and industrial price of electricity per kilowatt hour.  The ratio covers 
the range of 0.055 to 0.891 with an average of 0.437.  The variable, INDSALES, is the 
percentage of electricity sale to the industrial class.  Industrial customers represent 
between 8 and 58 percent of electricity sales in the states, averaging 29.3 percent of sales. 
Sales per capita, SALESCAP, in the state range between 6.61 and 31.33 million kwh per 
resident.  The ratio of generation provided by independent power producers and 
traditional utilities, GENERATION, varies widely among the states.  In some states there 
is very little generation by independent power producer, minimum value close to zero, 
and in other states independent power producers account for a large portion of the 
generation, maximum ratio of 1813.   
 The variable, ENTITY, is a ratio of non-public to public electricity entities in the 
state. The average ratio across the state is 2.9 non-public entities for every public entity 
and the range is between 0.07 and 40.  Population density varies significantly across the 
state ranging from a low of 1.2 in Alaska to a high of 1170 in New Jersey.  Energy 
intensity, INTENSITY— the ratio of electricity consumption to state gdp— are between 
9.49 and 1112.  Hydroelectricity generation, HYDRO, also varies by the state location.  
The highest amount of hydroelectricity generation is 90%, and the low is less than 1%.  
The variable, COMMISSIONERS, is the number of at the state utility commissions.  
Most states have 4 or 5 commissioners with a range of 3 to 7.  The term length of the 
commissioners, TERM, is between 3 and 8 years.   
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 The remaining variables, CHOICE, GAS, ELECTED, NEWCHAIR, 
MAJORITY, AND GOVERNOR are binary variables that represent the presence of 
consumer choice in the state electricity market, the presence of revenue decoupling in the 
state gas market, turnover in commissioner chair, a Republican control over electoral 
votes, and a Republican governor, respectively.   
 
Data Set I—Marginal Model 
 
The data set for the marginal risk set model contains 100 data points. The events 
in this data set are assumed to be independent.  There have been as many as two episodes 
of revenue decoupling by an individual state; therefore each state has two entries in the 
data set.  The data set contains a time variable that measures the time that has elapsed 
since the beginning of the study, a variable that separates the state based on the first or 
second event, and the values of the covariates.  For the states that adopted revenue 
decoupling, the time and the value of the covariates are recorded for that year. For 
example, for the state of New York entries are recorded for year 10 and year 30 of the 
study.  For states that adopted revenue decoupling once, values of the covariates are 
recorded in the year of adoption and the final year of the study.  In the data set Maine has 
entries for year 13 and 30.  Finally, for states that have not adopted revenue decoupling, 
both entries are recorded for the final year of the study.   
 
Data Set II—Conditional Model 
 
The data set consists of 57 observations.  The data set consists of a unique 
identifier for each state, the time that has elapsed since the beginning of the study is 
 63 
recorded, the number of adoptions, the value of the covariates for the years of adoption, 
and values of the covariates in the final year of the study for states that do not have 
revenue decoupling in the electricity market and states that never had revenue 
decoupling.  Some states have adopted the policy multiple times bringing the total 
number of observations to 57.  The states are considered to be at risk of adopting the 
policy in 1978.  That is, the model considers the state as having the potential of adopting 
the policy in each year between 1978 and 2008.  The states are not considered to be at 
risk for years in which the policy is in place.  For example, California is at risk from 1978 
to 1982.  California is not considered at risk between 1982 and 1995 but re-enters the risk 
set in 1996 when the policy was repealed.  The state is again at risk again between 1996 
and 2001.  California has had two periods of revenue decoupling in the electricity market.   
Below is a description of the variables, followed by a summary the hypotheses 
used in the models.   
 
Variables and Hypotheses 
The attributes of the electricity market influences how rules are made to govern 
the industry.  The number of participants, the distribution of the participants among the 
interest groups, and the types of and availability of resources determines the nature of the 
demands that will be placed on the regulators, how the rules will be formed, and how the 
benefits and costs will be shared in the market.  The paragraphs below identify the 
variables that will be used in the study and discusses how the variables are expected to 
impact the decisions about revenue decoupling in the state electricity market.   
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Market Structure 
The price of electricity plays a critical role in determining how surplus is 
distributed in the electricity market.  The price affects the quantity of electricity 
consumed by customers and how much surplus consumers receive in the market.  The 
price is also directly related to the surplus of producers and how many units of electricity 
they are willing to supply.  In unregulated markets the price is determined by the 
interaction of demand and supply.  However, in the electricity market the price is set by 
regulatory agencies.  Both consumers and producers have incentives to actively 
participate in the regulatory process because this process determines how much surplus 
they receive.  The two groups will attempt to influence the process in opposing fashions 
so that the net effect will favor the group that has the stronger influence.   
The variable DIFF is the difference between the average price of electricity in the 
state and the average price of electricity in the United States for that year.  The variable is 
used as a proxy for the amount of surplus that is potentially available for redistribution in 
the electricity market.  It is assumed that as the price difference increases, the price is 
approaching some maximum level.  Before the removal of transmission barriers which 
enable the expansion of open access, the difference between state-level prices and 
national prices played a less significant role in the state markets.  Development of 
technology and the removal of barriers in the electricity market have increased the 
important of differences in the state-level prices of electricity.   
The expansion of open access to transmission has made the relative prices an 
important determinant of how the state market operates.  A more open market allows 
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generated electricity to be sold in the state or to be transmitted interstate.  Androin and 
Grady (2006) found that states are more likely to restructure the electricity market when 
prices are high.  In the case of revenue decoupling higher prices may decrease the 
likelihood of the policy being adopted.  Revenue decoupling may increase prices in the 
future so that a high retail price in the state limits the ability of the regulators to adopt a 
policy that may cause further price increase.  It is argued that the regulators in states with 
prices lower than the national average may have greater leeway in implementing revenue 
decoupling.  Therefore, it is expected that as the price difference increases, the likelihood 
of implementing revenue decoupling in the electricity market decreases.  There should be 
a negative relationship between price difference and implementation of the policy.   
 The variable RESIND is the natural log of the ratio of residential price to 
industrial prices covers the range of highest to lowest price per kwh to electricity 
customers.  As discussed earlier, the current rate design has been criticized for not 
appropriately allocating costs between customer classes which benefits residential 
customers.  The price paid for electricity by the different classes of customers has direct 
bearing on the amount of surplus the group can retain.  Higher prices reduces consumer 
surplus, all else the same.  The allocation of costs among the customer groups in the 
electricity industry is also important.  When prices are set in the regulatory process, the 
prices determine how these shared costs are distributed among the customers.  For a 
given level of costs and benefits a higher price to one group will increase the relative 
burden of that group and increase the relative benefits to the other groups.   
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Revenue decoupling is aimed at better aligning costs with revenue—through rate 
design, by more accurately allocating fixed and variable costs.  The disparity between the 
price to residential and industrial customers provides an opportunity for the regulator to 
redistribute surplus and increase net support.  That is, all else the same, when the ratio is 
high—higher relative price to industrial—a marginal adjustment in residential prices 
should gain more support from the industrial customers than the support lost from the 
residential customers who currently pay a relatively low price.  Knittel (2006) found that 
increased lobbying by one group relative to another will alter the weights assigned to 
each customer class by the regulator.   Therefore, it is expected that as the ratio, increases 
it should decrease the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in the electricity 
market.     
 The net benefits of revenue decoupling are greater when the implementation is 
wide spread.  Implementing the policy for a small sector of society may result in a net 
cost because the costs outweigh the benefits.  In most states industrial customers account 
for a significant portion of retail sales in the electricity industry but make up a relatively 
small portion of the voting population.  In addition, industrial customers are exempt from 
revenue decoupling in many states.  Industrial customers are exempt because in some 
cases they generate their own electricity, among other things.  Therefore, to realize the 
proposed benefits of the policy the benefits accruing to the remaining customers have to 
be sufficiently large.  The variable, INDSALES, is the natural log of the percentage of 
retail sales to industrial customers in the state.  It is expected that high levels of industrial 
sales will decreases the likelihood of revenue decoupling in state electricity markets.  The 
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variable should be negatively related to the likelihood of policy adoption.  Therefore, as 
the percentage of industrial sales increases in the state it is expected to decrease the 
likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in the electricity market.   
The current regulatory format incentivizes the utilities to sell more units because 
increased sales increase profits.  The rate schedule is fixed between rate cases and with 
marginal revenue being higher than marginal costs—each unit result is profits to the 
utility (Eto, et al., 1997).  Utility capital investment includes fixed and variable costs.  A 
significant portion of costs is the fixed component.  Fixed costs are more easily 
recognized and are more likely to be included in the rate case.  Therefore, the price set by 
the regulators accounts for most of these fixed costs.  The utility‟s profit is more closely 
related to the difference between the price set by the regulators and the variable costs to 
provide service.  Revenue decoupling is designed to reduce or eliminate the incentive to 
sell more units because price is greater than average costs. 
Eto, et al. (1997) also show that the guaranteed revenue associated with revenue 
decoupling represents a small portion of overall utility revenue.  Although the utility may 
still collect revenue above the authorized level due to growth in customers, among other 
things, if revenue decoupling is adopted, the utility will be unable to retain excess profits 
from higher sales.  Revenue decoupling in this sense limits the profitability of the utility.  
The variable SALESCAP measures the average number of kilowatts hours sold to 
residents in each state.  Therefore, as SALESCAP increases, it is expected to decrease the 
likelihood of revenue decoupling being implemented in the electricity market. 
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Under traditional regulation the profitability of the utility is determined by the 
level of sales.  The volatility of sales affects the ability of the utility to earn the revenue 
requirements determined by the commission.  Over the past three decades the demand for 
electricity by each customer class has increased as the importance of the electricity 
industry has become more significant.  In addition to increase demand by customers, the 
predictability of customer demand has also increased.  Higher demand increases the 
likelihood that projected sales will be achieved creating a positive bias to deviations of 
actual sales around the estimated level.  Based on these factors, revenue decoupling 
should reduce utility profitability by eliminating the collection of excess profits resulting 
from higher sales.  The variable, SALESVAR, is the natural log of sales variance in the 
state.  It is expected that sales variance will be negatively associated with the 
implementation of revenue decoupling in the electricity market.  Assuming a positive 
bias in sales variance, it is expected that as variance increases it should decrease the 
likelihood of revenue decoupling being implemented in electricity markets.   
Since the late 1970s, both federal and state governments have implemented 
policies to encourage competition in the electricity sector.  Deregulation of the generation 
stage, open access to transmission and distribution, and customer choice have increased 
competition in the electricity market.  These policies have restructured the electricity 
market, and in some cases a significant departure from the traditional structure impacts 
the revenue stream of the utilities.  Competition in the electricity industry has increased 
the number of independent power producers offering services in the market.  These 
entities are exempt from state regulation and have applied competitive pressures to the 
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traditional utilities.  Traditional utilities are benefited by revenue decoupling when the 
amount of energy generated is small relative to the total in the state.  That is, as their 
market share decreases, the prospects of guaranteed revenue become more attractive.  It 
is also expected that traditional utilities will expend resources to ensure their prolong 
survival and to extend the transitory period.  Restructuring, in this sense, places 
competitors against competitors in the industry (Maloney and McCormick 1982, 
Stevenson and Penn, 1995).    
Independent power producers have much to gain from market reform in the 
electricity industry.  However, revenue decoupling, by guaranteeing some revenue to the 
regulated utilities reduces the effect of market forces in the electricity industry which 
benefits the regulated utilities.  Overall, revenue decoupling is expected to benefit 
traditional utilities more than independent power producers.  The variable, 
GENERATION, is the ratio of net generation provided by utilities and independent 
power producers in the state—measured in thousands of kilowatt hours.  A higher ratio is 
expected to decrease the likelihood that revenue decoupling will be adopted in the 
electricity market.  That is, the variable will have a negative relationship with the policy; 
as the number of utilities increases relative to the number of independent power 
producers, the likelihood of implementation decreases.   
The variable, ENTITY, is a ratio of non-public to public electricity entities in the 
state.  In most states only non-public utilities (investor-owned, cooperatives) are 
regulated by the utility commission.  In a few states the commissions regulate municipal 
electricity utility rates.  The non-public utilities represent a large portion of the supply 
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side of the market and are assumed to be more profit-driven.  Revenue decoupling 
hinders the level of competition in the state as market forces have a reduced effect on 
sales and revenue.  The composition of the electricity market, non-public/public 
distribution, is a proxy for the level of competition in the state.  A large portion of 
electricity supply is provided by non-public firms.  A small ratio indicates less non-public 
or regulated utilities relative to public utilities and potentially a less competitive 
electricity market. It is hypothesized that the ratio will be negatively related to the 
likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in the electricity market.  That is, a larger 
number of non-public utilities should decrease the likelihood that revenue decoupling 
will be adopted in the electricity industry.   
To make effective demands interest groups face cost of organization and 
maintaining pressure.  The ability for groups to organize at lower cost than the opposition 
gives that group an advantage in making demands (Becker, 1983).  All else being the 
same, groups that are close together should be able to reduce the cost of organizing and 
be able to more effectively influence the regulatory process (Becker 1983).  This is 
expected in densely populated areas.  A higher population density should increase the 
likelihood of consumer groups being formed in the state.  The formation of groups 
spreads the cost among the individuals and potentially increases the net benefits.  In the 
electricity market, group representation at various stakeholder meetings increases the 
likelihood that the groups‟ opinions will be heard and may be considered in the 
formulation of solutions.   
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While group representation does not guarantee favorable policies, lack of group 
presence generally does not help to improve agenda status.  Teske (1991) argued that that 
higher density reduced access cost and significantly affected telecommunication 
regulation.  The variable population density, POPDENS, measures the number of 
residents per square mile in the state.  Revenue decoupling is expected to benefit 
residential consumers more than any other group in the state.  The policy puts a cap on 
utility revenue and should reduce the amount of consumer surplus that is transferred to 
the producers.  Therefore a higher population density is expected to increase the 
likelihood that the state will adopt revenue decoupling in the electricity market.   
A goal of revenue decoupling is to induce more efficient use of electricity.  The 
policy is intended to improve decision-making by customers by better aligning the cost of 
electricity with the value obtained from its use.  The decisions of participants in the 
electricity industry include: how much electricity to consume and what sources of energy 
to use in the production of electricity.  The price in the market determines how and when 
these resources get allocated.  Revenue decoupling is designed as a mechanism to better 
allocate costs and benefits in the market.  The price promotes the allocation of resources 
to consumption that provides value.  Even though the revenue decoupling does not 
address other issues in the market such as equity, the mechanism is designed to improve 
efficiency in the market.   
The demand and thus the level of consumption of electricity used in production 
should vary with level of output in the state.  A proxy for the level of output is the state 
gross domestic product (GDP).  Efficiency in the electricity market dictates that energy 
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be used for activities that are at least as value as the resources used to produce the energy.   
A measure of energy efficiency in the economy is energy intensity.  Energy intensity is a 
measure of electricity consumption relative to demand (EIA).  The variable, 
INTENSITY, is a ratio of electricity sales to state GDP.  The state GDP is indexed on the 
year 1978.  If revenue decoupling is designed to increase energy efficiency then it is 
expected that states with high intensity, that is, high sales relative to GDP, will be more 
likely to adopt revenue decoupling.  There should be a positive relationship between 
intensity and revenue decoupling.  As electricity sales increase relative to GDP, there 
should be an increased likelihood of the states adopting revenue decoupling in the 
electricity markets.   
The cost of providing electricity in the state is expected to play a role in the 
decision of the state utility commission to adopt revenue decoupling. Regulators have 
increased margin for error when electricity costs, and therefore, price; are low in the 
state.  Hydropower is relatively inexpensive source of electricity generation.  The 
variable, HYDRO, is the percentage of total generation in the state that is provided by 
hydro energy.  It is expected that as the percentage of hydro generation increases, it will 
increase the likelihood of revenue decoupling being implemented in the electricity 
market.  There should be a positive relationship between hydroelectricity generation and 
revenue decoupling implementation.  As the amount of hydroelectric generation in the 
state increases it should increase the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in 
the electricity market.   
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 Historically, one of the characteristics of the electricity utility industry has been 
the direct connection between the utility and the premises of the customer.  The vertically 
integrated utility limited the ability for competition at the retail level.  In recent years, 
increased technology in the industry and increased competition in the electricity markets 
makes it possible for consumers to purchase electricity from competing retailers.  The 
generation portion of the electricity production is largely deregulated.  Before 
deregulation barriers to competition made it impossible for new generators to enter the 
market.  The vertically integrated utility monopolized the industry and generated, 
transmitted and distributed electricity.   
Open access enables new sources of generated electricity to be delivered directly 
to customers.  The distribution phase of the market is still regulated at the state-level, but 
regulation now requires that retailers have open access to the distribution system in most 
states.  Customer choice benefits the consumers because they can shop around for the 
lowest retail prices in the area.  The ability for customers to choose a service provider 
benefits utilities that have competitive advantage in the state or region.  That is, 
companies that can provide the same or similar service at a lower price will tend to attract 
customers while utilities that lack this advantage will lose customers.   
The variable, CHOICE, is a binary variable that indicates if the state allows 
consumers to choose retail providers of electricity.  The presence of consumer choice in 
the state electricity market is an indication that the market is relatively competitive.  
Revenue decoupling adversely affects competition in the market because it reduces the 
effects of market forces on outcomes.  With revenue decoupling reduction in the number 
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of customers due to customer migration would result in an adjustment to revenue to offset 
the lost revenue.  It is expected that consumer choice will be negatively related to the 
likelihood of revenue decoupling being implemented in the electricity market.  That is, 
the presence of consumer choice will decrease the likelihood of revenue decoupling being 
implemented relative to states that do not have consumer choice.    
The likelihood of the regulators implementing revenue decoupling in the 
electricity market should be dependent on the state‟s experience with the policy in the 
electricity market and also in any other markets in the state.  Several states have revenue 
decoupling in the natural gas market which provides additional exposure to the policy.  
The variable, GAS, indicates if the state had revenue decoupling in the natural gas 
market.  It is expected that experience with decoupling in the natural gas market should 
increase the likelihood of the policy being implemented in the electricity market.  The 
relationship between natural gas decoupling and revenue decoupling implementation in 
the electricity market should be positive.   
 
Commission Structure 
The structure of the regulatory commission and political environment in the state 
should play an important role in determining policy outcomes in regulated markets.  
These variables affect how problems are addressed, the solutions considered and the 
resources available to solve problems.  The institutional setting of the states is important 
in the regulatory process as well.  Gormley (1983), Crain and McCormick (1984), and 
Formby et al. (1995) found that the method of selecting commissioners significantly 
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affected regulatory policies in the states.  The findings suggested that elected 
commissioners are more responsive to the public and appointed commissioners conduct 
more policy analysis.  The cost of implementing revenue decoupling is higher for elected 
officials as public satisfaction plays a more direct role in how their performance is 
measured.  The decision to adopt revenue decoupling requires significant resources to 
analyze the potential benefits and costs of the policy.  The variable, ELECTED, indicates 
states that have elected regulators.  It is expected that elected commissioners will be less 
likely to implement revenue decoupling in the electricity market.     
The decisions made by the regulators at the utility commissions are also affected 
by the structure of the commission.  Structure affects the interplay between commissioner 
and interest groups.  The benefits and costs are assessed by the various groups to 
determine how they participate in the process.  A larger commission dilutes the voting 
power of each commissioner making it more difficult to obtain consensus on voting issue.   
These factors favor the status quo and decrease the likelihood of restructuring the 
electricity market.  The variable, COMMISSIONER, indicates the number of 
commissioners at the commission.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that as the number of 
commissioners increases, the likelihood that the commission will adopt revenue 
decoupling in the electricity market will decrease.  There should be a negative 
relationship between the number of commissioners and revenue decoupling 
implementation. 
 The chair of the commission has significant influence over the resources at the 
commission.  The leadership at the commission determines how resources are allocated 
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and how objectives are pursued.  Different chairpersons have different visions for the 
state, and they may attempt to put forth these ideals through the regulatory process (Berry 
1984, Katzman 1980).  At times a change in leadership may be followed by significant 
deviation from the previous policies, and a new direction may be pursued.  On the other 
hand, radical policy decisions may be corrected by changing the leadership of the agency.  
The variable, NEW CHAIR, is an indicator of whether the commission installed a new 
chairperson.  The variable indicates a change in commission leadership over a three year 
window— the year prior to revenue decoupling being implemented, the year revenue 
decoupling was implemented, the year following the implementation of revenue 
decoupling or in 2008.  It is expected that a new chair will increase the likelihood of 
revenue decoupling being implemented in the state electricity market.  A new chair at the 
commission should be positively associated with revenue decoupling implementation in 
the electricity market.   
 The regulatory process is characterized by bargaining and compromises.  In this 
environment the commissioners work with the various interest groups to resolve issues in 
the electricity market and over the years develop close relationships with group 
representatives.  The length of the commissioners‟ term in office is an indicator of how 
strongly these relationships may develop and significantly affect the regulatory outcome 
(Lewis and Sappington, 1991).  Shorter commission terms increase the possibility of 
turnover at the commission.  Increased turnover may be associated with new ideas 
including the possibility of restructuring the market.  The variable, TERM, measures the 
length of the terms of the commissioners in the state.  It is expected that as the length of 
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the commission term increases, the likelihood of revenue decoupling being implemented 
in the electricity market decreases.  There should be a negative relationship between 
revenue decoupling being adopted in the electricity market and the length of the 
commissioners‟ term.   
 
Political Climate 
The political climate affects the way in which residents engage in the regulatory 
process and the demands they will make on the process.  The voting decisions of the state 
residents affect how issues are viewed, the policy alternatives that are considered, and 
how decisions are made. Historically, in the United States, the policy outcomes under 
different political parties have been notably different (Teske 1991).  The two major 
parties in the United States subscribe to different political ideologies and as a result the 
outcomes differ.  In the past, Republican majorities have been associated with reduced 
government participation in market activities.  On the other hand, Democratic majorities 
tend to lead to larger governments, and their policies have been accompanied by more 
government participation and consumer protection. The variable, MAJORITY, indicates 
a Republican majority of the state‟s electoral votes.  The variable is used as a proxy for 
the political climate in the state and the overall ideology of the voting constituent.  It is 
expected that republican control of the state electoral votes will decrease the likelihood of 
revenue decoupling being implemented in the electricity industry.   
The governor is the head of the executive branch of the state and has significant 
influence over the state resources.  The governor through legislative directives affects the 
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agenda of state agencies, including the state utility commissions.  Governors issue energy 
initiatives that guide policy affecting the objectives of the regulatory agencies and the 
regulated industries.  In many states the commissioners are appointed by the Governor.  It 
is assumed that the political ideology of the governor is influential on the policies 
adopted by the commission in the state.  The variable, GOVERNOR, indicates a 
Republican governor in the state.  It is expected that a Republican governor will decrease 
the likelihood of revenue decoupling being implemented in the electricity industry.  
There should be a negative relationship between a Republican governor and revenue 
decoupling being implemented in the electricity market.   
 
Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: DIFF is expected to decrease the likelihood of revenue decoupling 
being adopted in the state electricity market.  
Hypothesis 2:  RESIND is expected to decrease the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling being adopted in the electricity market.     
Hypothesis 3: INDSALES is expected to decrease the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling in the state electricity market.   
Hypothesis 4: SALESCAP is expected to decrease the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling in the electricity market. 
Hypothesis 5: SALESVAR is expected to decrease the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling in the electricity market.   
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Hypothesis 6: GENERATION is expected to decrease the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling being adopted in the electricity market.     
Hypothesis 7: ENTITY is expected to decrease the likelihood that revenue 
decoupling will be adopted in the electricity market.   
Hypothesis 8:  POPDENS is expected to increase the likelihood of the state will 
adopt revenue decoupling in the electricity market.   
Hypothesis 9: INTENSITY is expected to increase the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling in the electricity market.   
            Hypothesis 10: HYDRO is expected to increase the likelihood of revenue  
            decoupling in the electricity market.  
Hypothesis 11: CHOICE is expected to decrease the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling being adopted in the electricity market relative to states that do not 
have consumer choice. 
Hypothesis 12: GAS is expected to increase the likelihood of the revenue 
decoupling in the electricity market.   
Hypothesis 13: The structure of the commission will affect the likelihood of 
revenue decoupling being adopted in the electricity market. 
Hypothesis 13a: ELECTED is expected to decrease the likelihood of 
revenue decoupling in the electricity market.     
Hypothesis 13b:  COMMISSIONER is expected to decrease the 
likelihood of revenue decoupling in the electricity market.  
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Hypothesis 13c: NEWCHAIR is expected to increase the likelihood of 
revenue decoupling in the electricity market.   
Hypothesis 13d: TERM is expected to decrease the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling in the electricity market. 
Hypothesis 14: Legislative environment in the state will affect the likelihood of 
revenue decoupling being adopted in the electricity market. 
Hypothesis 14a: MAJORITY is expected to decrease the likelihood of 
revenue decoupling in the electricity industry.   
Hypothesis 14b: GOVERNOR is expected to decrease the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling in the electricity industry. 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter reviewed revenue decoupling across the states, and described the 
statistical models and the data sets.  The hypotheses were developed and discussed for the 
variables.  The following chapter presents the results of the econometric models. There is 
a comparison of the hypotheses and the results and a brief discussion of the parameter 
estimates.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
Three econometric specifications are used to test the influence of electricity 
market characteristics, commission structure, and state political climate on the decision to 
adopt revenue decoupling in the electricity market.  The results from the econometric 
models are presented below.  The estimated directional relationship, magnitude, and 
significance of each variable are presented; followed by a discussion of the significant 
findings.  The models supports several of the hypotheses and produces several significant 
results that are opposite of hypothesized relationship. Tables 4-1 and 4-2 present the 
variables, hypothesized direction, estimated direction and variable significance for the 
marginal and conditional models, respectively.  
 
Marginal Risk Set Model Results 
 The marginal risk set model investigates the influence of the variables on the 
likelihood of adoption without making the distinction between states that are adopting the 
policy for the first time and states that adopted the policy multiple times.  The results of 
the marginal model indicate that market characteristics, commission structure, and the 
state political climate are influential factors in the adoption of revenue decoupling in the 
state electricity market.   
Table 4-1 present the results of the marginal model (complete results for each 
model specification is provided in Appendix C).  The influence of the variables varies 
under the different specifications; however, the variables HYDRO, INTENSITY, AND 
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ENTITY are significant in all three specifications at 1% or 5% level of significance.  In 
specification (1) of the marginal risk set model the variables, HYDRO, INTENSITY, and 
ENTITY are significant predictors of the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted 
in the state electricity market by the regulators.  HYDRO measures the percentage of 
electricity net generation produced from hydro sources in the state. The model estimated 
a hazard ratio of 1.0425 for the variable; indicating that a 1 percent increase in the 
amount of hydro net generation in the state will increase the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling in the state by 4.25 %. 
Energy intensity, INTENSITY, is the ratio of electricity consumption to state 
GDP.  The variable is estimated to increase the likelihood of revenue decoupling being 
adopted in the state electricity market.  INTENSITY has a hazard ratio of 1.0103.  The 
results indicate that as electricity consumption increases relative to state GDP, the 
likelihood of the state adopting revenue decoupling increases by 1.03 percent.   
The variable, ENTITY, is also significant predictor in specification (1).  ENTITY 
is the ratio of non-public utilities in the state relative to the number of publicly owned 
utilities.  The variable is positively associated with the adoption of revenue decoupling in 
the state electricity market.  The variable, ENTITY, has a hazard ratio of 1.0761.  
Therefore, a 1 unit change in the number of non-public utilities relative to publicly owned 
utilities increases the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in the state by 
7.61%.   
In specification (2) of the marginal risk set model, attributes of the state 
commission structure are added to the model.  These variables include: ELECTED, 
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COMMMISSIONER, NEWCHAIR, and TERM.  The addition of these variables resulted 
in the significance level of some of the market characteristic variables to increase.  In 
specification (2) the presence of customer choice, CHOICE, in the electricity market, the 
selection process of the commissioners, ELECTED, and the term length of the 
commissioners, TERM are also significant predictors of the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling being adopted in the state electricity market.   
The variable, CHOICE, has a value of 1 for states that allow customers to choose 
their electricity supplier and a zero otherwise.  CHOICE is significant at 10% and is 
estimated to be decrease the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in the state 
electricity market.  The hazard ratio of the variable is 0.1010.  The hazard ratio measures 
the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in states with electricity choice 
relative to states without customer choice.  The result indicates that for states that allow 
customer choice the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted is 10.10% of states 
that do not allow customer choice; or the likelihood of adoption decreases by 89.90% 
relative to states without customer choice.   
The variable, ELECTED, designates the process used by the state commission to 
select the commissioners.  A value of 1 is assigned to the variable if the commissioners 
are elected and zero if they are appointed.  ELECTED is estimated to be decrease the 
likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in the electricity market.  The variable is 
significant at 10% in specification (2).  The hazard ratio of the variable is 0.0236.  The 
hazard ratio signifies the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in states where 
commissioners are elected relative to states with appointed commissioners. The result 
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indicates that relative to states with elected commissioners are 97% less likely to adopt 
revenue decoupling than states with appointed commissioners.   
The variable, TERM, is the number of years of commissioner‟s stay in office.  
TERM is negatively associated with the adoption of revenue decoupling and is significant 
at 10% in specification (2).  The hazard ratio for this variable is 0.5057.  The result 
indicates that as the commissioner‟s term in office increases by 1 year the likelihood of 
revenue decoupling being adopted in the state decreases by 49.43%.    
Table 4-1—Marginal Risk Set Model Results 
Variables Hypothes
ized 
Direction 
Estimated 
Direction 
Specification (1) 
Significance 
Specificatio
n (2) 
Significance 
Model (3) 
Significance 
DIFF Negative Indeterminate Not Significant Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant  
RESIND Negative Positive Not Significant Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
INDSALES Negative Indeterminate Not Significant Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
SALESCAP Negative Negative Not Significant Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
SALESVAR Negative Negative Not Significant Not 
Significant 
5% 
GENERATION Negative Negative Not Significant Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
ENTITY Negative Positive 5% 5% 5% 
POPDENS Positive Indeterminate Not Significant Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
INTENSITY Positive Positive 1% 1% 1% 
HYDRO Positive Positive 1% 1% 5% 
CHOICE Negative Negative Not Significant 10% Not 
Significant 
GAS Positive Negative Not Significant Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
ELECTED Negative Negative - 10% 10% 
COMMISSIONER Negative Indeterminate - Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
NEWCHAIR Positive Positive - Not 
Significant 
10% 
TERM Negative Negative - 10% 15% 
MAJORITY  Negative Negative - - 5% 
GOVERNOR Negative Positive - - 5% 
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In addition, the variables HYDRO, INTENSITY, AND ENTITY are also 
significant in the model.  The estimated hazard ratio for HYDRO is 1.043, indicating that 
a 1 percent increase in the amount of hydro generation in state will increase the 
likelihood of revenue decoupling in the state by 4.35 %.  INTENSITY has a hazard ratio 
of 1.0091.  The hazard ratio indicates that as the ratio of electricity consumption increase 
relative to state GDP the likelihood of the state adopting revenue decoupling increases by 
0.91 percent.  ENTITY has a hazard ratio of 1.1520.  Therefore, a 1 unit change in the 
number of non-public utilities relative to publicly owned utilities increases the likelihood 
of revenue decoupling being adopted in the state by 15.20%.   
Specification (3) of the marginal risk set model builds on the previous two 
specifications by adding proxies for the political climate of the state.  Two variables are 
added to the model: MAJORITY and GOVERNOR.   
MAJORITY is a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if the majority of the 
electoral votes in the state are controlled by the Republican Party and a value of zero for 
Democratic majority.  MAJORITY is estimated to decrease the probability of revenue 
decoupling being adopted in the state electricity market.  The hazard ratio indicates the 
likelihood revenue decoupling being adopted by states with a republican majority relative 
to a democratic majority.  The hazard ratio in specification (3) is 0.0970.  The result 
indicates that the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in a state with a 
republican majority is decreased by 90.3% relative to states with a democratic majority.   
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The variable, GOVERNOR, designates the party affiliation of the state Governor.  
The variable takes on the value 1 if the state has a republican governor and zero if the 
state has a democratic governor. GOVERNOR is positive and significant at 5%.  The 
hazard ratio indicates the likelihood revenue decoupling being adopted by states with a 
republican governor relative to a democratic governor.  The estimated hazard ratio for 
GOVERNOR is 28.1612 in specification (3).  The results indicate that states that have a 
republican governor are 27.1612 times more likely to adopt revenue decoupling relative 
to states with a democratic governor.   
The variables HYDRO, INTENSITY, ENTITY, SALESVAR, are also significant 
in specification (3).  HYDRO, INTENSITY, ENTITY, and NEWCHAIR, are estimated 
to be positively related to the adoption of revenue decoupling in the electricity market.  
The hazard ratio for HYDRO is 1.0366, indicating that a 1 percent increase in the amount 
of hydro net generation in state will increase the likelihood of revenue decoupling in the 
state by 3.66 %.  INTENSITY has a hazard ratio of 1.0175.  The results indicate that as 
the ratio of electricity consumption increases relative to state GDP the likelihood of the 
state adopting revenue decoupling increases by 1.75 percent.  The variable, ENTITY, has 
a hazard ratio of 1.1396.  Therefore, a 1 unit change in the number of non-public utilities 
relative to publicly owned utilities increases the likelihood of revenue decoupling being 
adopted in the state by 13.96%.  NEWCHAIR is a binary variable therefore the hazard 
ratio indicates the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in states with a new 
commission chairperson relative to states without that did not have a change in 
leadership.  The hazard ratio for NEWCHAIR is 4.7495.  The result indicates that as a 
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state with a new commission chair is 3.7495 times more likely to adopt revenue 
decoupling than a commission that does not have a change in leadership.    
In specification (3) of the marginal risk set model, the variables—SALESVAR 
and ELECTED—are negative and significant at 5% and 10%, respectively.  The estimate 
supports the hypothesis that higher sales variance in the electricity market is expected to 
decrease the probability that revenue decoupling will be adopted in the state.   
ELECTED indicates if the state regulators are elected by residents of the state or 
appointed by the Governor. The hazard ratio of the variable is 0.0138.  A hazard ratio of 
less than 1 indicates negative relationship between the variable and adoption of revenue 
decoupling.  The hazard ratio indicates the likelihood of revenue decoupling being 
adopted in states where commissioners are elected relative to states with appointed 
commissioners. The result indicates that relative to states with elected commissioners are 
98.62% less likely to adopt revenue decoupling than states with appointed 
commissioners.   
 
Conditional Risk Set Model Results 
 
 In the conditional risk set model the distinction is made between first and second 
adoptions of revenue decoupling in the state electricity market.  The estimated direction 
of influence each variable are presented in Table 4-2 (the complete estimated results are 
provided in Appendix C).  The influence of the variables differs under the different 
specifications; however, the variables HYDRO, INTENSITY, AND ENTITY are 
significant in all three specifications.   
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 In specification (1) of the conditional risk set model the variables, HYDRO, 
INTENSITY, and ENTITY are significant predictors of the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling being adopted in by the state electricity market.  HYDRO generation in the 
state is estimated to increase the likelihood of adoption.  The estimated hazard ratio for 
HYDRO is 1.0519; indicating that a 1 percent increase in the amount of hydro generation 
in state will increase the likelihood of revenue decoupling in the state by 5.19 %. 
Energy intensity, INTENSITY, is the ratio of electricity consumption to state 
GDP. The variable is estimated to increase the likelihood of revenue decoupling being 
adopted in the state electricity market.  INTENSITY has a hazard ratio of 1.0127.  The 
results indicate that as the ratio of electricity consumption increases relative to state GDP 
the likelihood of the state adopting revenue decoupling increases by 1.27 percent.   
The variable, ENTITY, is also significant in specification (1).  ENTITY is the 
ratio of non-public utilities in the state relative to the number of publicly owned utilities.  
The variable is positively associated with the adoption of revenue decoupling in the state 
electricity market.  The variable, ENTITY, has a hazard ratio of 1.1190.  Therefore, a 1 
unit change in the number of non-public utilities relative to publicly owned utilities 
increases the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in the state by 11.90%. 
In specification (2) attributes of the state commission structure is added to the 
model.  The variables—ELECTED and SALESVAR—are significant in specification (2).  
The variable, ELECTED, is significant at 10% and is estimated to be negatively 
associated with the adoption of revenue decoupling in the state electricity market.  
ELECTED is a binary variable and takes on the value 1 if state commissioners are 
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selected through an election process and a value of 0 if the commissioners are appointed.  
The hazard ratio for ELECTED is 0.0329.  A hazard ratio of less than 1 indicates 
negative relationship between the variable and adoption of revenue decoupling.   
Table 4-2—Conditional Risk Set Model 
 
Variables Hypothesized 
Direction 
Estimated 
Direction 
Specification 
(1) 
Significance 
Specification 
(2) 
Significance 
Specification 
(3) 
Significance 
DIFF Negative Indeterminate Not 
significant 
Not significant Not 
significant 
RESIND Negative Positive Not 
significant 
Not significant Not 
significant 
INDSALES Negative Indeterminate Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
significant 
SALESCAP Negative Negative Not 
significant 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
SALESVAR Negative Negative Not 
Significant 
15% Not 
Significant 
GENERATION Negative Negative Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
ENTITY Negative Positive 5% 10% 15% 
POPDENS Positive Indeterminate Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
INTENSITY Positive Positive 5% 5% 10% 
HYDRO Positive Positive 1% 1%  5% 
CHOICE Negative Negative Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
GAS Positive Indeterminate Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
ELECTED Negative Negative - 5% 15% 
COMMISSIONER Negative Indeterminate - Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
NEWCHAIR Positive Positive - Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
TERM Negative Negative - Not significant Not 
Significant 
MAJORITY  Negative Negative - - 10% 
GOVERNOR Negative Positive - - 15% 
 
The hazard ratio indicates the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in states 
where commissioners are elected relative to states with appointed commissioners. The 
result indicates that relative to states with elected commissioners are 96.71% less likely to 
adopt revenue decoupling than states with appointed commissioners. 
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Also, HYDRO, INTENSITY, AND ENTITY are also significant in the 
specification.  The estimated hazard ratio for HYDRO is 1.0435; indicating that a 1 
percent increase in the amount of hydro generation in state will increase the likelihood of 
revenue decoupling in the state by 4.35 %.  INTENSITY has a hazard ratio of 1.0091.  
The results indicate that as the ratio of electricity consumption increases relative to state 
GDP the likelihood of the state adopting revenue decoupling increases by 0.91 percent.  
The variable, ENTITY, has a hazard ratio of 1.1520.  Therefore, a 1 unit change in the 
number of non-public utilities relative to publicly owned utilities increases the likelihood 
of revenue decoupling being adopted in the state by 15.20%.   
Specification (3) builds on the previous two specifications by adding proxies 
measuring the effect of political party affiliation on the adoption of revenue decoupling.  
Two variables are added to the model: MAJORITY and GOVERNOR.   
MAJORITY is a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if the majority of the 
electoral votes in the state are controlled by the Republican Party and a value of zero for 
democratic majority.  Majority is a binary variable that has a value of 1 if the Republican 
Party had a majority of the electoral votes in the state in that year.  MAJORITY is 
estimated to be negatively associated with the probability of revenue decoupling being 
adopted in the state electricity market.  The hazard ratio indicates the likelihood revenue 
decoupling being adopted by states with a republican majority relative to a democratic 
majority.  The hazard ratio in this specification (3) is 0.0571.  The results indicate that 
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states that have a republican majority are at a decreased risk of adopting revenue 
decoupling, by 94.29%, relative to states with a democratic majority.   
The variable, GOVERNOR, indicates the party affiliation of the state governor.  
GOVERNOR is positive and significant at 5%.  It is estimated that a Republican 
governor increases the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in the electricity 
market.  GOVERNOR is a binary variable that has a value of 1 if the republican governor 
in the state that year.  The hazard ratio indicates the likelihood revenue decoupling being 
adopted by states with a republican Governor relative to a democratic Governor.  The 
hazard ratio in specification (3) is 59.9820.  The results indicate that states that have a 
republican Governor are 58.9820 times more likely to adopt revenue decoupling relative 
to states with a democratic Governor.   
The variables, HYDRO, INTENSITY, and ENTITY, are significant in model (3) 
at 5%, 10%, and 15%, respectively.  The model estimated a hazard ratio of 1.0507 for the 
variable; indicating that a 1 percent increase in the amount of hydro generation in state 
will increase the likelihood of revenue decoupling in the state by 5.07 %.  INTENSITY 
has a hazard ratio of 1.0234.  The results indicate that as the ratio of electricity 
consumption increases relative to state GDP the likelihood of the state adopting revenue 
decoupling increases by 2.34% percent.  The variable, ENTITY, has a hazard ratio of 
1.2203.  Therefore, a 1 unit change in the ratio of public utilities relative to independent 
power producers will increases the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in the 
state by 22.03%.   
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Hypotheses 
 
 The following section compares each hypothesis to the estimated influence of the 
variables, discussing the estimated direction and the significance for each variable.   
Hypothesis 1: Not Supported. The general effect of the variable DIFF on the adoption of 
revenue decoupling is indeterminate from the models.  The estimated relationship is 
negative in four of the six specifications and positive in the other two specifications.  
DIFF is negative when market structure and commission structure are included while the 
relationship is estimated to be positive when the political climate of the state is taken into 
account.      
Hypothesis 2:  Not Significant.  The evidence suggests that the association between 
RESIND and the adoption of revenue decoupling is positive.  RESIND is positive but not 
significant in the models.   
Hypothesis 3: Not Supported.  The estimated relationship between INDSALES and the 
adoption of revenue decoupling is indeterminate.  The association between the variable 
and the policy adoption varies across models and specifications.   
Hypothesis 4: Not Significant.  Sales per capita, SALESCAP, is estimated to be 
negatively related to the adoption of revenue decoupling but is not significant.   
Hypothesis 5: Weakly Supported.  SALESVAR is negative and significant in two of the 
six specifications.  Each model suggests that sale volatility decreases the likelihood of the 
state adopting revenue decoupling in the electricity market.     
Hypothesis 6: Not Significant.  GENERATION is negative but not significant in each 
specification.     
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Hypothesis 7: Opposite.  ENTITY is positive and significant.  The evidence indicates 
that as the number of non-public utilities increase relative to the number of public utilities 
it increase the likelihood of revenue decoupling being implemented in the electricity 
market.  ENTITY is positive and significant at 5% in the specification that examines the 
effect of market structure on revenue decoupling adoption.  When commission structure 
is added in specification (2) the variable is positive and significant at 5% in the marginal 
model and significant at 10% in the conditional model.   In specification (3), the addition 
of proxies for the state political climate the variable is positive and significant at 5% and 
15% in the marginal and conditional models, respectively.   
Hypothesis 8:  Not Supported.  The effect of population density on the policy outcome is 
indeterminate.  The variable is not significant in either model and is positive when only 
market structure and commission structure are addressed in the models.  The estimated 
relationship is negative when the state political climate is taken into account.  
Hypothesis 9: Supported.  INTENSITY is positive and significant in all the 
specifications.  The evidence supports the hypothesis that high electricity consumption 
relative to GDP increases the likelihood of revenue decoupling being implemented in the 
electricity market.  INTENSITY is significant at 5% in the marginal models and is 
significant at 5% and 10% in the conditional models.    
Hypothesis 10: Supported.  HYDRO is positive and significant in all the models.  The 
evidence indicates that as the amount of hydroelectricity generation in the state increases 
the likelihood of revenue decoupling being implemented in the electricity market is 
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increased.  HYDRO is positive and significant at 5% in both models and each 
specification.   
Hypothesis 11: Weakly Supported.  CHOICE is negative and is significant in one of the 
six specifications.  The models indicate that consumer choice in the state electricity 
market decreases the likelihood that the policy will be implemented relative to states that 
do not have consumer choice.   
Hypothesis 12: Not Significant.  The presence of revenue decoupling in the state natural 
gas market, GAS, does not significantly affect the likelihood of revenue decoupling in the 
electricity market.  The estimated relationship is negative in five of the six specifications 
but is not significant in any case.   
Hypothesis 13: Weakly Supported.   
Hypothesis 13a: Supported.  ELECTED is negative and significant in the 
models suggesting that states with elected commissioners are less likely to 
implement revenue decoupling in the electricity market than states with 
appointed commissioners.  ELECTED is significant at 5% and 10% in 
marginal model and is significant at 5% and 10% in conditional model.   
Hypothesis 13b:  Not Supported.  COMMISSIONER does not 
significantly affect the likelihood of revenue decoupling implementation.  
The effect of the variable is indeterminate as the sign is sensitive to the 
specification.   
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Hypothesis 13c: Weakly Supported.  NEWCHAIR is positive in each of 
the specifications.  The variable is significant in one of the four applicable 
specifications.     
Hypothesis 13d: Weakly Supported.  Term length is negative in both 
models.  The variable is significant at 5% and 10% in the marginal model.  
However, the estimated relationship is not significant in the conditional 
model.  The estimated relationship suggests that as the term length of the 
commissioners increase the likelihood of revenue decoupling being 
adopted in the state electricity market decreases.     
Hypothesis 14: Supported.   
Hypothesis 14a: Supported.  The evidence indicates that a Republican 
control of the state legislative votes decreases the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling being adopted in the electricity market.  MAJORITY is 
negative and significant at 5% and 10% in the marginal model and 
conditional model, respectively. 
Hypothesis 14b: Weakly Supported.  GOVERNOR is positive and 
significant in the models.  Suggesting that Republican control of the state 
Legislature decreases the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted 
in the state electricity market.  The variable, GOVERNOR, is significant 
at 5% in the marginal model and is significant at 15% in the conditional 
model.   
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Robustness 
 In the study, two models and three specifications are tested.  The marginal 
risk set model makes no distinction between the first and second occurrence of revenue 
decoupling in the state electricity market.  Each individual is placed in the risk set for 
each stratum, i.e. number of occurrences.  The conditional risk set model assumes that the 
onset of a second event is conditional upon the individual experiencing the first event.  
Therefore, the risk set for each stratum is differentiated by the number of previous events.  
Different underlying assumptions allows for an examination of how the results vary 
under the different conditions.  
The Wald statistic produce by each specification is significant at 1%.  Also, 
specification (1), (2), and (3) produce similar results for each model under different 
assumptions about the nature of the occurrence of the events and when and how the risk 
set, i.e. the potential for state adopting the policy, is defined.  Even though the models use 
different assumptions the specifications produce similar directional relationship between 
the adoption of revenue decoupling and the covariates, and the magnitude of the effects 
of the significant covariates.   
Variance inflation factor (VIF) was used to test for multicollinearity in each 
specification.  The results showed that several variables were highly correlated.  
Variables with a VIF of greater than 10 were deleted and the regressions were re-
estimated.  The new specifications did not alter the major findings of the study.  The 
magnitude of the coefficients was affected by the new specification but the overall 
significance, directional relationships, and the significance of the individual variables 
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were similar. The estimates from the full and reduced specifications are presented in 
Appendix C.  
 
Conclusion 
 The study examines the effect of market structure, commission structure, and 
political climate on the adoption of revenue decoupling in the state electricity market.  
The evidence suggests the market structure, commission structure, and the political 
climate significantly affect the probability of revenue decoupling being adopted in the 
electricity industry.  The attributes of the electricity market that significantly affect the 
likelihood of adoption are the amount of hydroelectricity generation, HYDRO, in the 
state, the relative concentration of non-public to public utilities, ENTITY, and state 
output relative to electricity consumption, INTENSITY.  The three variables are found to 
be positive and significantly related to the adoption of revenue decoupling.  
 The findings also suggest that the commission structure and the political climate 
also affect the adoption of revenue decoupling.  Elected commissioners, ELECTED, are 
found to be less likely to adopt revenue decoupling in the electricity market than 
appointed commissioners.  Also, as the term length of the commissioners, TERM, 
increases the probability of revenue decoupling being adopted decreases.  Republican 
control of the state legislative votes, MAJORITY, is estimated to decrease the likelihood 
of revenue decoupling being adopted in the electricity market relative to a state with a 
Democratic majority.  On the other hand, a Republican governor, GOVERNOR, is 
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predicted to increases the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted relative to a 
Democratic governor.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The results of the econometric models indicate that the patterns of influence differ 
across the models and specifications.  However, despite the differences in the 
assumptions, the results exhibit some consistency in the relationship and influence of 
specific covariates on the probability of the states adopting revenue decoupling in the 
electricity markets.  Both the models estimate a significant relationship between the 
adoption of revenue decoupling and the amount of hydroelectricity generation, HYDRO, 
in the state; the amount of electricity consumption relative to the state GDP, 
INTENSITY; the ratio of non-public to public utilities, ENTITY, in the state; the method 
of selecting the commissioners, ELECTED; the political party that has the majority of the 
electoral votes, MAJORITY, in the state; and the party affiliation of the governor, 
GOVERNOR.     
 
Influence of Market Characteristics 
 The first specification tested in the study examines the influence of market 
characteristics on the probability of revenue decoupling being adopted in the electricity 
market.  The results of both the marginal model and conditional model indicate that the 
amount of hydroelectricity generation, HYDRO, the energy intensity, INTENSITY, and 
the ratio of non-public to public electricity entities, ENTITY, are important market 
characteristics that affect the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in the 
electricity market.   
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HYDRO is positive and significant at 1% in both models.  An examination of the 
sequence of adoption of revenue decoupling across the states shows that states with the 
highest amount of hydroelectricity generation were among the first to adopt the policy.  
The states that adopted revenue decoupling in the 1980s and 1990s have higher amounts 
of electricity generation from hydro sources relative to states that adopted in later years.  
The hypothesized relationship between the adoption of revenue decoupling and the 
amount of hydro electricity generation is positive.  The results support the hypothesis in 
both models.  Hydroelectricity is a low cost source in the production of electricity.  The 
evidence suggests that revenue decoupling is being adopted states with abundant source 
of low cost generation.   
The variable, INTENSITY, is positive and significant at a 5% in both models.  
INTENSITY is the ratio of retail electricity sales in the state divided by the state GDP 
indexed on 1978 GDP.  Analysis of the sequence of adoption reveals that energy intensity 
was relatively higher for early adopting states.  The estimated relationship supports the 
hypothesized direction; as it was expected that state with high energy intensity, that is, 
high electricity consumption relative to state output, would be more likely to adopt a 
policy aimed at increasing efficiency.  Regulators in these states may be adopting the 
policy to become more efficient users of electricity.  Revenue decoupling through rate 
design is aimed at better aligning costs and benefits in the electricity market.  The results 
suggest states that have high electricity consumption relative to state output are more 
likely to adopt revenue decoupling.   
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The variable ENTITY is also an important predictor of revenue decoupling 
adoption.  The states that adopted revenue decoupling are among the highest ratio in the 
country.  ENTITY is positive and significant at 1%.  The estimated direction of the 
relationship between revenue decoupling adoption and ENTITY is opposite to the 
hypothesized direction.  ENTITY is used as a proxy for the level of competition in the 
market between regulated and non-regulated electricity entities.  Traditional regulation is 
profitable to most utilities because sales are positively related to revenues.  The expected 
growth in demand and increased dependence on the electricity market creates incentives 
for utilities to oppose regulatory policies that may limit the profitability.  However, 
revenue decoupling could be in the utilities‟ interest when competition reduces the 
potential for meeting revenue requirements.   
The estimate suggests that as the number of non-public, regulated utilities, 
increase relative the number of public utilities state are more likely to adopt revenue 
decoupling.  In this sense, as the number of non-public utilities increase, all else the 
same, market share to each utility is decreased.  The possibility of some guaranteed 
revenue through the regulatory process may be beneficial to the regulated firms.  Also, in 
most state utility commission regulate the non-public utilities but do not have jurisdiction 
over the public utilities.  The results suggest that are regulators may be adopting revenue 
decoupling to more effectively monitor the non-public utilities in the state.   
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Influence of Commission Structure 
 In specification (2) the attributes of the state commission are added to market 
characteristics to predict the influence on revenue decoupling adoption.  The results 
suggest that the commission structure significantly influence on the adoption of revenue 
decoupling in the electricity market.  However, influence of covariates differs between 
the marginal risk set model and the conditional risk set model.  The method used to select 
commissioners, ELECTED, is significant at 10% and 5% in the marginal model and 
conditional model, respectively.  The length of the commissioners‟ term, TERM, is 
significant at 10% in the marginal risk set model.   
The presence of customer choice in the electricity market is significant at 10% in 
specification (2) of the marginal model; while, in specification (2) of the conditional 
model, sales variance, SALESVAR, is significant at 15%.  The variables HYDRO, 
INTENSITY, and ENTITY are also positive and significant in both model specifications.    
 The method of selection—ELECTED—significantly affects the adoption of 
revenue decoupling.  The predicted influence is supported in both models.   The results 
indicate that elected regulators are less likely to adopt revenue decoupling than regulators 
that are appointed.  Previous research, Gormley (1983), Crain and McCormick (1984), 
and Formby et al. (1995), suggest that elected regulators are more responsive to the needs 
of the public and less likely to carry out detailed analysis than appointed regulators.  The 
findings suggest that this may be the case as the variable is negatively related to the 
likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted in the state electricity market.  It is 
arguable that the elected commissioners may be more susceptible to pressures from 
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interest groups in the state as they go through the election process.  The groups that may 
oppose the policy in the state are at an organizational advantage due to their size and 
resources.  Revenue decoupling may limit the profitability of the utilities, and they have a 
vested interest in the matter.  Despite, the proposed benefits to the state, in general, 
elected commissioners are less likely to adopt revenue decoupling the appointed 
regulators.   
Additional investigation of the states with elected regulators shows that these 
states are largely representative of the lower income states in country.  The elected states 
are: Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina South Dakota and Virginia (National Association of 
Regulatory Utility Commissioners). The commissioners at the Nebraska Public Service 
Commission are also elected but the state‟s electricity market is regulated by the 
Nebraska Power Review Board, whose commissioners are appointed.   
Some of these states rank among the lowest in personal income per capita, total 
state expenditure per capita, and total state expenditure in recent decades, and this is 
supported by statistics from 2008.  Eleven of the 12 states are ranked 25
th
 or lower in 
personal income per capita by Statistical Abstract of the United States.  According to the 
Kaiser Family Foundation ranking of per capita state spending, six of the states with 
elected regulators are in the bottom 20 in the country and only two are in the top 10 in 
2008.  Also, the states represent a quarter of the bottom 20 states with the least amount of 
total state spending in 2008.  The three lowest ranked states were South Dakota, North 
Dakota, and Montana.  The evidence indicates states with elected regulators are less 
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affluent and less likely to adopt revenue decoupling in the electricity market.  The 
financial constraints on the states with elected commissioners may explain why the other 
researchers found that these states are less likely to carry out detailed policy analysis.   
The variable, TERM, is negative and significant in the marginal risk set model.  
The findings suggest that as the length of the regulators‟ term increases the likelihood of 
revenue decoupling adopted in the state electricity market decreases.  It is expected that 
as the tenure of the regulator increases the amount of turnover at the commission 
decreases.  Decreased turnover may be associated with less influx of new ideas into the 
commission including ideas about revenue decoupling policies.  Most decisions at the 
commission are made via majority votes.  When regulators work together on many issues 
over many years voting patterns may develop.  Increased commission turnover could 
reduce the amount of time the regulators work together and decreases the likelihood of 
these relationships being formed.  The results support the hypothesis that as the term 
length increases the likelihood of the policy being adopted is decreased.   
 The addition of commission structure increases the significance of customer 
choice, CHOICE, relative to the specification that examined the influence of market 
characteristics.  The hypothesized negative relationship is supported by the results.  As 
discussed earlier, revenue decoupling is expected to benefit customers because it reduces 
the amount of excess revenue collected by the utilities.  Revenue decoupling is also 
expected to benefit utilities in markets where the utility‟s customer base may be 
deteriorated.  Customer choice in the electricity market indicates that customer are able to 
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choice their electricity supplier, i.e. the electricity market in the state is relatively 
competitive.   
Revenue decoupling in the state electricity market is expected to decrease the 
amount of competition by guaranteeing the utility the revenue requirement authorized by 
the commission even with lower than expected sales.  The results suggest that states with 
customer choice are less likely to adopt revenue decoupling in the electricity market 
relative to states without customer choice.  Revenue decoupling is a mechanism to better 
align costs and benefits in the electricity market.  It is a policy in the regulators‟ tool kit 
to improve the way utilities are regulated.  Consumer choice decreases the amount of 
regulation in the electricity market and may increase competition.  The results suggest 
that states with higher levels of competition are less likely to adopt revenue to monitor 
utilities.   
 In specification (2) of the conditional risk set model, the variable sales variance, 
SALESVAR, is estimated to significantly affect the probability of revenue decoupling 
being adopted.  Sales variance is negative and significant at 15%.  The results support 
that hypothesis that increased sales variance will decrease the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling being adopted in the electricity market.  Over the past decades the electricity 
market has been characterized by increasing sales due to growing demand.  The trends in 
the electricity market indicate that the variance in sales is expected to be positively 
skewed.  Under traditional regulation the revenue requirement are set based on an 
estimated level of sales and utilities are allowed to keep the excess revenue when sales 
are greater than estimated.  The utilities are more likely to oppose revenue decoupling in 
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state where there is a positive variance in sales.  The results support the hypothesis that as 
the sales variance increases the probability of adopting revenue decoupling decreases.  It 
is in the utilities‟ interest to oppose revenue decoupling as it is potentially profit limiting.  
The results suggest that they may be effective in achieving their objectives.        
 
Influence of Political Climate 
 In addition to the market structure and the commission structure the third 
specification examines the influence of the state political climate on the likelihood of 
revenue decoupling being adopted in the electricity market.  The adoption of policy in the 
regulated market is dependent on the political feasibility of the policy in the state.  The 
political climate of the state is expected to affect the manner in which issues are address, 
the alternatives that are considered, and the policy outcomes in the state.  Specification 
(3) adds the political affiliation of the state Governor (GOVERNOR) and which political 
party has a majority of the electoral votes (MAJORITY) in the state.  In the marginal 
model both variables are significant at 5% while in the conditional models the 
MAJORITY is significant at 10% and GOVERNOR is significant at 15%.   
The variables ENTITY, HYDRO, INTENSITY, and ELECTED are estimated to 
have significant influence in both models.  In the marginal risk set model sales variance, 
SALESVAR, new chair, NEWCHAIR, and the commission term length, TERM, are also 
significant. 
 In most states the Governor plays an important role in the selection of the 
commissioners.  The governor either nominates the candidates who are then approved by 
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the state legislature, or the Governor chooses the commissioners from nominated 
individuals.  In addition, the Governor is responsible for the overall welfare of the state.  
They are the head of the executive branch of the state and are responsible for 
administering the state budget.  The agenda of the Governor is important in determining 
what policies are pursued in the state, how the policies are pursued, and how resources 
are distributed among the state agencies.     
The estimated relationship between the party affiliation of the state Governor and 
the probability of revenue decoupling being adopted in the state electricity market is 
positive and significant at 5% and 15% in the marginal and conditional models, 
respectively.  The result suggests that states with a republican governor are more likely to 
adopt revenue decoupling that states with a democratic governor.  The relationship is 
opposite of the hypothesized relationship.  It was expected that a republic governor would 
reduce the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted by the state commission as 
historically the Republican Party has been associated with smaller government and more 
free market activities, which suggest less regulation of market activities.   
Separating the states based on the party affiliation of the governor highlights the 
following evidence.  Despite having lower average energy intensity, lower average 
hydroelectricity generation, and 8 of the 12 states with elected regulators, a Republican 
governor is still associated with increased likelihood of adoption relative to a Democratic 
governor.  Also, Republican governorship is also associated with significantly higher 
number of non-public electricity entities relative to public entities, ENTITY; this variable 
is associated with an increased likelihood of policy adoption.  It is argued that under 
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significant competition among electricity utilities the prospects guaranteed revenues to 
the utilities—no matter how little—may be attractive.  The variables are predicted to 
increase the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted and suggest that they have a 
strong correlation with a republican governor.    
 The variable MAJORITY designates whether the Republican Party or the 
Democratic Party has the majority of the electoral votes in the most recent Presidential 
Election.  Electoral votes are the party affiliation associated with the Senators and the 
Representatives from each state.  A majority for one party is used as a proxy for the 
overall political climate of the state.  MAJORITY is negative and significant at 5% in 
specification (3).  The results support the hypothesis that a Republican majority decreases 
the likelihood of the revenue decoupling being implemented in the state electricity 
market.  States with a Republican majority have a lower average amount of 
hydroelectricity generation and lower average energy intensity which are also estimated 
to significantly increase the likelihood of policy adoption.   
In addition, states with a Republican majority have significantly lower non-public 
electricity entities relative to public entities.  The variable ENTITY is estimated to 
increase the likelihood of policy adoption.  A lower amount of non-public or regulated 
electricity utilities in the state may be associated with a less competitive private supply 
and larger market share to the utilities, all else the same.  The evidence support the 
hypothesis that a Republican majority in a state should decrease the likelihood of revenue 
decoupling being implemented in the state electricity market.   
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The variable, NEWCHAIR, is positive and significant at 10% marginal risk set 
model when the political climate of the state is added.  The result supports the 
hypothesized relationship which was based on the assumption that a new chairperson at 
the commission is likely to increase the probability that the state adopts revenue 
decoupling in the electricity market.  It is believed that new chairperson will bring new 
ideas to the commission and may be more open to policy changes than an incumbent 
chairperson.    
The results of the econometric models suggest that assumptions of the model 
produce different patterns of relationship between the covariates and the probability of 
revenue decoupling being adopted in the state electricity market.  Despite the differences 
the models show some consistency in the relationships.  The characteristics of the 
electricity market, the structure of the commissions, and the political climate of the state 
significantly affect the probability of revenue decoupling being adopted.   
 
States that Repealed Revenue Decoupling 
 The discussion now turns to the states that repealed revenue decoupling.  In each 
case, the rationale for adopting revenue decoupling is to remove utility disincentive to 
promote energy conservation or efficiency.  Listed in Table 5-1 are the states that have 
repealed revenue decoupling, the years the policy was repealed or suspended in 
electricity market, and the reason for such actions the policy.  The table displays the 
states that adopted revenue decoupling before the year 2000 discontinued the policy for at 
least a few years.  Reports by the utility commission in Maine and Florida cited two main 
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reasons for the discontinuation of the policy: dissatisfaction with the policy and market 
restructuring.  This section of the paper examines the efforts to restructure the electricity 
market and cited reasons for dissatisfaction with revenue decoupling.   
Table 5-1—States that Repealed Revenue Decoupling 
 
State Years of Repeal Reason for 
Discontinuing 
CA 1995 Market Restructuring 
FL 1997 Dissatisfaction 
ME 1993 Dissatisfaction 
MT 1998 Market Restructuring 
NY 1996 Market Restructuring 
OR 2001 Market Restructuring 
WA 1995 Market Restructuring 
 
 There are several key elements of the electricity market that are directly affected 
by revenue decoupling: the number of units sold and the collection of revenue 
requirement.  A much publicized objective of revenue decoupling is to encourage utilities 
to promote energy conservation and energy efficiency among their customers.  Revenue 
decoupling mechanisms breaks the traditional relationship between sales and revenue.  
The mechanisms allow for automatic adjustments to collected revenue to match the 
authorized revenue.      
The evidence suggests that five of the seven states—California, Oregon, Montana, 
New York, and Washington—that adopted revenue decoupling in the 1980s and 1990s 
discontinued the policy when the state restructured or considered restructuring the 
electricity market.  According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the 
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state utility commission in California issued an order to restructure the electricity market 
in the state.  In 1996, the state enacted a bill that, among other things, froze electricity 
rates at 1996 level.  The combination of this legislation discontinued revenue decoupling 
in the electricity market.   
In the state of Oregon, revenue decoupling was authorized as a pilot program in 
the late 1990s.  In 1999, the state of Oregon passed an electricity restructuring bill which 
lead to gradual deregulation between 1999 and 2001 (EIA).  According to a report by 
Pacific Economic Group, the utilities in Oregon chose not to extend the revenue 
decoupling programs in the state citing changes in the regulatory environment as a reason 
(52).  In the state of New York the state utility commission enacted a restructuring plan 
that would be phased in over two years.  The New York Public Service commission 
issued an order requiring utilities to submit restructuring plans in 1996 (EIA). 
The state of Washington and the state of Montana also discontinued revenue 
decoupling in the mid to late 1990s.  Washington‟s utility commission began 
investigating retail choice and restructuring issues in the electricity industry in 1994 
(EIA).  The EIA reports that the commission issued its final report in 1995 in favor of a 
gradual approach to retail choice and market restructuring.  Montana began the transition 
to competition in the electricity market in 1997 when the state enacted the Electricity 
Industry Restructuring and Customer Choice Act.   
Despite these states repealing revenue decoupling, their experiences were largely 
positive resulting in three—California, Oregon, and New York—of the five states re-
adopting the policy between 2001 and 2008.  The policy is still used in the states as 
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mechanism to reduce utility disincentive to promote energy conservation and energy 
efficiency.   
The remaining early adopting states, Maine and Florida, were dissatisfied with the 
outcome of revenue decoupling in the electricity market.  Dissatisfaction with revenue 
decoupling stems from the inability to track energy conservation efforts when sales are 
significantly less than expected.  In these states revenue decoupling did not make 
accommodation for instances when demand for electricity is significantly lower that 
estimated; for example in an economic downturn.  The Maine Public Utility Commission 
adopted a three year trial of revenue decoupling in 1991.  After adopting the policy the 
state experienced a recession which lowered the amount of electricity consumption.  In 
2004, the Maine Public Utility Commission stated that the lower sales resulted in 
substantial accumulated deferrals during the period which the utility was entitled to 
recover under the mechanism design (29).   The Maine Public Utility Commission 
reported in 2004 that revenue decoupling does not “provide a positive incentive for 
utilities to promote or support energy efficiency or conservation programs” (27).  The 
mechanism only makes the utilities financially neutral to these activities (27).   
Similarly, in Florida the utility commission adopted a three year pilot of revenue 
decoupling in 1995.  In a 2008 report to the governor, the Florida Public Service 
Commission stated that residential revenue fluctuated widely over the period of revenue 
decoupling due to weather variations and that the commission was unable to determine 
the association between conservation and lost revenue (23).  A letter to the commission 
from the utility deemed the pilot unsuccessful for three reasons: 1) weather variation 
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overshadowed energy conservation; 2) complexity of the decoupling mechanism; 3) 
decoupling may be adverse to possible industry restructuring (23).  The Florida Public 
Service Commission staff concluded that “the greatest impact of the decoupling 
experiment was the neutralization of variances in the utility‟s revenue due to variations in 
weather (24).  Also the results of the experiment indicated that the utility exceeded its 
megawatt goals during the experiment (24).    
 The experiences of Maine and Florida are examples one of the major 
shortcomings of revenue decoupling.  If not implemented properly, the mechanism can 
shift substantial risk from the utility to the customers.  The shifting of risk is exacerbated 
when unforeseen events deem forecasts to be imprecise.  Weather variation and economic 
events in the state increase the likelihood that the forecasts of sales may be inaccurate.  
Revenue decoupling should be designed to ensure that neither the customers nor the 
utilities are exposed to increased risk due to these events.   
  To minimize this risk the regulators need to accurately track the costs of the utility 
to ensure prudence.  Whether under traditional rate making or revenue decoupling, the 
ability to track utility cost is difficult task.  In either case rate design is based on approved 
revenue and estimated levels of sales.  The utility has to submit estimated demand years 
in advance to ensure system reliability.  In many cases, once investment spending is 
approved—that is, procurement contracts or plant and equipment spending—it is difficult 
to adjust these costs for changes in consumer behavior.     
Revenue decoupling is an excellent mechanism to promote energy conservation 
and energy efficiency if the market conditions are highly predictable or when forecasts 
 114 
under-estimate sales in the market.  In predictable situations the variation in sales is 
relatively small and will be associated with small adjustments to revenue and prices.  
Some commissions approve rate caps which will cover these small adjustments—that is, 
rates may not be allowed to increase or decrease by more than a fixed percentage.  The 
revenue decoupling mechanism will reduce over-collection of revenue when sales are 
greater with a rate cap in place and minimize bill variation.  Persistent over-collection 
allows the commission to adjust rates and provide credits to the customers. Also, the 
commission, depending on the design, will have flexibility in adjusting the mechanism to 
reduce over-collection.   
Revenue decoupling places the regulators in a precarious situation when sales are 
less than estimated.   They authorized utility to incur the costs and then have to make 
adjustments when the estimated do not come to fruition.  In a market that is characterized 
by substantial amounts of fixed costs the total costs incurred by the utility may not vary 
because the variable costs of production are a small relative to the fixed costs.  As a result 
the utilities expenditures are made based on projected demand in the market.  When sales 
are lower than expected and especially in situations where a significant portion of the 
company‟s cost structure is fixed, under-collection of revenue may affect the financial 
integrity of the company.  Regulators have to keep this in mind when designing revenue 
decoupling.   
 The review of the states that repealed revenue decoupling suggests that states 
adopted revenue decoupling in the electricity market to incentivize utilities to promote 
energy conservations and energy efficiency in the electricity market.  Seven states have 
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repealed revenue decoupling.  The evidence shows that five of these states repealed the 
policy due to market restructuring; however, three of the five states readopted the policy.  
The other two early adopting states repealed the policy because the policy was deemed to 
be ineffective in achieving the policy objectives.       
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CHAPTER SIX 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Recommendations 
Revenue decoupling breaks the traditional relationship between sales and revenue 
in the electricity market by ensuring the utility collects the authorized level of revenues 
regardless of the amount of sales.  The desire to remove the disincentive is to promote 
energy conservation and energy efficiency programs.  Revenue decoupling permits 
automatic adjustments to the price of electricity in response to changes in sales that 
reduce revenue collected by the utility.  A major implication of the mechanism is that it 
affects the distribution of risk in the market.  The components of revenue decoupling 
such as cost tracking, revenue tracking, and rate caps are designed to reduce the risk 
associated with achieving the policy objectives faced by both consumers and the utilities.   
The cost tracking component is designed to ensure that the incremental costs 
incurred by the utility are prudent.  These costs include operation and maintenance, and 
investment.  The cost tracking should also record utility spending on energy conservation 
and energy efficiency programs such as rebates or discounts for upgrading to more 
efficient appliances and providing customers with more efficient light bulbs.  For 
example, rebates or discounts programs should require customers to provide information 
describing the type of appliance that is being upgraded to assess efficiency 
improvements.  The utility may also have to ensure that the old appliances are collected 
and taken out of circulation.  In the case of light bulbs programs, some baseline measure 
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should be established to determine the efficiency gains that can be attributed to the new 
light bulbs.    
The revenue tracking component aligns collected revenue with the amount of 
revenue authorized by the commission.  Revenue is often determined based on the 
number of customers served or the number of units sold. When sales deviate from 
estimated figures revenue tracking is necessary to ensure that utility does not under-
collect or over-collect revenue.  Also, revenue tracking ensures that customers are 
reimbursed for over-collected revenue or charged for under-collection.   
The rate cap stabilizes the customer‟s bill and the utility‟s revenue by limiting the 
decreases or increases in price and revenue collected—the range may be a maximum 
percentage change in the rates or percentage change in customer bill.  Variation in 
customer bills is especially a concern for fixed-income or low-income customer as the 
electricity bill is a large portion of their budgets.  Increased predictability of income 
benefits the utility by improving forecasting and planning processes.    
Prior to implementation of any revenue decoupling efforts several steps are 
necessary to ensure that the transition from traditional regulation to revenue decoupling is 
smooth.  The desired energy conservation targets should be clearly defined by the 
regulations.  Clear conservation targets enable the utility and regulators to work towards 
designing programs that will achieve the goals.   Measures should be taken to assess the 
impact of the programs on customer behavior and customer bills.  The program design 
should include estimated impacts on energy consumption and account for unintended 
consequences of the programs. Essential elements to achieving energy conservation goals 
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are customers understanding of the programs, description of the actions necessary to 
achieve the goals, cost analysis of the programs, and potential outcomes under various 
behavioral assumptions.   
Past experiences show that the components of revenue decoupling is effective 
when sales projections are a reasonable estimate of actual sales and when actual sales are 
consistently under-estimated.  However, when forecasts over-estimate sales in the 
electricity market the components are not as effective at minimizing the risks to 
customers.  In addition to adopting cost tracking, revenue tracking and rate cap 
components as a part of the revenue decoupling mechanism regulators should 
periodically compare actual sales to the post-utility program targets.  Trends in the 
economy should be accounted for to reduce the likelihood of lower sales being credited to 
utility programs, if in fact lower sales may be associated with factors outside the utility 
programs.   
Two methods are suggested below that can be used to improve the evaluation 
process of revenue decoupling.  The dissatisfaction with revenue decoupling arises when 
actual sales are lower than expected and when it is difficult to determine what factors are 
responsible for the decrease in electricity consumption.  The first method is an index that 
defines a range capturing the expected decrease in electricity consumption due to energy 
efficiency programs.  Based on the goals of the conservation and efficiency programs, 
intermediate targets—monthly, quarterly, annually—can be developed and tracked by the 
regulators and the utilities.  If sales reduction is consistently outside the range, the index 
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can serve as a trigger mechanism to investigate other potential sources in the economy 
which may cause a reduction in electricity sales.   
The second method is the use of indicators to assess the overall well-being of the 
state economy.  Persistent deviation from the targets may be due to unintended 
consequences, due to economic activities, or due to weather changes.  The second method 
examines several non-utility programming indicators that may reduce electricity 
consumption.  Tracking indicators that reflect these factors can help regulators and the 
utilities to better assess the cause of energy conservation and energy efficiency and 
improve the evaluation of the effectiveness of revenue decoupling.   
 
Method I 
One of the major drawbacks of revenue decoupling mechanism is that the 
components are not effective at distributing risk when sales are significantly lower than 
expected.  Under this condition regulators are unable to determine if lower sales should 
be attributed to utility energy conservation programming or factors in the economy.  
Improper designed of revenue decoupling guarantees the utility revenue when sales 
decrease independent of utility programming.  Decreased sales due to weather, decisions 
by individual to be more energy efficient, and increased customer-sited generation should 
not be attributed to utility programs and the utility should not be compensated for 
reduction in sales due to these factors.  Revenue decoupling should compensate the utility 
for revenue lost due to utility energy programs.  It is important that regulators adopt 
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components of the mechanism that are aimed at identifying the factors resulting in energy 
conservation and energy efficiency.       
A method that can be used to improve the evaluation process is to develop 
reasonable targets for the energy conservation and efficiency programs implemented by 
the utilities.  One key to developing these estimates is the ability to predict how customer 
behavior—i.e. consumption patterns—will be affected by the programs.  Required is an 
understanding of the types of customers in the market and their ability to substitute away 
from electricity.  Below I propose an index that seeks to capture these market 
characteristics and estimate the amount of sales reduction that should be expected.   
The Revenue Decoupling Matching Index (RDMI) is a mechanism that can be 
used to estimate the expected decline in electricity consumption due to new pricing 
structure and energy conservation and energy efficiency programs.  The components of 
the index includes the types of customers being targeted by the programs, the market 
share of the customers, and the ability of customers to substitute away from electricity—
whether by using a different source energy or by changing the timing of their 
consumption.   
RDMI is a weighted index of the elasticity of different groups of consumers in the 
market.  In the illustration, the market is segmented into two groups of customers: 
residential and non-residential customers.  The index is aimed at capturing the ability of 
consumers to respond to price changes.  The responsiveness of the customers is reflected 
in the elasticity of demand for electricity.  Revenue decoupling will result in new pricing 
schemes that may affect price variance.  The index is weighted by the share of residential 
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and non-residential customers in states and the respective elasticity of demand for the 
customer groups.   
RDMI = (AEd + BEs) Sales 
A = share of residential customers in the state. 
B = share of non-residential customers in the state. 
Es= elasticity of substitution for non-residential customers. 
Ed = elasticity of demand for residential customers. 
Sales= Previous year‟s sales 
A range can be constructed using high and low estimates of the elasticity of demand for 
the different types of customers.   RDMI can be applied to the actual sales figures from 
the previous year to determine the range.   
The use of RDMI is not a fail proof method to assessment of electricity 
consumption but can assist regulator to improve evaluation.  These are suggested 
components which can be complemented or substituted for more pertinent market 
characteristics.  The index is general and is a starting point for more precise estimates.  
The index is not program specific and does not attempt to identify all the types of 
customer in the market.  Program designers should develop more refined indices that 
capture the types of customers and their ability to substitute away from electricity.   
 
Method II 
A second method of addressing the dissatisfaction with revenue decoupling is the 
use indicators in the state to assess whether changes in sales are due to energy 
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conservation programs or due to factors such as weather or the economy.  The indicators 
can be used to assess the well-being of the state and to eliminate the effects of some of 
the more predictable factors that may affect electricity sales.  These suggested measures 
can be used in conjunction with the components of the revenue decoupling mechanism to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the policy.   
Provided below is a list of suggested indicators that can be used to achieve this 
goal.  The list is not exhaustive or complete but provides a starting point from which 
further improvements can be achieved.        
1. Income, 
2. Employment,  
3. Input prices, and 
4. Customer-owned generation. 
Income 
 Regulators should consider how individual disposable income or consumer 
spending behavior changed over the period being examined.  Stable income or spending 
over the period in an electricity market with lower consumption may be an indication that 
energy efficiency or energy conservation is taking place in the state. On the other hand, 
decrease income or spending in combination with lower electricity consumption may be a 
signal of state wide economic factors and not evidence of energy conservation. 
Employment 
 The state employment figure is one measure that can be used to judge the overall 
well-being of the state.  Employment is important input of state economy.  Employment 
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trends tell a story about the current state of the economy and can be used to make 
predictions about future economic conditions.  Regulators can examine the employment 
trends of the state and especially key sectors in the economy to determine how the 
changes in electricity consumption may be correlated with trends or other events.   
Input Prices 
 In addition to employment figures the regulators can examine the prices of input 
in key sectors of the state economy—such as raw material, and fuel—to examine the 
relationship between electricity consumption and the state economy. Businesses make 
economic decisions in their everyday operation.  The total costs faced by the business 
will undoubtedly affect electricity consumption.  Stable input prices, strong employment 
numbers, and strong state output in combination with lower energy consumption can be 
an indication that energy conservation efforts are effective.   
Customer-owned generation 
 In recent years, the amount of customer owned generating units have increased 
significantly across the states.  Decreased cost of solar generation, for example, has made 
it more affordable for residents to purchase solar panels.  Also, small fossil fuel 
generation units are now more widespread in the economy.  These conditions have 
resulted in a decrease demand for electricity service provided by the traditional utilities.  
Continuation of these trends will result in further decline in traditional electricity sales, 
especially if price variation increases.  Regulators should be mindful of these trends to 
reduce the likelihood that utilities are rewarded for the conservation efforts of other 
market participants.    
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Each of these indicators seeks to identify factors in the economy that may 
contribute to changes in electricity consumption.  The index and the suggested indicators 
can be combined with revenue decoupling components to improve the evaluation of 
revenue decoupling mechanisms and progress towards specific policy goals.  These 
assessments should be conducted on a periodic basis—quarterly, semi-annually or 
annually—when these and similar types of information are available for comparison.  
Regulators should consider longer waiter times between assessments, whenever possible, 
as it allows minor variations in economy to work themselves out and reduces the amount 
of revenue and price adjustments.  Periodic assessments in combination with cost 
tracking, revenue tracking, and rate caps, can provide several benefits while reducing the 
negative aspects of multi-year assessments.     
 
Conclusion 
 In recent decades state policy makers have faced increasing pressure to address 
the rising costs of energy and the harmful effects of electricity generation.  Increased 
reliance of the global economy on electricity places state regulators at the forefront of 
political and economic agendas.  The growth of particular interest in the economy creates 
competition for benefits and attempts to shed burdens to other groups in the market.  In 
the United States there are several levels of regulation in the electricity market.  The 
federal government oversees the interstate transactions in the electricity market.  State 
regulators administer the intrastate electricity market transactions of private companies.  
Finally, the local governments monitor and regulate local electricity markets.  This study 
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investigates why states regulators are adopting revenue decoupling in the electricity 
market. 
Economic and policy science literature suggest that regulators adopt policies to 
achieve specific objectives and in doing so these policy may disproportionately affect the 
distribution of wealth in society.  Individuals affected by the policies will mobilize to 
form specific interest.  Group formation can reduce the cost of competing for the benefits 
in the market for legislation.  Through lobbying and other means of competing in the 
market for legislation specific interest seek to influence the decision-makers in 
government.    
Revenue decoupling is a rate design mechanism that alters the traditional 
relationship between utility sales and revenue.  Under the current regulatory framework 
the utilities have very little incentive to promote energy efficiency or energy 
conservation.  Revenue decoupling removes the disincentives and enables the regulators 
to achieve these objectives through improved rate design.  Despite the potential benefits 
of revenue decoupling, adoption of the policy affects the risk factors to different groups 
in society.  Revenue decoupling directly affects producer and consumer surplus by 
altering the price in the market and the distribution of costs.   
The study examines how the adoption of revenue decoupling in the state 
electricity is influenced by market characteristics, the structure of the utility 
commissions, and the political climate of the state.  Data is collected for the period 1978 
to 2008 from the state utility commission websites, other government agency websites, 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration.   Two models, marginal risk set and 
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conditional risk set, are tested under three different specifications to obtain the predicted 
influence and the marginal effects of the covariates.  The models are derivatives of the 
Cox Proportional Hazard model but differ in the assumption made about the nature of the 
adoption and when a state is considered to be at risk of adopting the policy.   
The results indicate that the adoption of the policy is significantly influence by the 
characteristics of the electricity market, the structure of the utility commission, and the 
political climate of the state.  Although the predicted influences of the variables differ 
under the assumptions there were some consistent results for both models.  Both models 
predict that the amount of hydroelectricity generation in the state, how energy 
intensiveness of the state economy, and the ratio of non-public to public utilities are 
market characteristics increase the probability of revenue decoupling being adopted by 
the state regulators.  Also the method of selecting the commissioners and the length of the 
term of the commissioners, which serve as proxies for the size of the agency, are aspects 
of the commission structure that significantly influence the probability of adoption of the 
policy.   Finally, the political climate of the state is measured by the party affiliation of 
the governor and the party control of the electoral votes in the state.  The models predict 
that a Republican governor increases the likelihood of revenue decoupling being adopted 
in the state relative to a Democratic governor and a state with majority of the electoral 
votes controlled by the Republican Party decreases the probability of the state adopting 
the policy relative to state controlled by a Democratic majority.   
An investigation of the states that have experience with revenue decoupling 
suggests that an overwhelming majority of the states that have adopted the policy did so 
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to promote energy conservation and energy efficiency in the state.  States pursue energy 
conservation programs because of capacity constraints which result in higher electricity 
prices and to the negative environmental effects of electricity generation.  The use of 
renewable resources is one method of reducing the environmental negative effects of the 
electricity industry.  Hydroelectricity generation is the largest source of renewable energy 
in the United States.  The results suggest that as the amount of hydroelectricity generation 
increases it increases the probability of revenue decoupling being adopted in the state 
electricity market.     
The positive association between the adoption of revenue decoupling and the 
energy intensity of the state economy suggests that the relative energy efficient states are 
more likely to adopt the policy.  The results also indicate that state regulators are 
adopting revenue decoupling as mechanism to control the non-public utilities in the state.  
As the number of non-public utilities increase relative to the number of publicly owned 
utilities there is an increased likelihood of the state adopting revenue decoupling in the 
electricity market.   
The investigation also shows that the components of revenue decoupling work 
more effectively when actual sales are similar to projects figures and when the actual 
sales are under estimated.  The study recommends that state regulators used state 
economic indicators to aid in determining the effectiveness of the policy.  By combining 
cost tracking, revenue tracking, and rate caps with various leading indicators regulators 
can better assess the effectiveness of energy conservation and energy efficiency programs 
to reduce sales.   
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One reason for dissatisfaction with revenue decoupling in the past was the 
inability for regulators to differentiate the reduction in sales due to energy conservation 
or efficiency or due to weather or economic factors.  Variation in economic indicators 
such as energy intensity, state income, state employment, and input prices, can eliminate 
some of the more predictable factors that influence consumer and business decision 
making in the electricity market and help improve the evaluation process associated with 
revenue decoupling. The study proposes an index to approximate a range that regulators 
can use to estimate reduction in electricity consumption due to energy conservation and 
energy efficiency programs in the state.   
 
Limitations 
There are several factors that affect the accuracy of the results of this study.  The 
use of secondary data limits the control the researcher has over data error.  The values 
used to construct the covariates maybe overstated or understated.  The data set begins 
several decades earlier which may impair the data accuracy.  Also, for years in which the 
data were not readily available, the closest available values were used.  The sample size 
is relatively small as less than one third of the states in the country have experience with 
revenue decoupling.  Statistical analysis of such a small data set may lead to inaccuracy 
in the estimates.  The District of Columbia was excluded from the study because it did 
not meet some of criteria that the study investigated even though the district adopted 
revenue decoupling in 2008.  The models used in the study examine specific years in 
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which an event occurred but does not necessarily consider how these factors change over 
time.   
Future Research 
 In the future, more detailed examination can be carried out on the factors 
influencing states to adopt revenue decoupling in the electricity market.  As more states 
may adopt the policy, the availability of data could improve predictions by examining 
how the factors of influence change over time.  In the study, it is proposed that regulators 
can use economic indicators to assess the reasons for changes in electricity consumption.  
Future research can test the effectiveness of the proposed measures.  Also, the proposed 
mechanism, RDMI, which can be used to assess the effect of energy conservation and 
energy efficiency programs when consumption is below estimated can be tested and 
improved with further research.   
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Appendix A 
 
Data 
 
States Year 
# of 
Adoptions Status 
Commis 
sioners 
 Term  
New 
Chair 
Elected/ 
Appointed 
AL 2008 0 At Risk 3 4 1 1 
AK 2008 0 At Risk 5 6 1 0 
AZ 2008 0 At Risk 5 6 0 1 
AR 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 1 0 
CA 1982** 1 Adopted 5 6 1 0 
CA 2001** 2 Adopted 5 6 1 0 
CO 2008 0 At Risk 3 4 1 0 
CT 2007** 1 Adopted 5 4 0 0 
DE 2008 0 At Risk 5 5 0 0 
FL 1995** 1 Adopted 5 4 1 0 
FL 2008 0 At Risk 5 4 1 0 
GA 2008 0 At Risk 5 6 1 1 
HI 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 0 0 
ID 2007** 1 Adopted 3 6 1 0 
IL 2008 0 At Risk 5 5 0 0 
IN 2008 0 At Risk 5 4 0 0 
IA 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 1 0 
KS 2008 0 At Risk 3 4 0 0 
KY 2008 0 At Risk 3 4 1 0 
LA 2008 0 At Risk 5 6 1 1 
ME 1991** 1 Adopted 3 6 0 0 
ME 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 1 0 
MD 2007** 1 Adopted 5 5 1 0 
MA 2008** 1 Adopted 3 3 1 0 
MI 2008 0 At Risk 3 5 0 0 
MN 2008** 1 Adopted 5 6 1 0 
MS 2008 0 At Risk 3 4 1 1 
MO 2008 0 At Risk 5 6 1 0 
MT 1994** 1 Adopted 5 4 1 1 
MT 2008 0 At Risk 5 4 0 1 
NE 2008 0 At Risk 5 4 1 0 
NV 2008 0 At Risk 3 4 1 0 
NH 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 0 0 
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States Year 
# of 
Adoptions Status 
Commis 
sioners 
 Term  
New 
Chair 
Elected/ 
Appointed 
NJ 2008 0 At Risk 5 6 0 0 
NM 2008 0 At Risk 5 4 1 1 
NY 1988** 1 Adopted 5 6 1 0 
NY 2007** 2 Adopted 5 6 1 0 
NC 2008 0 At Risk 6 8 1 0 
ND 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 1 1 
OH 2008 0 At Risk 5 5 0 0 
OK 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 1 1 
OR 1995** 1 Adopted 3 4 1 0 
OR 2008** 2 Adopted 3 4 0 0 
PA 2008 0 At Risk 5 5 1 0 
RI 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 0 0 
SC 2008 0 At Risk 7 4 1 1 
SD 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 1 1 
TN 2008 0 At Risk 4 6 1 0 
TX 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 1 0 
UT 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 1 0 
VT 2007** 1 Adopted 3 6 0 0 
VA 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 1 1 
WA 1991** 1 Adopted 3 6 0 0 
WA 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 1 0 
WV 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 1 0 
WI 2008** 1 Adopted 3 6 1 0 
WY 2008 0 At Risk 3 6 1 0 
 
 
States Year 
# of 
Adoptions Status Majority Governor 
AL 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 
AK 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 
AZ 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 
AR 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 
CA 1982** 1 Adopted 0 0 
CA 2001** 2 Adopted 0 0 
CO 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 
CT 2007** 1 Adopted 0 1 
DE 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 
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States Year 
# of 
Adoptions Status Majority Governor 
FL 1995** 1 Adopted 1 0 
FL 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 
GA 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 
HI 2008 0 At Risk 0 1 
ID 2007** 1 Adopted 1 1 
IL 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 
IN 2008 0 At Risk 0 1 
IA 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 
KS 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 
KY 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 
LA 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 
ME 1991** 1 Adopted 0 1 
ME 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 
MD 2007** 1 Adopted 0 0 
MA 2008 1 Adopted 0 0 
MI 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 
MN 2008 1 Adopted 0 1 
MS 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 
MO 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 
MT 1994** 1 Adopted 0 1 
MT 2008 0 At Risk 0 1 
NE 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 
NV 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 
NH 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 
NJ 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 
NM 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 
NY 1988** 1 Adopted 0 0 
NY 2007** 2 Adopted 0 0 
NC 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 
ND 2008 0 At Risk 0 1 
OH 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 
OK 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 
OR 1995** 1 Adopted 0 0 
OR 2008 2 Adopted 0 0 
PA 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 
RI 2008 0 At Risk 0 1 
SC 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 
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States Year 
# of 
Adoptions Status Majority Governor 
SD 2008 0 At Risk 0 1 
TN 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 
TX 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 
UT 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 
VT 2007** 1 Adopted 0 1 
VA 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 
WA 1991** 1 Adopted 0 0 
WA 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 
WV 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 
WI 2008 1 Adopted 0 0 
WY 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 
 
 
States Year 
# of 
Adoptions Status ResInd Entity Indsales Salescap 
AL 2008 0 At Risk 1.702 0.750 0.390 19.243 
AK 2008 0 At Risk 1.168 1.088 0.212 9.216 
AZ 2008 0 At Risk 1.563 0.607 0.169 11.735 
AR 2008 0 At Risk 1.574 1.467 0.369 16.157 
CA 1982** 1 Adopted 1.057 0.100 0.286 6.614 
CA 2001** 2 Adopted 1.290 0.829 0.197 6.715 
CO 2008 0 At Risk 1.523 1.138 0.265 10.556 
CT 2007** 1 Adopted 1.479 2.125 0.159 9.745 
DE 2008 0 At Risk 1.333 2.000 0.254 13.457 
FL 1995** 1 Adopted 1.516 0.636 0.098 11.824 
FL 2008 0 At Risk 1.412 0.656 0.084 12.340 
GA 2008 0 At Risk 1.489 0.830 0.241 13.956 
HI 2008 0 At Risk 1.248 4.000 0.366 8.066 
ID 2007** 1 Adopted 1.643 1.727 0.396 15.843 
IL 2008 0 At Risk 2.438 1.537 0.315 11.209 
IN 2008 0 At Risk 1.625 0.667 0.453 16.777 
IA 2008 0 At Risk 1.973 0.350 0.423 15.150 
KS 2008 0 At Risk 1.561 0.297 0.272 14.102 
KY 2008 0 At Risk 1.647 1.000 0.494 21.884 
LA 2008 0 At Risk 1.295 0.857 0.342 17.848 
ME 1991** 1 Adopted 1.560 1.400 0.414 9.220 
ME 2008 0 At Risk 1.385 6.750 0.272 8.867 
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States Year 
# of 
Adoptions Status ResInd Entity Indsales Salescap 
MD 2007** 1 Adopted 1.264 6.400 0.091 11.639 
MA 2008 1 Adopted 1.191 0.825 0.167 8.600 
MI 2008 0 At Risk 1.595 0.829 0.307 10.575 
MN 2008 1 Adopted 1.659 0.435 0.346 13.177 
MS 2008 0 At Risk 1.584 1.217 0.339 16.239 
MO 2008 0 At Risk 1.626 0.563 0.212 14.274 
MT 1994** 1 Adopted 1.805 38.000 0.452 15.402 
MT 2008 0 At Risk 1.547 40.000 0.380 15.842 
NE 2008 0 At Risk 1.525 0.074 0.334 16.155 
NV 2008 0 At Risk 1.495 2.000 0.393 13.535 
NH 2008 0 At Risk 1.191 3.000 0.188 8.343 
NJ 2008 0 At Risk 1.442 3.444 0.129 9.274 
NM 2008 0 At Risk 1.569 3.000 0.310 11.106 
NY 1988** 1 Adopted 0.723 4.083 0.240 7.003 
NY 2007** 2 Adopted 1.963 1.250 0.136 7.686 
NC 2008 0 At Risk 1.718 0.486 0.214 14.102 
ND 2008 0 At Risk 1.343 2.083 0.298 19.355 
OH 2008 0 At Risk 1.625 0.553 0.368 13.877 
OK 2008 0 At Risk 1.541 0.581 0.274 14.353 
OR 1995** 1 Adopted 1.344 0.708 0.346 14.520 
OR 2008 2 Adopted 1.630 1.611 0.263 12.978 
PA 2008 0 At Risk 1.617 1.314 0.320 12.082 
RI 2008 0 At Risk 1.229 10.000 0.137 7.441 
SC 2008 0 At Risk 1.842 1.182 0.363 18.003 
SD 2008 0 At Risk 1.557 1.086 0.212 13.646 
TN 2008 0 At Risk 1.417 0.484 0.315 16.761 
TX 2008 0 At Risk 1.484 2.181 0.305 14.266 
UT 2008 0 At Risk 1.800 0.275 0.322 10.302 
VT 2007** 1 Adopted 1.586 0.333 0.279 9.439 
VA 2008 0 At Risk 1.653 1.188 0.167 14.172 
WA 1991** 1 Adopted 1.903 1.750 0.440 18.476 
WA 2008 0 At Risk 1.657 0.659 0.242 13.335 
WV 2008 0 At Risk 1.681 5.000 0.431 18.860 
WI 2008 1 Adopted 1.768 0.439 0.352 12.460 
WY 2008 0 At Risk 1.837 1.769 0.578 31.333 
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States Year 
# of 
Adoptions Status Generation Hydro Diff Intensity 
AL 2008 0 At Risk 7.188 4.2 -1.15 160.2827 
AK 2008 0 At Risk 12.144 17.3 4.99 11.99733 
AZ 2008 0 At Risk 3.777 6.1 0.07 70.48006 
AR 2008 0 At Risk 5.003 8.5 -2.14 81.34184 
CA 1982** 1 Adopted 0.006 30.3 -2.29 1112.005 
CA 2001** 2 Adopted 0.546 12.7 1.49 497.89 
CO 2008 0 At Risk 3.357 3.8 -1.15 61.22731 
CT 2007** 1 Adopted 0.001 1.2 6.71 52.67 
DE 2008 0 At Risk 0.003 0 2.62 12.76413 
FL 1995** 1 Adopted 6.603 0.1 -2.73 379.3375 
FL 2008 0 At Risk 8.503 0.1 1 234.3948 
GA 2008 0 At Risk 12.427 1.6 -0.9 157.2243 
HI 2008 0 At Risk 1.433 0.7 19.46 17.043 
ID 2007** 1 Adopted 2.995 78.2 -1.28 38.17 
IL 2008 0 At Risk 0.019 0.1 -0.48 293.9289 
IN 2008 0 At Risk 8.507 0.3 -2.65 225.4668 
IA 2008 0 At Risk 5.369 1.5 -2.85 100.9671 
KS 2008 0 At Risk 33.425 0 -2.29 73.38396 
KY 2008 0 At Risk 7.258 2 -3.48 191.4355 
LA 2008 0 At Risk 0.876 1.2 -0.3 160.2157 
ME 1991** 1 Adopted 1.305 11.8 -1.14 40.6 
ME 2008 0 At Risk 0.000 26.1 4.09 19.59797 
MD 2007** 1 Adopted 0.000 3.3 5.42 97.1 
MA 2008 1 Adopted 0.012 2.7 6.53 84.94035 
MI 2008 0 At Risk 4.613 1.2 -0.8 270.9756 
MN 2008 1 Adopted 5.841 1.3 -1.95 107.6345 
MS 2008 0 At Risk 2.345 0 -0.75 93.0378 
MO 2008 0 At Risk 48.198 2.2 -2.9 166.3035 
MT 1994** 1 Adopted 55.192 32.2 -1.93 58.38 
MT 2008 0 At Risk 0.304 33.7 -2.02 32.07311 
NE 2008 0 At Risk 1813.049 1.8 -3.16 54.35039 
NV 2008 0 At Risk 1.897 5 0.15 24.41636 
NH 2008 0 At Risk 0.235 7.1 4.91 13.6323 
NJ 2008 0 At Risk -0.003 0 4.7 125.0517 
NM 2008 0 At Risk 10.692 0.8 -1.39 32.3698 
NY 1988** 1 Adopted 9.846 17.4 2.15 538.81 
NY 2007** 2 Adopted 0.381 17.3 5.48 266.12 
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States Year 
# of 
Adoptions Status Generation Hydro Diff Intensity 
NC 2008 0 At Risk 18.384 24 -1.78 163.042 
ND 2008 0 At Risk 16.395 3.8 -3.05 25.7009 
OH 2008 0 At Risk 1.698 0.3 -1.35 366.9671 
OK 2008 0 At Risk 3.696 5 -1.93 104.5047 
OR 1995** 1 Adopted 35.673 90 -2.25 147.67 
OR 2008 2 Adopted 3.156 57.6 -2.51 78.73366 
PA 2008 0 At Risk 0.006 1.1 -0.42 303.5741 
RI 2008 0 At Risk 0.001 0.1 6.27 13.22316 
SC 2008 0 At Risk 32.034 1.1 -1.89 119.7872 
SD 2008 0 At Risk 66.526 42.3 -2.6 17.88074 
TN 2008 0 At Risk 36.766 6.2 -1.56 158.5065 
TX 2008 0 At Risk 0.305 0.3 1.25 424.6307 
UT 2008 0 At Risk 20.617 1.4 -3.25 31.01513 
VT 2007** 1 Adopted 0.137 11.1 2.3 9.49 
VA 2008 0 At Risk 4.635 1.4 -1.74 136.5117 
WA 1991** 1 Adopted 70.898 86.8 -3.38 319.2007 
WA 2008 0 At Risk 5.273 70.1 -3.19 114.2576 
WV 2008 0 At Risk 2.726 1.4 -4.13 90.22061 
WI 2008 1 Adopted 2.538 2.5 -0.74 133.6357 
WY 2008 0 At Risk 16.947 1.8 -4.07 31.83909 
 
 
States Year 
# of 
 
Adoptions Status Choice Gas  Salesvar PopDensity 
AL 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 245289577.9 91.870 
AK 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 1214968.54 1.200 
AZ 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 267273399.2 57.200 
AR 2008 0 At Risk 0 1 77065580.93 54.840 
CA 1982** 1 Adopted 0 1 9686774.7 160.786 
CA 2001** 2 Adopted 1 1 706399548 224.828 
CO 2008 0 At Risk 0 1 98998181.92 47.620 
CT 2007** 1 Adopted 1 0 14459497.83 722.871 
DE 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 5966715.114 446.820 
FL 1995** 1 Adopted 0 0 758297709.4 262.688 
FL 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 2396376263 339.870 
GA 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 890084158.5 167.270 
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States Year 
# of 
 
Adoptions Status Choice Gas  Salesvar PopDensity 
HI 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 2439958.312 200.560 
ID 2007** 1 Adopted 0 0 11348830.65 18.120 
IL 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 316082813.8 232.110 
IN 2008 0 At Risk 0 1 302389384.3 177.790 
IA 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 47438396.34 53.740 
KS 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 41693689.38 34.250 
KY 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 250362300.2 107.460 
LA 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 101748029.8 101.250 
ME 1991** 1 Adopted 0 0 1843111.758 40.003 
ME 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 2009692.918 42.660 
MD 2007** 1 Adopted 1 1 141432508.6 574.826 
MA 2008 1 Adopted 1 1 62624896.31 828.820 
MI 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 215586827.1 176.100 
MN 2008 1 Adopted 0 0 140163672.9 65.570 
MS 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 86959605.41 62.650 
MO 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 204577463 85.820 
MT 1994** 1 Adopted 0 0 1838246 5.910 
MT 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 1930056.29 6.650 
NE 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 24678829.82 23.200 
NV 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 77748384.45 23.680 
NH 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 3115241.062 146.720 
NJ 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 115326052.1 1170.640 
NM 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 19701992.16 16.350 
NY 1988** 1 Adopted 0 0 46286211 380.000 
NY 2007** 2 Adopted 1 1 218935204.1 408.348 
NC 2008 0 At Risk 0 1 572811015.6 189.330 
ND 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 4255936.28 9.300 
OH 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 362624580.1 280.500 
OK 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 62483723.51 53.040 
OR 1995** 1 Adopted 0 0 14872428 32.800 
OR 2008 2 Adopted 1 1 25211679.11 39.480 
PA 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 323873621.4 277.760 
RI 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 1044191.492 1005.540 
SC 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 244263577.9 148.790 
SD 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 3220495.596 10.600 
TN 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 167855319.7 150.780 
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States Year 
# of 
 
Adoptions Status Choice Gas  Salesvar PopDensity 
TX 2008 0 At Risk 1 0 3415421877 92.920 
UT 2008 0 At Risk 0 1 30476605.33 33.310 
VT 2007** 1 Adopted 0 0 596694.5517 67.160 
VA 2008 0 At Risk 1 1 445693113.2 196.220 
WA 1991** 1 Adopted 0 0 65625697 75.410 
WA 2008 0 At Risk 0 1 69833572.89 98.420 
WV 2008 0 At Risk 0 0 17007231.65 75.360 
WI 2008 1 Adopted 0 1 138982011.8 103.630 
WY 2008 0 At Risk 0 1 6345638.561 5.490 
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Appendix B 
 
Models 
 
This appendix provides a summary of the Cox Model (Cox, 1972); the marginal 
risk set model, (Wei, Lin, Weissfeld, 1989), and the conditional risk set model (Prentice, 
Williams, Peterson, 1981).   
Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Cox (1972) considered a population of individuals that either experience an event 
or are censored.  For individuals that experience and event the time to the event is 
examined and for individuals that do not experience an event the only information that is 
available is that the time to the event is greater than the censoring time. T is a random 
variable that represents failure time.  The survivor function is denote by  
F(t) = pr (T ≥ t)  
and the hazard rate λ(t) is given by 
λ(t) = lim  pr(t ≤ T < t + Δt| t ≤ T) 
                               Δt0+                         Δt 
 
The hazard function is described as the probability that the variable representing 
failure time is occurs between the initial time of the study and last observed time in the 
study; that is, the probability that the event occurs within the study period.  The 
individuals that have not experienced an event are considered to be at risk and make up 
the risk set.   
The regression model is developed to assess the relationship between the 
distribution of failure time and covariates.  In the model the hazard is a function of the 
covariates and time.  Individuals are considered for which the following measurements 
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are available on a set of variables, z = z1…….zp. The hazard are composed of the 
covariates, z, a vector of parameters, β (with dimensions p x 1), to be estimated and an 
unknown function,  λ0 , giving the hazard  function for the standard set of conditions for 
the covariates at the value of zero z = 0.  In the model, the hazard is given by  
λ (t; z) = exp (zβ) λ0 (t) 
The unknown function is allowed to be arbitrary.  The result of leaving the function 
arbitrary is that no information can be contributed about the parameters by time intervals 
in which no failures occurs because the unknown function may be zero.  Cox 
acknowledges that there is some loss of information when the unknown function is made 
arbitrary; however, the loss of information is usually slight.   
The failure at a particular time conditional on the risk set, given by R(t(i))  at that 
time, the probability that the failure is on the individual as observed is the ratio of the 
covariates of the individual relative to the sum of the individuals in the risk set.  The 
probability that the failure is on the individual observed is  
exp {z(i) β} 
         ∑  exp {z(l) β}     
lєR(t(i)) 
 
In the model each failure contributes this factor to the conditional log likelihood given by 
                           k                   k 
L(β) = ∑ z(i) β - ∑ log [ ∑ exp {z(l) β ]. 
           i = 1               i =1             lєR(t(i)) 
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Marginal Risk Set Model 
Wei, Lin, and Weissfeld (1989) proposed semi-parametric methods to analyze the 
general multivariate failure data.  They model the marginal distribution of each failure 
time variable with a Cox proportional hazard model.  The regression estimates are 
obtained by maximizing the failure-specific partial likelihoods.  The model assumption k 
types of failures (k = 1,…., K) and i subjects where i = 1,….., n).  Therefore, Yki is the 
failure time for the i
th.  For Ỹki a bivariate vector (Yki, Δki) is observed, where Yki = 
min(Ỹki, Cki), Cki is the censoring time, and Δki = 1 if Yki = Ỹki and 0 otherwise. If Ỹki is 
missing, let Cki be zero, implying that Xkk = 0 and Δki = 0 since Ỹki is positive.  Zki (t) = 
(Z1ki (t),…, Zpki (t))‟ is a p x 1 vector of covariates for the i
th subject at time t ≥ 0 with 
respect to the k
th
 type of failure.  Conditional on the covariates for the individual 
observation, the failure vector, Ỹki, and the censoring vector, Cki, are assumed to be 
independent.  It is also assumed that (Xi, Δi, Zi ( )) are iid random vectors with bounded 
covariates Zi ( ).   
 The hazard function for a specific individual and a type of failure is given by 
λki = λko (t) exp {β‟Zki (t)}   t≥0    
where λko (t) is an unspecified baseline hazard function and βk = (β1k,…., Bpk)‟ is the 
failure-specific regression parameter.  The individuals at risk prior to time t is given by 
Rk (t)  = {l : Xkl ≥ t.  The partial likelihood for a specific type of failure is given by 
Lk (β) =  ∏  [ exp {β’Zki(Xki)} / ∑ l є Rk(Xki)  exp {β’Zkl (Xkl)} ]. 
Δki  n 
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Conditional Risk Set Model 
Prentice, Williams and Peterson (1981) proposed models to analyze the regression 
effects when subjects may experience multiple failures.  The two general classes of 
regression models proposed are stratified proportional hazard models that use arbitrary 
baseline hazard functions.  Partial likelihood functions are used to estimate the regression 
coefficients in the model.  The focus of the models is the analysis of a possibly small 
number of failure times on a fairly large number of study subjects.  The models are 
generalizations of survival data techniques in which the hazard function modeling is 
continued beyond the subject‟s first failure to second and subsequent failures. 
 Prentice et al define z(u) = {z1(u),……..,zp(u)} as a vector of covariates, for a 
subject as of time u≥0. Z(t) = {z(u): u≤t} is the corresponding covariate process up to 
time t.  Similarly, N(t) = {n(u): u≤t} where n(u) is the number of failures on a study 
subject prior to time u.  The hazard function at time t is the instantaneous rate of failure at 
time t given the covariate and counting process at time t. 
λ {t|N(t),Z(t)} = lim pr {t ≤ Tn(t)+1 < t+Δt | N(t), Z(t)} / Δt      (1) 
                                                                                   Δt0 
 
 Equation (1) is specified as the product of an arbitrary function of time and an 
exponential function of covariate; as set forth by Cox (1972).  Two models are 
developed.  The first examines failure time from the beginning of the study (2), and the 
second examines the time, t-tn(t) from the immediate preceding failure.  Model (1) is used 
in the study and will be discussed in this section.  In the model the hazard function is 
allowed to depend on the number of preceding failures and on other characteristics of 
{N(t), Z(t)}.  The two partially-parametric hazard functions are: 
 144 
λ{t|N(t),Z(t)} = λ0s (t) exp{z(t) βs}    (2) 
where λ0s (.) ≥ 0 (s=1,2,….) are completely arbitrary baseline intensity functions, where 
the stratification variable s = s{N(t),Z(t), t} and βs is a column vector of stratum-specific 
regression coefficients.  The models permit the baseline to be arbitrary function of 
number of preceding failures for the study subject.  Model (2) permits an arbitrary 
baseline hazard dependent on the total time on study. 
 To estimate the coefficients in the models; let ts1<….<tsds denote the ordered, 
assumed distinct, failure times in stratum s.  The supposition is made that if subject i fails 
in stratum s at time tsi let zsi(tsi) denote  this subject‟s covariate vector at tsi.  Also let 
R(t,s) denote the set of subjects at risk in stratum s just prior to time t.   
 The partial likelihood for the regression coefficient can be developed as follows.  
Let where As
(i)
 = {As1,….,Asi}, is the event that subject i fails in stratum s at time tsi and 
Bs
(i)
 = {Bs1,….,Bsi} is the event that specifies the stratum s risk set R(t,s) as well as all 
the s covariate, counting process and censoring information through the period (ts, i-1 ,tsi) 
for i = 1,…., ds + 1, where ts0 = 0 and ts,ds+1 = ∞, along with information that a stratum s 
failure occurs at time tsi.  {As^(0), Bs^(0)} consists of all information available prior to t 
= 0.  The overall likelihood function can be written as  
                                             ds                                            ds+1  
∏ ∏ pr(Asi |As
(i-1)
, Bs
(i)) ∏  ∏ pr(Bsi |As
(i-1)
, Bs
(i-1)
)   (4). 
                                       s≥1 i=1                                    s≥1 i=1  
 
 
Under the assumption that given {N(t), Z(t)} the failure mechanism of the 
individual at risk at t act independently over [t, t+dt), and under „independent censorship‟ 
assumption, models (2) can be write as  
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Pr (Asi| As
(i-1)
, Bs
(i)
) = exp{zsi(tsi) βs} /      ∑      exp{zl(tsi) βs}.             
                                                 l є R(tsi,s) 
The partial likelihood (Cox, 1975) is given by the first factor of equation (4) and 
can be written as 
                                              ds                                              
L(β) =  ∏ ∏ [exp{zsi(tsi) βs} /  ∑         exp{zl(tsi) βs}          (5). 
                                                       s≥1 i=1                                   l є R(tsi,s) 
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Appendix C 
 
Regression Results—Marginal Risk Set Model 
 
Marginal Specification (1) 
 
Table C-1-1 
 
 
Variables Coefficients Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
DIFF -0.0237934 0.1346461 -0.18 0.86 -0.2876948 0.2401081 
RESIND 0.2164393 1.269266 0.17 0.865 -2.271276 2.704155 
INDSALES 0.2039593 8.716206 0.02 0.981 -16.87949 17.28741 
SALESCAP -0.3626663 0.3331784 -1.09 0.276 -1.015684 0.2903514 
SALESVAR -2.17E-09 1.72E-09 -1.27 0.205 -5.54E-09 1.19E-09 
GENERATION -0.0158286 0.0197326 -0.8 0.422 -0.0545039 0.0228467 
ENTITY 0.0733893 0.0308443 2.38 0.017 0.0129357 0.133843 
POPDENSITY 0.0013398 0.0019703 0.68 0.496 -0.0025218 0.0052015 
INTENSITY 0.0102743 0.0027127 3.79 0.000 0.0049576 0.015591 
HYDRO 0.0416298 0.0109423 3.8 0.000 0.0201832 0.0630763 
CHOICE -1.615106 1.30147 -1.24 0.215 -4.16594 0.9357274 
GAS -0.2203283 0.9681859 -0.23 0.82 -2.117938 1.677281 
       
Number of 
Observations 
100   Wald chi2(12) 67.35 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
 
 
 
Table C-1-2 
 
Variables Coefficients Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
DIFF 0.0936569 0.0607326 1.54 0.123 -0.0253768 0.212691 
SALESVAR -2.22E-09 2.02E-09 -1.1 0.27 -6.17E-09 1.73E-09 
GENERATION -0.0196854 0.016864 -1.17 0.243 -0.0527382 0.013367 
ENTITY 0.0469171 0.030242 1.55 0.121 -0.0123562 0.10619 
POPDENSITY 0.0015373 0.0010548 1.46 0.145 -0.00053 0.003605 
INTENSITY 0.0094423 0.0020752 4.55 0.000 0.005375 0.01351 
HYDRO 0.0396025 0.0095067 4.17 0.000 0.0209697 0.058235 
CHOICE -0.8244643 0.797655 -1.03 0.301 -2.387839 0.738911 
GAS 0.021883 0.720691 0.03 0.976 -1.390645 1.434411 
       Number of 
Observations 
100 Wald chi2(9) 63.40
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
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Marginal Specification (2) 
 
Table C-2-1 
 
Variables Coefficients Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
DIFF -.0080684 .1564816 -0.05 0.959 -.3147668 .298629 
RESIND 1.43827 1.575484 0.91 0.361 -1.649622 4.526162 
INDSALES -.433283 9.146281 -0.05 0.962 -18.35967 17.4931 
SALESCAP -.3564599 .4143319 -0.86 0.390 -1.168536 .455615 
SALESVAR -2.93e-09 2.69e-09 -1.09 0.275 -8.21e-09 2.34e-09 
GENERATION -.0185972 .0284885 -0.65 0.514 -.0744336 .037239 
ENTITY .1415331 .0562407 2.52 0.012 .0313034 .2517628 
POPDENSITY .0017848 .0021584 0.83 0.408 -.0024456 .0060151 
INTENSITY .0090367 .0025733 3.51 0.000 .0039932 .0140802 
HYDRO .0425478 .0143621 2.96 0.003 .0143987 .070697 
CHOICE -2.292267 1.29765 -1.77 0.077 -4.835614 .25108 
GAS -.7508959 .9819135 -0.76 0.444 -2.675411 1.17361 
ELECTED -3.747129 1.990009 -1.88 0.060 -7.647475 .1532183 
COMMISSIONERS .3741162 .3848425 0.97 0.331 -.3801612 1.128394 
NEWCHAIR .5695775 .9044798 0.63 0.529 -1.20317 2.342325 
TERM -.6782208 .3567582 -1.90 0.057 -1.377454 .0210124 
       
Number of 
Observations 
100   Wald chi2(16) 178.69 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
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Table C-2-2 
 
Variables Coefficients Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
DIFF 0.0986109 0.0692427 1.42 0.154 -0.0371023 0.234324 
SALESVAR -2.21E-09 1.52E-09 -1.45 0.146 -5.20E-09 7.73E-10 
GENERATION -0.0123585 0.0205077 -0.6 0.547 -0.0525529 0.0278358 
ENTITY 0.1161717 0.0518938 2.24 0.025 0.0144616 0.2178817 
POPDENSITY 0.0014438 0.0010468 1.38 0.168 -0.0006079 0.0034954 
INTENSITY 0.0096493 0.0026502 3.64 0.000 0.004455 0.0148435 
HYDRO 0.0338425 0.0084742 3.99 0.000 0.0172334 0.0504516 
CHOICE -0.7668706 0.8276123 -0.93 0.354 -2.388961 0.8552196 
GAS -0.076926 0.638852 -0.12 0.904 -1.329053 1.175201 
ELECTED -2.493806 0.8153992 -3.06 0.002 -4.091959 -0.8956529 
NEWCHAIR 0.9297313 0.9505818 0.98 0.328 -0.9333748 2.792837 
       
Number of 
Observations 
100   Wald chi2(11) 120.91 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
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Marginal Specification (3) 
 
Table C-3-1 
 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
DIFF .0445683 .1351979 0.33 0.742 -.220414 .3095513 
RESIND 1.59012 1.765867 0.90 0.368 -1.870915 5.051155 
INDSALES -11.46769 9.392423 -1.22 0.222 -29.8765 6.94112 
SALESCAP -.1136846 .3922201 -0.29 0.772 -.8824219 .6550527 
SALESVAR -3.31e-09 1.30e-09 -2.54 0.011 -5.87e-09 -7.59e-10 
GENERATION -.0183349 .0280799 -0.65 0.514 -.0733706 .0367007 
ENTITY .1306641 .0602761 2.17 0.030 .0125252 .248803 
POPDENSITY -.0014406 .0026298 -0.55 0.584 -.0065949 .0037136 
INTENSITY .0173201 .0065187 2.66 0.008 .0045436 .0300966 
HYDRO .0359084 .0171589 2.09 0.036 .0022775 .0695394 
CHOICE -1.05252 1.105842 -0.95 0.341 -3.21993 1.11489 
GAS -.4154621 .8721079 -0.48 0.634 -2.124762 1.293838 
ELECTED -4.279796 2.193048 -1.95 0.051 -8.578092 .0184992 
COMMISSIONERS -.458779 .6376499 -0.72 0.472 -1.70855 .7909918 
NEWCHAIR 1.558042 .8824373 1.77 0.077 -.1715032 3.28758 
TERM -.8298581 .5117713 -1.62 0.105 -1.832912 .1731953 
MAJORITY -2.333344 1.044428 -2.23 0.025 -4.380385 -.286304 
GOVERNOR 3.337945 1.649734 2.02 0.043 .1045261 6.571363 
       
Number of 
Observations 
100    Wald chi2(17) 186.12 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
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Table C-3-2 
 
 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
DIFF 0.0686889 0.0586676 1.17 0.242 -0.0462974 0.1836753 
SALESVAR -1.88E-09 1.25E-09 -1.51 0.131 -4.33E-09 5.63E-10 
GENERATION -0.0031038 0.0122677 -0.25 0.800 -0.0271481 0.0209404 
ENTITY 0.0783038 0.0543522 1.44 0.150 -0.0282246 0.1848323 
POPDENSITY 0.0009956 0.0014056 0.71 0.479 -0.0017594 0.0037506 
INTENSITY 0.0107908 0.0027595 3.91 0.000 0.0053822 0.0161994 
HYDRO 0.0375924 0.0092227 4.08 0.000 0.0195162 0.0556686 
CHOICE -0.0201469 1.096629 -0.02 0.985 -2.169501 2.129207 
GAS 0.3258513 0.6930838 0.47 0.638 -1.032568 1.684271 
ELECTED -2.915394 0.9866358 -2.95 0.003 -4.849165 -0.9816232 
NEWCHAIR 1.655999 0.8866405 1.87 0.062 -0.0817845 3.393783 
MAJORITY -2.012111 0.8351429 -2.41 0.016 -3.648961 -0.3752609 
GOVERNOR 2.138089 0.8667241 2.47 0.014 0.4393412 3.836837 
       
Number of 
Observations 
100    Wald chi2(13) 107.98 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
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Regression Results—Conditional Risk Set Model 
 
Conditional Specification (1) 
 
Table C-4-1 
 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.    Interval] 
DIFF -.0389587 .1589824 -0.25 0.806 -.3505585 .2726411 
RESIND .4583298 1.152895 0.40 0.691 -1.801302 2.717962 
INDSALES -.7381806 12.20165 -0.06 0.952 -24.65298 23.17662 
SALESCAP -.4752047 .3601602 -1.32 0.187 -1.181106 .2306964 
SALESVAR -2.35e-09 2.90e-09 -0.81 0.417 -8.03e-09 3.32e-09 
GENERATION -.0140834 .0213604 -0.66 0.510 -.0559489 .0277822 
ENTITY .1124433 .0550618 2.04 0.041 .0045242 .2203624 
POPDENSITY .0009012 .002807 0.32 0.748 -.0046005 .0064028 
INTENSITY .012617 .0057474 2.20 0.028 .0013522 .0238817 
HYDRO .0506115 .0115612 4.38 0.000 .027952 .0732709 
CHOICE -1.826651 1.45028 -1.26 0.208 -4.669148 1.015846 
GAS -.0797625 1.212454 -0.07 0.948 -2.456128 2.296603 
       
Number of 
observations 
57   Wald chi2(12) 47.36 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
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Table C-4-2 
  
Variables Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.    Interval] 
DIFF 0.1013908 0.0593725 1.71 0.088 -0.0149772 0.2177587 
SALESVAR -1.81E-09 1.08E-09 -1.68 0.093 -3.93E-09 3.02E-10 
GENERATION -0.0141386 0.0167963 -0.84 0.400 -0.0470587 0.0187815 
ENTITY 0.0666323 0.0339903 1.96 0.050 0.0000126 0.133252 
POPDENSITY 0.0016216 0.0011871 1.37 0.172 -0.0007051 0.0039483 
INTENSITY 0.0110722 0.0022159 5 0.000 0.0067291 0.0154153 
HYDRO 0.0388486 0.0082796 4.69 0.000 0.0226209 0.0550764 
CHOICE -1.057302 0.8630388 -1.23 0.221 -2.748827 0.6342225 
GAS -0.0332233 0.7644286 -0.04 0.965 -1.531476 1.465029 
       
Number of 
observations 
57   Wald chi2(9) 82.67 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
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Conditional Specification (2) 
 
Table C-5-1 
 
 
Variables Coefficients Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
DIFF -.0616283 .2191994 -0.28 0.779 -.4912513 .3679947 
RESIND 1.132346 1.318771 0.86 0.391 -1.452398 3.71709 
INDSALES 2.23846 14.66691 0.15 0.879 -26.50816 30.98508 
SALESCAP -.5214166 .5546225 -0.94 0.347 -1.608457 .5656236 
SALESVAR -2.13e-09 1.39e-09 -1.53 0.125 -4.86e-09 5.95e-10 
GENERATION -.0028721 .0084859 -0.34 0.735 -.0195042 .01376 
ENTITY .1415447 .0749981 1.89 0.059 -.0054488 .2885383 
POPDENSITY .0018209 .0037508 0.49 0.627 -.0055307 .0091724 
INTENSITY .0096445 .0043253 2.23 0.026 .0011671 .0181218 
HYDRO .0440879 .0113182 3.90 0.000 .0219047 .0662711 
CHOICE -2.396752 1.927866 -1.24 0.214 -6.1753 1.381797 
GAS -.6932248 1.537094 -0.45 0.652 -3.705873 2.319424 
ELECTED -3.414293 1.365921 -2.50 0.012 -6.09145 -.7371359 
COMMISSIONERS .3450967 .528212 0.65 0.514 -.6901798 1.380373 
NEWCHAIR .0759346 .9989094 0.08 0.939 -1.881892 2.033761 
TERM -.6109565 .4510709 -1.35 0.176 -1.495039 .2731262 
       
Number of 
Observations 
57   Wald chi2(15) 97.59 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
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Table C-5-2 
 
Variables Coefficients Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
DIFF 0.0991294 0.0698959 1.42 0.156 -0.037864 0.2361229 
SALESVAR -1.93E-09 9.27E-10 -2.08 0.038 -3.74E-09 -1.10E-10 
GENERATION -0.0073452 0.0196786 -0.37 0.709 -0.045914 0.0312241 
ENTITY 0.1334296 0.0474839 2.81 0.005 0.040362 0.2264963 
POPDENSITY 0.0013628 0.0011671 1.17 0.243 -0.000924 0.0036503 
INTENSITY 0.0109703 0.00264 4.16 0.000 0.005796 0.0161446 
HYDRO 0.0335849 0.0087152 3.85 0.000 0.016503 0.0506664 
CHOICE -0.9344577 0.8987477 -1.04 0.298 -2.695971 0.8270554 
GAS -0.0844339 0.673251 -0.13 0.900 -1.403982 1.235114 
ELECTED -2.5721 0.795555 -3.23 0.001 -4.131359 -1.012841 
NEWCHAIR 0.7390926 0.8737024 0.85 0.398 -0.973332 2.451518 
       
Number of 
Observations 
57   Wald chi2(11) 128.67 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
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Conditional Specification (3) 
 
Table C-6-1 
 
Variables Coefficie
nts 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
DIFF .044062 .198619 0.22 0.824 -.3452242 .4333482 
RESIND 1.437827 1.633204 0.88 0.379 -1.763193 4.638848 
INDSALES -17.76044 18.1503 -0.98 0.328 -53.33455 17.81367 
SALESCAP -.1311296 .473712 -0.28 0.782 -1.059588 .7973293 
SALESVAR -3.74e-09 2.88e-09 -1.30 0.194 -9.38e-09 1.90e-09 
GENERATION -.0215614 .029918 -0.72 0.471 -.0801998 .037077 
ENTITY .199072 .1261008 1.58 0.114 -.048081 .446225 
POPDENSITY -.0037618 .004371 -0.86 0.390 -.0123302 .0048067 
INTENSITY .0231202 .0129773 1.78 0.075 -.0023149 .0485553 
HYDRO .0494903 .0202399 2.45 0.014 .0098208 .0891598 
CHOICE -.7033951 1.33518 -0.53 0.598 -3.320303 1.913513 
GAS .3667577 .9798589 0.37 0.708 -1.553731 2.287246 
ELECTED -4.628226 3.096277 -1.49 0.135 -10.69682 1.440366 
COMMISSIONERS -.7104964 .981655 -0.72 0.469 -2.634506 1.213513 
NEWCHAIR 1.268398 1.390393 0.91 0.362 -1.456722 3.993518 
TERM -.648517 .5018887 -1.29 0.196 -1.632201 .3351667 
MAJORITY -2.863585 1.69587 -1.69 0.091 -6.18744 .4602705 
GOVERNOR 4.094045 2.56228 1.60 0.110 -.9279323 9.116022 
       
Number of 
Observations 
57   Wald chi2(18) 400.78 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
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Table C-6-2 
 
Variables Coefficients Std. 
Err. 
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
DIFF 0.0659907 0.064417 1.02 0.306 -0.0602644 0.1922459 
SALESVAR -1.65E-09 8.26E-10 -1.99 0.046 -3.27E-09 -2.77E-11 
GENERATION -0.0030426 0.012801 -0.24 0.812 -0.0281327 0.0220475 
ENTITY 0.1005628 0.048712 2.06 0.039 0.0050885 0.1960372 
POPDENSITY 0.0009627 0.001666 0.58 0.563 -0.0023029 0.0042284 
INTENSITY 0.0119523 0.002964 4.03 0.000 0.0061419 0.0177627 
HYDRO 0.0368475 0.011105 3.32 0.001 0.0150817 0.0586132 
CHOICE -0.33507 1.343654 -0.25 0.803 -2.968583 2.298443 
GAS 0.2058946 0.843464 0.24 0.807 -1.447265 1.859055 
ELECTED -2.774527 0.902882 -3.07 0.002 -4.544145 -1.00491 
NEWCHAIR 1.27374 0.808954 1.57 0.115 -0.3117805 2.859261 
MAJORITY -1.704838 0.950412 -1.79 0.073 -3.567612 0.1579368 
GOVERNOR 1.703674 0.914217 1.86 0.062 -0.0881583 3.495507 
       
Number of 
Observations 
57   Wald chi2(13) 128.72 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
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